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TO

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS

THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE

K.G. K.P. G.C.M.G. G.C.H. G.C.B. P.C.

FIELD-MARSHAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

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PREFACE

JOMINI says, 'It is necessary to know little, but to know that little well.' The object of this work is to provide young officers with a certain number of military facts, and to draw attention to the precarious tenure on which all military success is based. They are invited to remember that 'A general who has thought much on war will be qualified for command.'[1] It is by knowing well what has been already done, that commanders can guess what their antagonists will not be prepared for. In this lies the art of war—in knowing your enemy's mode of attack, that is to say, and anticipating him, as the Prussians did the French. 'The card system fails. The man who never reflected in his life cannot be expected to reflect on an emergency. An inequality or contraction of ground puts him out, the unexpected appearance of a

[1] Jomini.

crabbed Brigadier flusters him, the whirlwind rush of a Sir Charles Napier down the line frightens him out of his senses, &c., and the unhappy field-officer is like a babe in a wood.'[1] We wish to inculcate prudence. Let us remember Napoleon's remarks at Toulon, when he stood amongst 200 dead grenadiers who fell at Fort Phuron. Turning to his brother Louis, he said: 'Learn, Louis, from this example, how absolutely necessary instruction is to those who aspire to command others.' Study may not make *all* men good generals, but it will give them resources, and a knowledge of *men*. Our desire is to spare the lives of our soldiers, and to endeavour to avoid the disasters caused by rashness. We feel that every man who loves our Gracious Majesty should heartily say (with Scipio) that 'he would rather preserve *one* citizen than slay a *thousand* enemies.'

Let our motto be, Fear no foe, but *never despise an enemy*.

R. P. ANDERSON,

Col.-Commanding H.M.'s 34th Regt.
Bengal Infantry.

MERAR, GWALIOR: 1872.

[1] Sir Henry Lawrence.

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VICTORIES AND DEFEATS.

CHAPTER I.

Of the Critical Time in Battle—Use of the Reserve—Be Sparing of your *Greatest* Efforts—Potential Energy—Need of Preparation for War—What is Gained by Discipline—Moral Courage—Steadiness *versus* Dash—The Breechloader and what came of it—Effect of Accurate Fire—Moral Effect—'Nerve'—Lessons in the pages of History, and in historical characters—Von Phull—Berthier—Napoleon—Wellington.

IT has been remarked that 'Too much courage may degenerate into fool-hardiness; too much prudence into cowardice or stupidity. It is older than Solomon that there are times to hesitate and times to dare; times to reflect and times to act; times to respect and fear impediments, and times to set them at defiance. A wise boldness may yoke Fate itself into the Chariot of Victory, if displayed at the *proper* moment.' Burke said, with truth, 'That timidity with regard to the well-being of our country is heroic virtue,' and every soldier should remember these words. As 'there is a tide in the affairs of men

Author's remarks.

that leads to fortune'; so also there is a moment in the din and uproar of battle which, taken advantage of, leads to victory. Yet, alas! how often has that auspicious moment passed unregarded? EMPIRES have declined in consequence of the oversight. From the 'golden mines of history' we have dug up a considerable quantity of the 'ore of facts' which we have melted down in the 'crucible of analysis,' and we now present the pure metal, devoid of dross, for the inspection of our readers. Napoleon said, 'In all battles a moment occurs when the bravest troops, after having made the greatest efforts, feel disposed to fly. That terror proceeds from a want of confidence in their own courage, and it only requires a slight opportunity,—a pretence,—to restore confidence to them. The great *art* is to give *rise* to the *opportunity*, and to *invent* the pretence.' Thus it was that he won the battle of Arcole with only twenty-five horsemen; seizing that moment of lassitude in the two armies to charge down on the Austrians, who, perfectly astonished, cried out, 'Here are the French cavalry,' and fled! On this wonderful success Napoleon remarks: 'It is true the *proper* moment must be seized; one moment sooner or later, that attempt would have proved useless, even though I had sent 2,000 horse.' Both armies were tired, and

Author's remarks as to facts from history.

Napoleon on panic in battle.

The battle of Arcole.

Napoleon's remarks.

the extra endurance on the part of the French, at the critical moment, finished the affair.

A lesson to soldiers to make extraordinary efforts at the *last*.

From this a lesson may be learnt by every commander—one proved by *all* battles, more or less, viz. that after hard fighting that side is generally victorious whose extraordinary efforts are made at the *last*. Both sides being tired, nothing causes the fatigued infantry soldier greater despondency than to observe his enemy still stubbornly advancing, or holding his ground against attack. Napoleon was well aware of this and said that 'the British did not know when they were beaten.' His last effort at Waterloo was made with the very object of causing this *despondency*, knowing that when it once sets in, men give way; though the plan failed against the British soldier. At Sedan, where the Emperor could not get 25,000 men for a final and desperate rush, the truth of the axiom was again painfully proved. Hence the necessity (as Colonel Hamley says) of bringing 'at a certain point of the battle-field a superior number of troops to bear upon the enemy,' viz., to have *fresh* men (even if *less* in number, we think) to dash at a tired and jaded foe. For this reason he urges the use of the Reserve at certain times. Napoleon always had his troops in selected and admirable positions, and ever ready to be hurled at

Napoleon's last effort at Waterloo.

Col. Hamley's remarks.

Napoleon's tactics.

the particular points he had previously decided he would rush upon. He said, for instance, 'I shall occupy the centre—Dresden, say; a few marches only will enable me to reach any point where my presence, or my reserves, may be required.' There is no doubt that if the Reserve is in a good position it may tend to bring a battle more rapidly to a close. For instance, an attack is made, and the Reserve is all ready; the enemy give way a little—then the fresh men dash in; while those who have been long engaged, if possible, are withdrawn, and allowed to *rest* at once. What we desire to impress on every British soldier is this, that in almost all battles there is a critical time—of but a few seconds or minutes in duration perhaps—when the contending forces are either so well matched, or when some unexpected occurrence takes place that the most trifling indecision at that moment on the part of a commander may lose him a victory, whilst a quick perception may make him a hero. How many generals have lost battles by not appreciating both 'time' and 'distance!'

The value of *time* in a battle.

Kellerman defeats the Hungarian Grenadiers.

Kellerman repulsed the Hungarian Grenadiers before the Austrian cavalry (then half a league off) could come to their assistance.

Napoleon on the value of a quarter of an hour.

Napoleon said, 'I have observed that it is always those *quarters of an hour* that decide the

fate of a battle.' Hence it was that he always had his troops so placed that they reached their intended destination at the exact time required of them. Macdougall says, 'It is not the number of troops ranged in order of battle which decides the victory, but the number which is actually put in vigorous motion by a commander.[1]

Battle of Leuthen.

At the battle of Leuthen the Prussians with 40,000 beat 60,000 Austrians, and killed and wounded about 27,000 of them. At Metaurus, B.C. 207, Nero defeated Hasdrubal by 'wheeling a brigade of his best men in the rear of the Roman army, and then fiercely charging the flank of the Spaniards and Africans.'[2] Napoleon always endeavoured to outnumber the enemy at the critical time; and at Waterloo, nothing but his mistake in using his cavalry too soon, and the stubborn opposition of the British soldier, could have prevented his gaining a victory. Those terrific charges of cavalry on the 'squares' were indeed enough to daunt the bravest men, yet the British stood firm, and then, after a grand and final effort made by Napoleon, the French lost heart, and defeat and flight ensued. When advancing to battle then, we say let every commander *spare* and *save* his men as much as pos-

How Nero defeated Hasdrubal.

Napoleon's tactics at Waterloo.

[1] Macdougall.

[2] E. S. Creasy, vol. i. p. 201.

sible; do not let them exhaust their strength to no purpose. Do not put on the 'full power' till you absolutely require it, or, in other words, if you commence the 'double,' or *pas de charge*, at such a distance as is sufficient to put your men out of breath, do not be astonished if those men are defeated. Marshal Saxe said, 'Battles are won by legs.' The 'tug' of war requires endurance and physical force, and what boys at school call 'good wind.' How often do we find the 'cock of the school' is a boy who stands a long pounding, but will not give in! and as a *general* rule find, though far from the most powerful as regards his *physique*, he yet holds his position by sheer 'pluck.' Physical force or energy held in reserve for the crisis of a battle is all in all. We want the greatest amount of 'potential energy' kept ready for the critical moment. Let us suppose 1,000 yards to represent the distance a body of men can do at full speed. If they, however, get over the distance in one-fourth the time that another body of men do it in (who move slowly), they do about sixteen times the amount of work by having done it in one quarter the time. Thus it follows that a body of men who only start from a short distance (just sufficient to get up the required 'momentum' to 'push home') will strike with a 'potential energy' equal to that already *expended* by those

Marshal Saxe's opinion.

'Potential energy.'

who came rapidly over the 1,000 yards *plus* the 'potential energy' that *still* remains to those who did that distance at the run. One body has done sixteen times the work before it has reached the other that has done only one-sixteenth, or perhaps, one-fourth of the work. It is surely quite evident, therefore, that it is like 'full power' opposed to 'quarter power.' This we opine is the real cause of men being hurled back after dashing up too rapidly to a position, and arriving at 'close quarters' with little 'potential energy' left, at the *very* moment when the *utmost* expenditure of power is absolutely demanded of them. Men who are 'winded' are easily beaten by fresh men. Take the best racer round a course at full speed, and then take a very much inferior horse round with the racer a second time, and observe the result. All the pluck of the best horse will be of little use when all the 'go' has been previously extracted from him.

A racer as an example.

We are living in most unsettled times: God grant that Great Britain may not be drawn into war. Our preparations are merely for our own security; we want peace—we *love* peace. But who knows what even a day may bring forth? Did many of our comrades in arms ever think of the possibility of the occurrence of such astound-

Advice as to the necessity to prepare for war.

ing events and changes as took place between July 15, 1870, and February 16, 1871?

Another year may find us *minus* many of our wisest and bravest of generals; and if, perchance, war does break out, it will require the whole talent of our most experienced and able commanders to cope with the scientific warriors of the other European armies. Is it not our solemn duty to our gracious Sovereign, and a sacred obligation we owe to our country—that, as soldiers, we should study war?

Lessons from 'Sedan,' 'Metz,' and 'Woerth.'

A catalogue of German triumphs.

What might not have been averted had the French Emperor been better prepared in July 1870? The occurrences at 'Sedan,' 'Metz,' and 'Woerth,' are sad and mournful lessons for us. In 180 days it has been calculated that the Prussians were in 146 engagements and seventeen great battles; twenty-six fortresses were taken; 11,650 officers and 363,000 rank and file made prisoners, and 6,700 guns and 120 eagles or standards captured. In short, on an average, the Prussians took sixty-five officers and some 2,070 men per day.[1]

The vast preparations of all the great European powers.

When men urge us to rest quiet whilst our neighbours are making such vast preparations, and whilst all the workshops of Europe are turning

[1] Extract from a Berlin paper, from a Prussian Correspondent, dated March 13, 1871.

out all sorts of deadly weapons, we must stop our ears and remember what Hermocrates said to the people of Syracuse: viz. 'They are coming against us with a belief that we shall offer no resistance. Be persuaded, therefore, to show boldness, to get ready resources for the war, and to think—*every one of you*—that contempt for your assailants is best shown by bravery of deeds.' We should not be true British soldiers did we doubt the result if war is forced upon us, yet if we now neglect the *means*, we cannot wonder if the results are mournful or unfortunate. The writer has seen more than one city after a battle had been fought in its vicinity; seen the dead bodies in the streets; seen the poor inhabitants—plundered and ill-treated by their own countrymen, as well as by thievish followers of an army, who make their way through 'safe-guards,' 'patrols,' and all the checks that enlightened commanders interposed,—wringing their hands and exclaiming they were totally ruined. He has passed through the perils and horrors of the siege of Lucknow, and can well understand what took place in Paris when besieged by the Prussians; and those who can imagine what happened in Paris may have some faint idea of the feeling of the garrison of Lucknow (from June 30 till November 22, 1857) when there was

The noble advice of Hermocrates to the people of Syracuse.

Remarks on cities around which battles have been fought

The sieges of Paris and Lucknow.

not the remotest hope of our lives being spared, had the place been taken by the mutineers of the Bengal Army. These are the horrid realities of war, and every soldier should enter battle as if all depended on his own individual energy; he is a link of a chain which is only strong so long as *each* link is *sound*. He should call forth all his moral courage and fight as if for the very safety of his own fireside.

How men should therefore enter a battle.

The strongest part of a chain is its *weakest link*.

Alexander's orders were, 'The silence in the ranks must be unbroken, but when the time came for the charge, the shout and the cheer must be full of terror for the foe. Everyone to act as if the whole result of the battle depended on his own single good conduct.'[1] The Roman Legions under Varus were destroyed by the Germans under Arminius, because the Romans were too anxious to secure their own individual property, and did not, quickly, attend to the words of command. Discipline requires that a soldier should sacrifice all idea of self on such occasions; and 'moral courage' to avoid the temptation to act contrary to *duty* is as requisite on the battle-field as in all secular affairs. 'Facts illustrative of the beneficial influence of a *mental* stimulus as the only legitimate source of *muscular* activity abound everywhere, and must be familiar to every reflect-

Alexander's orders for silence.

Defeat of Varus.

What real discipline requires.

Andrew Combe on 'mental' stimulus necessary to exercise.

[1] E. S. Creasy, vol. i. p. 131.

ing mind.'[1] It is the 'moral courage' we require in the soldier, coupled with good behaviour. The extraordinary triumphs and successes of the German Army, now matters of history, were doubtless due to its splendid discipline and rigorous performance of all duties.

Why the Germans were victorious.

With reference to the memorable campaign of 1794, Alison says, 'Beginning on every side under disastrous and critical circumstances, it terminated with universal glory to the Republic. Their triumphs were generally achieved without magazines, tents, or equipments of any kind: the armies, destitute of everything, bivouacked in the most rigorous seasons equally with the mildest, and the innumerable multitudes who issued from their frontiers almost always provided for their daily wants from the country through which they passed.'[2] Who can say what may *not* yet be the glorious future for such a brave nation? What words were those spoken by Napoleon to Klenau, Lichtenstein, and other Austrian generals on the capitulation of Ulm? The greatest triumphs should indeed teach the conquerers humility: Napoleon used these words, 'Gentlemen, war has its chances. Often victorious,

The campaign of 1794.

Napoleon on the capitulation of Ulm.

[1] Andrew Combe, in his 'Mental Stimulus necessary to Exercise.'

[2] Alison's 'History of Europe,' vol. i. p. 2.

you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. This is the moment to remember that there are limits to all empires, however powerful.'

On the following day, October 21, 1805, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his navy by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a great disaster to the arms of France, sustained on the field of Leipzig.[1]

Napoleon on 'Moral Courage.'

Napoleon well understood the effect of 'moral courage,' because two days before the battle of Jena he said to a regiment of Horse Chasseurs, 'My lads, you must not fear death; when soldiers brave death they drive him into the enemy's ranks.'

No nation is so powerful as to be able to suspend all preparations for war.

There is no nation so powerful as to be able to suspend all military preparations. To do so is simply to invite an attack. The invasion of England was out of the question from the day we armed our Volunteers. There is undoubtedly a 'moral effect' in the mere knowledge that a nation is prepared for war which prevents other nations from offering battle.

A school-boy's reputation.

A brave school-boy earns his reputation as a pugilist by hard-fought encounters, but afterwards he has little trouble to hold his place simply because others, who have *seen* him fight, do not care to molest him without very substantial reasons.

A nation's.

Nations act very much

[1] Alison's 'History of Europe,' vol. vi. p. 98.

in the same manner in matters relative to war. But when we are on the subject of 'preparation for war,' let us be understood to allude to the men as well as to the weapons used in warfare. We assert that England has no need to forsake the good sound discipline which gave her such magnificent soldiers as she had at Waterloo. Let us not throw away the substance for the shadow: let British soldiers ever remember that impetuosity (except at the proper moment) tends to bring men up to the enemy out of breath and consequently at a terrible disadvantage. One really steady company, all fresh and ready, awaiting an attack, need not fear to dash at four or five times their number, if their assailants are jaded and have come from a distance at great speed. At Syracuse, 413 B.C. we read, 'All at first favoured them (i.e. the Athenians), the outwork was abandoned by its garrison, and the Athenian engineers began to dismantle it. In vain Gylippus brought up fresh troops to check the assaults; the Athenians broke and drove them back, and continued to press hotly forward in full confidence of victory. But amid the general consternation of the Syracusans and their confederates *one* body of infantry stood firm. This was a brigade of their Bœotian allies, which was posted low down the slope of Epipilæ, outside the city walls. Coolly and steadily the

England does not require to change her discipline.

Impetuosity.

What a mere company of steady men might do.

Battle at Syracuse.

The Bœotian Brigade turns the day.

Bœotian infantry formed line, and, undismayed by the current of flight around them, advanced against the advancing Athenians. This was the crisis of the battle. The Athenian van was disorganised by its own success, and yielding to the unexpected charge thus made (by troops in perfect order and of the most obstinate courage), it was driven back in confusion upon the other divisions of the army that still continued to press forward.[1]

Crisis of the battle.

French 'dash' not *safe* for the British soldier.

'Cat-like' leaps!

False ideas of 'dash.'

Instead, steadiness and a good aim.

Notwithstanding all that was written after the Crimean War, regarding the wonderful 'dash' of the French, 'of the Voltigeurs of the Guard taking the heights of Solferino at the *run*,' and of the 'cat-like leaps' of the Turcos and Zouaves, we must say we still prefer the steady old British advance. Without any invidious comparisons, or any wish to disparage the French, it behoves us to prevent 'false impressions' from entering the minds of the steady British soldier. We feel certain that such impetuosity would utterly ruin our noble army. Let us remember that the staunch old British line, in bygone days, never wavered, although equally as furiously attacked. Let us recollect, too, that a rifle-bullet fired with good aim can instantly annihilate the 'feline propensities' of any foe endeavouring to *jump* at us. The very swiftest bird or animal cannot escape from a good marksman.

[1] E. S. Creasy, vol. i. p. 97.

The only important point is to remember that your foe has a rifle also; and that the soldier must possess immense 'nerve' and 'moral courage,' so as not to miss his enemy.

Nerve necessary.

All hurry should be avoided, and there must first be perfect silence, to be followed by the loudest hurrahs and shouts when once ordered to charge. When even Englishmen have been known to imagine that our troops are not a match for the Turcos and Zouaves, it is indeed high time for us to look back and see what the brave British private has done; happily there is ample proof in the past to justify our placing the utmost confidence in our soldiers when properly led and handled. With all their heroic dash and impetuosity the brave French could not penetrate beyond the mere threshold of Hougomont. Yet Heaven knows they fought with inconceivable valour and obstinacy—indeed, they made frantic attempts to dislodge our soldiers—but to no purpose. Steady soldiers in well-chosen positions are not easily driven out; what unsteady soldiers can do if they are only determined was shown by the Turks at Eupatoria. But their defence of Silistria proves they have splendid troops amongst them; even if in the Crimea they were far from steady always. At Talavera when the French attempted to take possession of a com-

Comparison between our troops and the Turcos or Zouaves.

French at Hougomont.

Turks at Eupatoria and Silistria.

French at Talavera.

manding height on the left of the valley, they were driven back by Hill's Division. Again, when endeavouring to storm the position, on the following day, they were repulsed by the *same* division, and General Hill's force, even a *third* time, repulsed them and drove them back at the point of the bayonet. The French were equally as unsuccessful on the right when opposed to the bayonets of Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell's brigade. In the battles in the Punjáb there were many infuriated fanatics, called '*akhalees*' (i.e. immortals!), who rushed madly at our lines of infantry, but our soldiers met them with a deadly fire and sent them rolling in the dust. These men occupied somewhat the same position as the Feditori of the Florentine Army, who always engaged the enemy first, so as to encourage the rest of their troops. During the siege of Lucknow small outposts consisting of only twenty men drove back immense bodies of the Sepoy mutineers, though both sides were armed alike with the old 'Brown Bess.' The steadiness of the fire of each little garrison quite appalled the enemy. The men from hospital loaded the pieces which others discharged, and thus our fire was, to the enemy, quite inexplicable, on account of its rapidity. Some officers also used their 'sporting rifles' and 'guns' with such deadly effect as gave the rebels a wholesome

The 'Akhalees' or Immortals!

Like the Feditori of the Florentine army.

Lucknow outposts.

Rapidity of fire and its deadly effect.

dread of them in after encounters. On these occasions the contrast between the loud shouts of defiance of the mutineers and the solemn *silence* of the besieged was most marked. As the mutineers advanced, each officer and man covered his foe, and on every occasion the foremost of the enemy fell dead. Those in rear pressed on and still they went down. There was no retreating for us; the foe must be repulsed, or all would be lost. It was a mere question how *many* daring men were ready to die. The foremost fell only a very few yards off; and they came so close, in these rushes, and in such dense masses, that it was impossible to *miss* them. Here was the 'moral courage' opposed to the 'physical,' with the happiest results in favour of the former.

Rebels and our garrison compared.

'Moral' versus 'physical' courage.

The question now is whether the new breech-loading rapid-firing rifle would give a foe any advantage over our comparatively small army? Our fixed opinion is, that the British Army has gained by the introduction of the new weapons because our men can *all* be trusted in *line*. There is not the least doubt that steady firing must tell; and the object of every officer should be to impress this constantly on his men, and particularly when entering the battle-field. The Prussians at 'Sadowa' beat the Austrians mainly by the rapidity of fire of their needle-gun, but their aim too must have been

Steady firing *must* tell.

Prussians at Sadowa.

The Author writing of artillery before the war of 1870.

good to kill and wound so many. Before proceeding further on this head, we wish to record this fact, viz. that a year before the German war broke out, we stated in the 'Pioneer' newspaper that, in the event of an European war, 'it would not be improbable to see an army totally disorganised by an overwhelming artillery fire;' and our impression was founded on the inference that Prussia, seeing other Powers mad for breech-loaders, would feel that in this respect her superiority was gone, and would pay instead the greatest attention to her artillery. It is well known what splendid service her guns did during the war in France. On the return of the author of this work from furlough in February 1872, the Editor of the 'Pioneer' wrote as follows: 'Yes, your opinions regarding artillery, which were once regarded as extreme, if not extravagant, have now become truisms.' *Stultorum magister eventus.* Soldiers going up to an attack will now advance with numerous skirmishers; nor do we think that 'shoulder to shoulder' is needed for line formation till close within charging distance, because every foot of vacant space gives so much room for round shot or bullets to pass harmlessly through. Soldiers should be directed to deliver their *first* few rounds with the utmost care, and with the steadiest aim—such an aim as they would en-

Reply from the Editor of the 'Pioneer.'

The first round.

deavour to take if they were firing for a prize of great value. Imagine the effect of twenty regiments acting thus. The 'first impression' strikes the enemy with awe; despondency, taking away men's nerve, is the *certain* result of severe loss. Whenever a general can make the foe deeply feel his first onset, he has put in the thin end of the wedge that will eventually split the mass of humanity opposed to him into pieces. Create despondency by every effort imaginable; pound the enemy well with a concentrated artillery fire, at points where the *deepest impression* can be made, doing it as *early* in the action as possible, in other words, before the *spirit* of the opposite troops has risen to that excitement that seizes men, roused almost to frenzy, during the uproar of battle. Was not this the case before the attack on Magdala? Theodore's troops were struck with the profoundest awe at the previous effect of the British fire.

The moral wedge!

Where to make the impression.

Magdala an example.

At the battle of Mars-la-Tour (August 16, 1870) the Prussians were saved by 30,000 men dashing—at the critical and *proper* time—against 80,000 or 90,000 of the French. 'Establishing themselves in the enemy's quarters, and judiciously making use of every advantage offered by the configuration of the ground, they stood on the *defensive* against nearly three times their number.

Battle of Mars-la-Tour.

There they stood and battled for *eight* hours. Six times they were charged by the Imperial Guard; six times they repulsed the attack; and, pursuing the enemy in their turn, drove him from position to position. One after another, the corps of Generals Froissard, Canrobert, Decaen, Ladmirault, and the Second Division of General Failly, were forced to give way before the Prussian onslaught.'[1] Afterwards, however, when the French were massing their columns for a decisive attempt, the position of the Prussians became so critical (their men having '*suffered grievously*') that it became absolutely necessary to hurl the Dragoon Guards and Cuirassiers at the French. Then it was that 'a column of 1,900 rode against the enemy a thundering block of steel.' This was done to save time; and this splendid charge 'actually succeeded in preventing the contemplated assault of the French, till Prince Frederick Charles appeared on the field, and assumed the command. Soon after this the Hanover Corps-d'Armée fell upon the right flank of the French.' From this battle we learn that cavalry can be used with great effect even against troops armed with the new rapid-firing rifle. The boldness of the charge, probably, over-

Grand charge of Prussian cavalry which prevented French assault.

Lesson as to how cavalry can be used.

[1] *Vide* Letter from the Prussian Correspondent of the 'Times' Berlin, dated August 30, 1870.

whelmed the French with consternation. On the other hand, two fine regiments of French cuirassiers charging earlier in the campaign were totally annihilated by the Prussian Infantry; we must pause therefore ere we assert that cavalry can always be sent against steady infantry, all prepared and ready for the onslaught. The effect of steady firing enabled 30,000 Prussians to stand for hours before 80,000 or 90,000 Frenchmen. The effect of steady firing was proved over and over again at Lucknow. Individual officers and men stood for hours, each bringing down his '*man*' at almost every shot. So close did the mutineers approach, so dense were their masses, it was almost impossible to miss them; and many a bullet *must* have passed through more than one mutineer. The Author, in one attack, fired off in about three-quarters of an hour a large bag full of rifle cartridges, at men not twenty-five yards distant. The probable result can be imagined. This having been the case (in a greater or a less degree) at every outpost, we were able to judge of the dejection that soon set in amongst the rebel Sepoys. The first *impression* did it all; we shot down all the foremost men, who were doubtless the most resolute and daring in the whole army of rebels. Poor noble Fulton, himself killed by a round-shot, could hit anything, the size of a man's hand,

Two regiments of French cuirassiers annihilated.

Steady firing at Lucknow.

Mutineers in dense masses.

A hot three-quarters of an hour!

Poor Fulton.

every time at 100 yards, and the Author of this work (when unable to dislodge an enemy's marksman at distances over 120 or 150 yards) has constantly asked poor Fulton to do the needful with his sporting rifle, which he never failed to accomplish, so accurate was his aim. There were numerous splendid shots amongst the officers at the outposts. The 'Brigade Mess' garrison was composed entirely of officers. The rebels came up to within twelve yards of the wall of that outpost, and their loss was terrific in every attack they made, because they were exposed to the fire of double-rifles and guns, aimed at them by the most steady and determined soldiers. Dash, at the proper time, doubtless has done wonders; but those who hope by it alone to gain a victory, will often be sorely disappointed.

Splendid shots.

Close quarters.

'Dash,' its value.

A commander should take every pains to get the men to deliver the first few rounds with deadly effect; and this cannot occur if the firing commences from the body in line (not the skirmishers of course), at too long ranges. The Prussians generally opened fire at 200 to 300 yards, and then the effect was fearful. The skirmishers should all be the best marksmen in a corps; and there is no reason why they should not fire at even the *longest* ranges, if certain they could hit their enemy. Clouds of such skirmishers will shake the 'nerve'

Prussians commenced firing at 200 to 300 yards.

Skirmishers.

of the enemy, and prepare the way for that feeling of despondency which it should be our aim to inspire. Three murderous rounds will do more to awe the foe than 100 inflicting little loss in proportion to the large number of bullets expended. The enemy is sure to gain *confidence* when, hearing a tremendous roar of artillery and musketry, he finds nevertheless that there are few casualties in his ranks; if, on the other hand, he sees men fall on all sides he loses heart at once. And here we must remark that too much importance seems to be placed in the disposition of the forces, instead of in the *effect* of the fire. The Austrians have ever been famous for their profound respect for the 'rules of war,' and what has been the result? The Prussians adopted the more sensible view, and considered that, as the object of firing is to *kill*, they had better look to the weapon rather than to the marching and dressing.

Advantage of good aim.

An enemy gains confidence if no one is killed, or few are.

Effect of fire of the utmost importance.

Once make your enemy feel your fire, and then the 'moral effect' will instantly come into operation. The moment any hesitation is observed or partial disorder occurs, not a single instant must be lost. The foe must be well plied with rapid musketry (if too far off for a charge with the bayonet), and not allowed to recover his 'nerve,' which he assuredly will if you leave him alone—either by not advancing boldly towards him or

Make the enemy *feel* your fire.

What is to be done if you see any disorder in the ranks of the enemy.

A bold front required. Men soon recover their nerve.

ceasing your fire. Man after all *is* man—and once he loses confidence in himself or his commander, all is lost. Nerve, however, is soon recovered; so if the enemy retreats, follow him up very circumspectly. If he rallies, be quite prepared to fight him, as in the first instance: a plan impossible if your troops, by a too hasty advance, had been permitted to lose both their 'wind' and their compactness or solidity. No doubt when an enemy faces you in line, he sees all the gaps in his ranks and appreciates the effect of your fire; but it is when the retreat commences that the shots tell most. To bring about a retreat, then, should be your primary endeavour; for this purpose let your aim from the first be as accurate and deadly as you can. The firing will improve when the enemy has turned tail; because all the philosophy in the world will not inspire men to shoot as well at a foe who is facing them rifle in hand, as at the same foe dispirited and in flight.

What men see.

Necessity of taking good aim at first.

Battles won by 'moral effect.'

Examples.

Battles are won by the 'moral effect.' If not, how is it that men are made to fly off the field of battle in such numbers? How is it that one regiment may chase a whole brigade? How is it that a couple of brigades may keep a whole pursuing army in check? For the first the reason is obvious; the retiring body, having been under fire, has lost its 'nerve.' For the second it is the

same. In the third case the two brigades were probably part of the Reserve, and, having as yet formed no part of the front line, they are still in the possession of their 'presence of mind,' and, if really steady men, they are likely to hold in check a much larger body which having been in action is not so fresh as themselves. It will be well for a commander therefore to pursue fugitives with caution; because when his own troops are out of breath he may be called upon unexpectedly to fight fresh men—men who have as yet taken no share in the battle in which their side have been beaten; and who, consequently, will fight with desperation to save their retreating comrades in arms. What but want of presence of mind, and a feeling of utter hopelessness, caused the French army to lay down their arms at Sedan? They were surrounded by a belt of artillery, and could not be made to try a last effort. Yet we cannot but admire the bravery of the French under all their sad misfortunes; chiefest among which was an overwhelming artillery fire, the most terrible perhaps that any soldiers were ever exposed to and enough to shake the nerve of the bravest men in the world. Cæsar acted on the cautious mode of following up a retreating enemy. In pursuit he avoided actual collision—satisfied to follow, day by day, the enemy at a distance

To follow up with caution—and why?

Sedan.

Terrible artillery fire.

How Cæsar pursued an enemy.

of five or six miles, and to await patiently the most favourable occasion to inflict an utter defeat.[1]

Grouchy and Blucher after Ligny.

After the battle of Ligny, had Grouchy followed Blucher to Waterloo, he very probably would have found the Prussians drawn up to meet him, Wellington having prepared Blucher for a concentration at that place.

Napoleon's orders to Grouchy.

Grouchy's orders were: 'To follow up, complete their rout, and never lose sight of them.' Whether it would have been prudent (on the part of Grouchy) to have done so to the letter, is for commanders to decide, after recollecting the force at Blucher's disposal and the fact of Wellington being actually on his way to meet him.

Remarks.

Hence it was that Blucher did not hesitate to march to Waterloo, 'notwithstanding that Grouchy was descending perpendicularly on his line of communication with his base.'[2]

A chance here.

A dash here might have been fatal to Grouchy had Blucher during his retreat 'faced about' to give battle.

Moral effect on the French.

The final attack of the Prussians on the front and flank of the French army was fatal to Napoleon. The 'moral effect' of it completely disorganised the French. The defeated army was completely routed, and fled over the frontier, by the great Charleroi road, pursued by the Allies.

French dash at Quatre Bras.

As regards dash, let us

[1] 'Julius Cæsar,' by the Emperor Napoleon, vol. ii. p. 74.
[2] Hamley, p. 194.

not forget that of the French at Quatre Bras. They attacked with furious impetuosity, but were repulsed by the British bayonet; and although, trusting to their immense superiority in numbers, they came thundering down a second time, they made no impression. They were again driven back. These heroic foes made a third attempt, with redoubled fury and impetuosity, but our brave soldiers stood like a wall, and again repulsed them with the bayonet. Now during all this time the great difficulty doubtless was to restrain our men. Their blood 'was up,' but had they dashed at the French they would have lost their solidity in the midst of dense masses of the enemy, and might have been defeated. We have to thank God, therefore, that our Great Commander knowing the enemy's intention, was also quite aware that his strength consisted in keeping his men well in hand. Our army consists of men of three nations, and it is a '*mixture*' that requires to be very well '*shaken*' before it can be '*taken*'!

Too much reliance in mere *dash* is unsafe.

We have no right to flatter ourselves with the idea that 'dash' will do everything; but it is our duty, as soldiers, to extract from history whatever is really worth recollecting and to apply the same to present circumstances. 'In the rapid pages of its history (i.e. of France) will be found

Parallels in French history.

parallels to the annals of ancient greatness; to the genius of Hannibal and the splendour of Gracchus; the ambition of Cæsar and the splendour of Augustus; the triumphs of Trajan and the disasters of Julian.'[1] Yet notwithstanding all this, we must be careful not to copy any nation's mode of attack in battle, if such is not applicable to our own soldiers. Napoleon said, with great truth, 'In contemporary, as in historical facts, we may find lessons, but seldom *models*.' Louis Napoleon (vol. i. page 348) says, 'One should not merely *copy* that which has already been done, for imitations do not always produce resemblances. In fact, to copy in its details, instead of copying in its spirit, a government that is past, were to act as a general would, who finding himself on the same battle-field where Napoleon or Frederick had conquered, should think of merely repeating the same manœuvres. In reading the history of peoples, as in reading the history of battles, we should derive thence *general* principles, and not servilely limit ourselves to the following, step by step, a track which is not impressed in sand, but on more elevated ground—the interests of humanity.'

Imitation in attack to be avoided.

Louis Napoleon's remarks on reading the history of nations or of battles.

Let us then avoid the errors of our ancestors, but at the same time let us reap the advantages

Deductions to be made from the lessons of history.

[1] Alison's 'History of Europe,' vol. i. p. 2.

of the good lessons they have taught us as regards the Art of War. Let us only follow the beaten track where we can do so safely; with the option of divergence ever at our disposal, we shall be acting prudently in taking that only which, for a certainty, we know to be a better way. Reading may often mislead a man, but if we read carefully, and place the substance of our studies in well-arranged order in our minds, we shall have, as regards Military tactics, an innumerable number of crafty sleights all ready for immediate use in battle just as a wrestler uses his best sleight when he meets a powerful antagonist. To explain this better, we will give the character of General Von Phull: 'He had thoroughly studied the theory of war, and in the seclusion of a contemplative life had imbibed a clear sense of its principles. But he was ignorant of *men!* Constantly living with the departed *great*, he was not an adequate match for the existing *little;* familiar with Cæsar and Frederick, he knew little of the mode of managing public affairs or ruling mankind in real life. Hence he was *unfit* for any practical command, and held none; but, nevertheless, his forcible genius, romantic turn of mind, and noble disinterestedness, gave him a great sway with the Emperor, and rendered him the author of the

Character of General Von Phull.

plan, and in the outset, the real Commander-in-chief of the campaign.'[1]

Character of Major-General Berthier.

Let us take another character: that of Major-General Berthier, for instance, who in 1809 (in Germany) 'brought the empire to within a hair's breadth of destruction;'[2] yet being a constant companion of the Emperor, is considered the *mind* that directed, simply because 'All the orders from head-quarters emanated from his pen.'[3] This impression was afterwards dispelled by his incapacity. His mind was the essence of order,[4] 'universal in application, methodical in habit.'[5] 'The pretension of his manner,' (from constantly associating with the great Napoleon) gave him much influence. Napoleon said, 'It was quite natural; nothing is so imperious as weakness which feels itself supported by strength: *Look at women!*' What then came of all Berthier's 'method,' or his 'application'? Any Bengalee Writer has *both* to the utmost degree; yet what use would such a man be when sent to act on his own account? Every man who has lived twenty-five or thirty years in the Army, has no doubt met more than one Berthier in character.

Napoleon's opinion of him.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 3.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 307.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*

Napoleon the Great.

The disposition and character of the great Napoleon is an instructive study. What first strikes us is 'The opposite and apparently irreconcileable features of disposition to which they point.' [1]

He was 'accustomed to consider *everything* with geometrical precision, and to estimate human strength and capacity at its highest average, and calculated upon the march of his different corps as he would have done on the result of an arithmetical calculation, and was as much surprised where the one failed him as he would have been if the other had not produced the expected result.'[2]

'He could not remain a moment quiet without doing something; and if news of an exciting or disquieting kind was received, he not unfrequently poured the whole snuff out of the snuff-box into the hollow of his hand, and shovelled it at once up his nostrils.' [3] To the ladies at St. Cloud he often said to twenty in a row, 'Il fait chaud'! [4] 'He always walked about when he was dictating; the energy of his mind, and rapid succession of ideas, rendered it impossible for him to sit still. The fervour of his imagination, the vehemence of his conceptions, seemed to render him insensible to the fatigues of the moment. He

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 273.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 288.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 287.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 184.

scarcely ever wrote with his own hand. But his writing was so bad as to be almost illegible even to himself; a few letters were only given to each word, and such as were employed were, in general, wrong spelt.'[1]

'At the head of the table of the "Council of State" he was constantly cutting the chair, on which he sat, with his *penknife!*'

Yet, notwithstanding all these 'opposite and irreconcileable features,' of his disposition, the 'mental superiority' of this wonderful man appears only to perfection when he is compared with his 'admirable lieutenants.'

Napoleon's tact in finding out the value of a book.

Some men are unable to see the merits of a book: now Napoleon had a wonderful power as regards this. 'He had an incredible tact in discovering from a few pages whether there was anything worth reading in a book. His taste was for solid and well-informed writings, not amusing trifles.'[2]—No one had studied *man* more than Napoleon. What did he say of the gallant Murat? that 'he was a Paladin in the field, but in the Cabinet destitute of either decision or judgment. In battle he was perhaps the bravest man in the world; left to himself he was an imbecile without judgment. He was my right arm, but without me he was nothing.'[3] The imposing dignity of Murat (at

His opinion of the noble Murat's character and capacity.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 292. [2] *Ibid.* p. 295. [3] *Ibid.* p. 304.

the head of 18,000 or 20,000 horse) 'his incomparable seat on horseback,' 'superb costume,' 'gorgeous trappings,' etc., all took the eye of the French.

Wellington. His character.

Let us now notice another type of a great man, —Wellington. 'Capable, when the occasion required or opportunity was afforded, of the most daring enterprises, he was yet cautious and wary in his general conduct; prodigal of his own labour; regardless of his own person, he was avaricious only of the blood of his soldiers. Endowed by nature with an indomitable soul and a constitution of iron, he possessed that tenacity of purpose and indefatigable activity which are ever necessary to great achievements; prudent in council, sagacious in design, he was yet prompt and decided in action. His activity in war was unwearied; his frame capable of enduring unbounded fatigue. No general ever revolved the probable dangers of an enterprise more anxiously before undertaking it; none possessed in a higher degree the eagle eye, the arm of steel, necessary to carry it into execution. Skilfully seizing the opportunity of victory, he studiously avoided the chances of defeat; aware that a single disaster would at once endanger his prospects and strengthen his opponents. Of food and drink he took what nature, not pleasure, dictated.' [1]

[1] Alison, vol. vii. pp. 114, 115.

Napoleon and Wellington compared.

'Napoleon was covetous of glory; Wellington was impressed with *duty*. Napoleon was reckless of slaughter; Wellington was sparing of blood. Napoleon was careless of his word; Wellington was inviolable in faith.'[1]

'Duty' versus 'Glory.'

'There is not a proclamation of Napoleon to his soldiers in which glory is not mentioned, nor one in which duty is alluded to. There is not an order of Wellington to his troops in which *duty* is not inculcated, nor one in which *glory* is mentioned.'[2] It must be here remembered, however, that Napoleon was an *Emperor*, and Wellington a mere servant to the Crown. The one had untrammeled sway in power; the other was subordinate to the orders of the Government. Hence it was that Napoleon used the word 'glory,' and the other the word 'duty.'

The one had to rouse the enthusiasm of his troops by a word that acted as a charm on every Frenchman. Wellington commanded men of a different temperament, to whom 'duty' meant whatever tended to benefit our country, and add to the dignity of our nation; just as 'obedience or submission to parents, governors, or superiors, reverence and respect towards the King,' are inculcated in our youth, and impressed upon us by our parents. Consequently, all the

[1] *Ibid.* vol. xii. p. 273. [2] *Ibid.* vol. xii. p. 274.

men fully understood the power of duty, and felt its responsibility to the fullest degree. The most uneducated soldier understands his duty to his parents, and can comprehend the gratitude he owes to them—to them, and to the Government that acts the same parental part by giving him the means of subsistence, while it honours him by placing the honour of the nation in his hands to be defended, if need be, with his very life. Duty to parents.

To do one's 'duty,' then, is simply to act the part of a man of *honour* to the fullest degree. What has not been done by a single word? Cæsar quelled a mutiny by using the word 'Quirites,' instead of 'Milites.' What is duty? 'Quirites' and 'Milites.'

CHAPTER II.

The British Soldier and Sailor—The Desire to Conquer—Inventive Power in our Officers—'Dash'—The Proper Time for it—Advantage of Shaking the Enemy by Artillery—The Henry-Martini Rifle—Attacks upon Jaded Foes—Fresh Men at a Crisis—Reserves should not be always kept to the last—Quality *versus* Quantity—Forlorn Hopes 36

The object of this Analysis.

THE object of this Analysis is to adduce history as the proof in all matters herein introduced because 'History is Philosophy teaching by example.'[1]

When a dash may succeed.

When the soldiers of a well-disciplined army, like the French, rush with sudden and vehement impetuosity at troops without much intellectual acuteness, success may as often follow as not.

But sometimes dangerous.

The plan did remarkably well in Algeria; but if the same men are driven by the impetus of a false excitement upon a compact body of stanch British or German soldiers, they are pretty certain to be hurled backward like waves are shattered into foam upon a breakwater.

The true British soldier.

There is something in the British warrior that is not found to the same degree in other soldiers.

[1] Bolingbroke.

He is not stolid; he weighs danger by his own courage, having the utmost reliance in himself as an *individual*, and in his commanders. He is not easily over-excited; and his notion that he is as brave as any man of any nation is so strong that he will never give in whilst a hope of victory remains. He is a splendid sentry; no man can pass him. Orders to him are orders indeed—meant to be obeyed. He is not easily alarmed. During the siege of Lucknow a very young private in H.M.'s 102nd was on sentry when an eight-inch shell burst close to him, and threw up an immense quantity of earth. The noise was considerable, as the gun was fired from only 100 yards off. The Author, who commanded at the outpost, rushed out to see what had happened. He saw the youth standing at his post, close to where the shell had just exploded, as calmly as if nothing had occurred! On asking the man what had happened, he replied *unconcernedly*, 'I *think* a shell has *busted*, sir.' Again, two Jack tars were strolling up from the Dil-Kusha Park, (where Lord Clyde's army was then stationed) towards the Residency position at Lucknow. They passed our picquets of horse and foot (by which they were directed), and considered themselves quite safe. Suddenly a twenty-four pound shot struck the road just in

A brave man.

The type of men in the glorious British Navy.

front of them; one said to the other, 'I'm blessed, Bill, if this here channel is *properly buoyed!*' i.e., comparing the picquets to 'buoys.' Having said this, they proceeded towards the Residency as calmly as if they had been on Portsmouth Hard.

Such men are not beaten very easily.

These are but three specimens of the stuff we have throughout the Navy and Army. Rash indeed must be the foe who thinks to disturb the equanimity of such men by shouting or rushing at them.

For the simple reason, therefore, that we own such splendid, noble fellows, we should hesitate to adopt any system in force in armies the men of which are more easily excited. The Rev. T. D. Greig understood how Napoleon was defeated by Wellington. He says, 'You see in the case of the former, (Napoleon) the workings of a conviction that he ruled over battalions of enthusiasts. You perceive all the energies of his mind employed to evoke that enthusiasm, to create in the breast of his troops a thirst for that glory[1] which he knew them to be chiefly quickened by. He seems to have been aware that it was by the impetus of an assault, by the fury which grew out of a rapid onset, (in which reason scarcely had a part to play) that they would alone achieve success. Here lay his "forte," and he knew it; and so long as he con-

Rev. T. D. Greig's comparison between Napoleon and Wellington.

[1] *Vide previous* remarks on 'Glory' and 'Duty' at pp. 34, 35.

tended with mere soldiers, the flight of his eagles through almost the length and breadth of Europe and Africa was over fields strewed with the corpses of his victims. At last he became watched by a master spirit. Wellington penetrated into the heart of his antagonist, and there he discovered the mystery of his might. He coolly placed in the metaphysical balance, the minds of Britons and the minds of Frenchmen. He saw that he was the leader of a phlegmatic race, who in a mere battle of enthusiasm would be worsted: a thinking, reasoning, grave, and sober people[1] not likely to be kindled with such flames as the genius of his opponent could so easily excite; but at the same time, patient, enduring, and fraught with a dauntless energy of purpose, an energy which if it would not so brilliantly triumph, appeared incapable of understanding what it meant to yield.[2] He weighed these counter qualities, he compared their relative worth, and by a course of reasoning, brief, perhaps, but what a meaner mind could not have accomplished, save through the most elaborate process, he arrived at the conclusion that by making proper use of the material, with which he was furnished, he might not merely fling his gigantic adversary as a prey into the

[1] *Vide* remarks on 'Duty' at pp. 34, 35.

[2] *Vide* remarks at pp. 36, 37 on the British private soldier.

midst of the rocks of the ocean, but demonstrate to the remotest ages of posterity, that the native qualities of the British character were, in the battle-field, more than a match for the most chivalrous powers that ever elicited the admiration of mankind.'

Baron Bazancourt on the British soldier.

Baron Bazancourt called the British 'Those human walls which may be pierced by the heavy fire of the enemy, but never beaten down.'

The desire to conquer, etc.

Besides possessing these noble qualities, there is also in the British soldier a feeling of daring in the midst of danger, a desire to conquer never lessened by being opposed to vastly superior numbers, a determined will moreover that gives hopefulness and cheerfulness when he is surrounded by almost insurmountable difficulties. This the Author himself saw at Lucknow. Now, 'The will and the muscles must both be directed to the same end, and at the same time, otherwise the effect will be imperfect. The force exerted by strong muscles, animated by strong nervous impulse or *will*, is prodigiously greater than when the impulse is weak or discordant; and as man is made *not* to do two things at once, but to direct his whole powers to one thing at a time, he has ever excelled most when he has followed this law of his nature.'[1]

[1] Andrew Combe, in his 'Mental Stimulus necessary to Exercise.'

It is this very energy of purpose, this hopefulness amidst dangers, this reliance in their commanders, that makes the British so fit for fighting in line. In the French army the idea of 'glory,' the 'enthusiasm' etc., etc., are all supported by that further feeling of confidence that men in dense masses acquire. The British soldier has confidence in *himself*, and also in the comrade to his right and left. We opine, therefore, that the introduction of the rapid-firing rifles is an advantage to the Army that could be trusted in line even with the old Brown Bess. One good steady man now is as effective as ten or more with the old weapon. So long as an enemy cannot bring a column up to our line we need never fear the result of line opposed to line, i.e. as regards the British soldier. Amongst our officers we have much 'inventive power'; much of that 'individual intelligence' as it is termed which comes into operation whenever something *new* is required. As a single instance, we may mention that during the siege of Lucknow an eighteen-pounder at 100 yards was giving us great annoyance and we were unable to stop the fire by shells from a mortar as the range was so short. An Artillery officer at once 'cocked up' a mortar, and fired it as if it had been a howitzer.[1]

What makes the British soldier so fitted to fight 'in line.'

Confidence of men in dense masses.

The new rifles give the British the advantage.

'Inventive power' in the officers.

An example of an Artillery officer at Lucknow.

The 'Ship.'

[1] This was called 'The Ship.'

The very first shell went point-blank right into the embrazure of the eighteen-pounder, and there exploded! It is hardly necessary to add that, as far as the Author knows, the rebels did not again trouble us with that gun, at least during *that* day.

French cavalry charged by British infantry at Vimiero in 1808.

As to courage, can we ever forget how three 'weak squadrons' of British cavalry led by Colonel Taylor were charged by thrice their numbers at Vimiero, August 21, 1808; and how these horsemen, getting into an enclosure, the French cavalry stopped the only aperture of egress? Then it was that the Infantry came to the rescue of the other arm. The gallant Colonel Walker of the 50th Foot actually charged the French cavalry at the 'double.' The blockading mass gave way, and 'forth rode the liberated cavalry, striking right and left.'

This is proper 'dash.'

This is 'dash' at the *proper* time; very different to that species of dash where men rush up, with shouts, in disjointed masses without the necessary compactness, against positions where steady and yet unshaken soldiers await the onset, and are dealing out a murderous fire. More than 100,000 Rebel soldiers attacked the weak (sand-bag, etc., etc.), defences at Lucknow, but all their attacks were abortive because a merciful Providence gave the defenders hope and confidence. Yet these

At Lucknow in 1857.

mutineers were perfectly *mad* to carry the place if possible. When soldiers are made to rush up to positions, from great distances, they are then forced to attempt to do two things at the same time: hence, the 'impulse is weak' on the part of the attackers, whilst the 'nervous impulse or will is prodigiously greater' on the side where the whole muscular power is brought into play by men with unexhausted potential energy, calmly awaiting the attack. Human beings have only a certain amount of endurance. This backed by an *indomitable will* can accomplish much. Yet man, however brave, is mortal. 'The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,' and the strongest man must succumb when the physical energy is exhausted. According to the laws of Mechanics, we find that the 'potential energy of a body is the *work* which it is capable of doing in *moving* from its actual position to another position which it tends to approach.' The momentum produced is equal to the impulse exerted. Again, 'the potential energy *expended* in accelerating a body is equal to the actual energy *gained* by the body.' Surely, then, to make a man run, over great distances, is to force him to break the laws of nature as well as the laws of mechanics.

A long charge makes the impulse weak.

A human being has only limited powers of endurance.

Proved so by Mechanics.

As well might we expect a steam-engine to perform its work without steam as to expect tired and breathless men to fight. The energy of the man

is the same as the steam to the engine. What took the potential energy out of the men who attacked the great Chinese batteries on the Peiho? was it not the dashing 'breast high into mud'?

Instance of exhaustion at the Peiho.

Another instance; the Guards at Inkerman.

At Inkerman our magnificent Guards were broken, but not till they had beaten back five times their own number of the Russians. Although the valour and 'pluck' of the Guards remained undiminished, they had expended all their energy in the strenuous efforts to repulse the foe. As one huge mass of Russians was repulsed by the Guards, another dense column of fresh men strode forward to grapple for ground their countrymen had just been forced to relinquish. The 'moral courage' of the Guards never forsook them; they were simply exhausted. But when they had breathed a little, they had replenished the 'steam,' the energy that is to say, and went to work again as vigorously as ever.

Splendid moral courage of the Guards.

Another instance of exhaustion at battle of the Nile.

A remarkable instance of this kind showing the exhausted state of men occurred at the battle of the Nile. 'The first lieutenant came to Captain Ball, and informed him that the *hearts* of his men were as good as ever, but that they were so completely exhausted that they were scarcely capable of lifting an arm.' He asked, therefore, that the men might be permitted to lie down and rest. 'Sir Alexander acceded to the proposal, and the

ship's crew lay down each in the place he was stationed and slept for twenty minutes. After that they were roused, recommenced their fire, and in a few minutes the enemy surrendered.'[1] Sir Alexander, his officers and the appointed watch alone kept awake during those twenty minutes. The French ship, however, had 'ceased firing' too, during that interval, and it was afterwards ascertained that the crew equally exhausted had also slept. Imagine the result if the French could have roused themselves and continued the fire for merely a *few* minutes? But here the potential energy had been completely expended on both sides.

Another instance at Lucknow of exhaustion.

As to the effect of total prostration of the physical or potential energy, we may mention the case of a stalwart soldier of the gallant 32nd on the melancholy retreat from Chinhut, (Lucknow), who was so completely exhausted from the heat that he could not defend himself nor could he march a single step further. Out of breath, his mouth parched and full of dust, he stood, like a lion, against a tree, and was there literally hacked to pieces by half a dozen mutineers. Had that noble fellow been attacked by twenty such men, when able to use his musket, a very large number of dead would have marked the spot

The tired soldier of the 32nd Regiment.

[1] *Vide* Coleridge's 'Sir Alexander Ball.'

where he made his last stand; but alas! the lion heart had but a paralysed arm, and thus a hero fell without a struggle. When a strong man is tired and thirsty, a child may attack him with impunity.

Rapidity of movement calls for much muscular expenditure.

If men dash up 1,000 yards in a quarter the time that others take to span that distance, they have performed sixteen times the work of those who go slower. So we must not judge entirely by the distance, but by the *rapidity* of the movement, to know what portion of the 'potential energy' remains unexpended. 'If a man with a pound weight in his hand walks up hill sixteen feet he performs a certain amount of work beyond lifting his body. If he ascend to thirty-two feet, he does *twice* the work. If to a height of forty-eight feet, he does *three* times the work. Twice the velocity gives a nine-fold elevation.'[1] Hence rapidity of movement requires an immense muscular expenditure. Admitting this, how very important it is that men should be brought up 'fresh' to the point where the energy (to give the 'momentum' for the charge), is required to the fullest degree!

Examples.

It is desirable to fire during an advance.

During an advance it is often desirable to keep up a well-directed fire. This adds particularly

[1] The 'Constitution of the Universe,' in the *Fortnightly Review*, Dec. 1865.

to the confidence of the young soldiers, and gives them less opportunity to mark the casualties that occur amongst their comrades. It keeps them occupied, and prevents their minds from being affected by staring round and witnessing the horrible effect of a round shot or a shell in the ranks. It seems pretty certain that Napoleon gained many victories by realizing the advantage of always 'shaking the enemy' with a crushing fire of artillery. Thus we constantly read that he directed a large number of guns to concentrate their whole fire on certain points or positions. He knew the value of artillery in 1795, when only a very young man attached to that branch of the service. General Barras made him his second in command, and it was Napoleon who ordered up the fifty pieces of artillery from Sablons. 'The line of defence extended from the Pont Neuf, along the quays of the river, to the Pont Louis XVI.; the Place-du-Carrousel and the Louvre were filled with cannon, and the entrances of all the streets which open into the Rue St.-Honoré were strongly guarded. Above 30,000 men, under Generals Daunican and Duhoue, surrounded the little army of 6,000, who, with this powerful artillery, defended the seat of the legislature. Bonaparte allowed them to advance within twenty yards of his batteries, and then opened his fire. The insur-

Shaking the enemy important.

Napoleon quells the insurrection in Paris in 1795 by artillery.

gents stood three discharges without flinching, but ultimately retreated in disorder.'[1]

'Such was the result of the Last Insurrection of the people in the French Revolution. The insurgents, on this occasion, were not the rabble or the assassins who had long stained its history with blood; they were the flower of the citizens of Paris, comprising all that the Revolution had left that was generous, or elevated, or noble in the capital.

'They were overthrown not by the superior numbers or courage of their adversaries, but by the *terrible effect of their artillery;* by the power of military *discipline*, and the genius of the youthful conqueror, before whom all the armies of Europe were destined to fall.'[2]

Importance of artillery.

Artillery well used *must* tell, and infantry, in these days, should not be exposed to *unnecessary* loss. Guns, therefore, should cover all advances; and if a point is to be forced, that spot or portion of the enemy's position should be first assailed by fire. It is a mistake to keep artillery too much in reserve. It should be used. All soldiers mark the effects of round shot and shell far more than that of musketry fire. The splendid practice of our artillery at Goozerat (Punjáb), awed the Seiks, though they themselves worked their guns right

The Battle of Goozerat.

[1] Alison, vol. iii. pp. 241, 242. [2] *Ibid.* p. 242.

well. But one battery of the '*Company's*' European Horse Artillery dashed up to 'grape distance' of a Seik 18-pounder battery and silenced it. The rapidity of fire of the field-guns drove the Seik artillerymen away.

Our artillery should be far more numerous.

The day is not distant when artillery *must* be used enormously; in numbers far greater even than the Germans possessed in the late war. *Well* will it be for the nation that is *fully* and *duly prepared.*

The Military Art is progressive.

'The military art, like every other branch of knowledge, is *progressive.* The achievements of one age illuminate that which succeeds it, and mediocrity can, in the end, judge of what genius only could at first conceive. A school-boy now can solve a problem to which the minds of Thales and Archimedes alone were adequate in the commencement of geometry.'[1]

The Prussians knew that and acted in good time.

The Prussians knew that the military art is progressive, and acted like men with sound common sense. They paid every attention to their artillery when the other Powers of Europe were thinking entirely of the rapid-firing rifle. It is wonderful that the other Powers took no notice of the 'needle gun' (or of that style of weapon) till the astounding defeat of the Austrians at Sadowa.

Rapid-firing rifles began to be adopted after *Sadowa.*

[1] Alison, vol. v. p. 49.

Nevertheless the Author drew attention to the value of that kind of weapon after the Danish war, in which it was quite evident that the Prussian firing was so immensely superior that the Danes could not stand it. In fact the latter seemed to have been driven clean away from their defences.

Our rifle is good.

There is no doubt that we have now a far better weapon than the 'needlegun.' The Henry Martini is doubtless as near perfection as can be, so far as we at present know. But future wars will be mostly decided by artillery, and our army being small, we should possess the larger amount of guns. Instead of taking so many fine men for the Cavalry branch, we ought to utilise those powerful men by drafting them into the Artillery. It was the Seiks who taught us to bring the old 18-pounder into use as a field-gun; before that we used 9- and 12-pounders. Some of the Seik guns threw very heavy shot, and one immense piece required a whole regiment to be turned out to charge it. The range, too, of artillery is now very great, and unless we *shake* a position thoroughly in the first instance,—overcoming the enemy's guns by the superiority of our own artillery fire,—we shall find the loss will be prodigious if we attempt to take strong positions by a charge with the bayonet. Many are

Future battles will be decided by artillery.

The Seiks made us use the eighteen-pounder as a field-gun

Range too of guns so immense.

the instances in history of fine regiments wavering when compelled to charge unshaken men, in strong positions. General Laval's Division of the French at Barossa was first checked by the left wing of the British advancing and firing. After this came a brilliant charge of three companies of the Guards, and the 87th. The whole wing supported, and the affair was thus decisively ended. Here we see that the jaded men were the French; they were checked by the left wing. The fresh men of the Guards and 87th then turned the scale. This proves how much can be done by the 'moral effect' of fresh men suddenly brought up. Here a division of the French army (which required a wing of the British army to check it) is hurled back when a few new men arrive. The Guards and Highlanders at the battle of Alma advanced in a magnificent line towards the 'redoubt,' and it was not till the critical time that they were permitted to charge the foe. We are aware that no orders were given to fire till they neared the said redoubt, but doubtless there was good reason for such a precaution. As the Russians were in a strong position, it might have been considered imprudent to meet muzzle to muzzle with unloaded muskets, or what is more likely, there was no firing because our men were creeping up through

Laval's Division at Barossa.

The Guards and Highlanders at the battle of Alma.

the 'thickets' and across 'gulleys.' Under most circumstances (unless strict silence is required, as in a night attack, or when creeping up to a position under cover of trees or brushwood) it seems very advantageous to fire when advancing on the enemy. If the advance is steady, and the fire well directed, that of the enemy will gradually become unsteady and consequently less fatal. They are but men, and each casualty will have its effect, with them even as your own men get anxious when their comrades are falling fast. We advise a commander to hurry his attack on an enemy that has marched far, or is wearied by a struggle. If on the other hand his men are fresh, try to induce him to attack you; consider, in fact, that every yard you can make him march to meet you is so much in your favour, because all movement has to be done by an expenditure of the potential energy.

Advantages of a steady advance accompanied by accurate fire.

Hasten the attack on a jaded foe.

'The long and fearful excitement of battle once relaxed, leaves the toil-worn frame nerveless and exhausted, and the mind itself destitute of the energy requisite for any renewal of vigorous exertion. A bold onset made by a few resolute men on troops who have maintained even successfully a hard day's combat, is almost sure to turn the scale in favour of the new assailants.' [1]

Lieutenant-Colonel Mitchell on jaded soldiers.

[1] 'Life of Wallenstein,' by Lieut.-Col. Mitchell, p. 259.

Napoleon's tactics were 'accumulating forces in a *central point*, striking with the *whole* mass the detached wings of the enemy, separating them from each other, and compensating, by rapidity of movement, for inferiority of numbers. Most of his triumphs were achieved by the steady and skilful application of this principle.' [1]

Napoleon's tactics.

A similar system was afterwards pursued with the greatest success by Wellington, in combating the superior forces of Soult and Marmont upon the frontiers of Portugal, and by Napoleon himself around the walls of Dresden in 1813, and in the plains of Champagne in the year following. At Montenotte Napoleon broke into the centre of the Austro-Sardinian army (when it was executing a difficult manœuvre), separated the Piedmontese from the Imperialists, accumulated an overwhelming force against the latter at Dego, and routed the former when detached from their allies, at Mondovi.' [2]

Adopted by Wellington in Portugal.

Napoleon defeats the Austro-Sardinian army at Dego and Mondovi.

A commander must calculate the time that corps will take to reach their destination, and above all he must consider the exact state the men will be in on arriving. Everything is in favour of the British commander: his men in line two deep will face any foe; they care little for superior numbers; they will do anything that

Commander to calculate time, etc.

Everything in favour of the British general, but he must not *over*-tax the 'potential energy of his troops.'

[1] Alison, vol. iii. p. 312. [2] *Ibid.*

human beings can accomplish, but they must not be taxed beyond the limits of their powers of endurance. History and actual experience lead us to think that a brigade of three regiments, if attacked by a large force that had marched far, might charge in compact order and rout the superior force with ease.

The British at Sauroren, Pyrenees.

At Sauroren (Pyrenees) three companies of the British were quite sufficient to bear down a whole brigade of tired and jaded Frenchmen who had assaulted no less than four times.

Sir John Burgoyne on an attacking army.

'An attacking army during its advance must, naturally, lose many more men and be reduced to much more confusion than the one that stands firm; if, therefore, the latter advances to the charge at the *proper* moment (when the other has arrived at a *short* distance from them) and continues it with determination, the event must be certain.'[1]

Russian losses in 1828–29.

In 1828-29, out of 200,000 Russians, not 13,000 were effective when the Treaty of Adrianople was signed; and not one-tenth of that immense army ever returned to Russia. In the Peninsula, 200,000 of the enemy were either killed, wounded, or captured, against a loss of 40,000 to the British. The Russians were generally the attackers; the British, more fre-

Loss of the enemy and of the British in the Peninsula.

[1] Sir John Burgoyne.

quently, on the defensive, and assaulted by superior numbers. These two cases prove the truth of Sir John Burgoyne's remarks. Men who are jaded cannot fight long; all is then a mere matter of time, with ten to one in favour of the fresh and resolute British soldier. The Guards at Inkerman drove back five times their own number; but although the Russians brought up more men, all their columns were more or less fatigued before they reached the Guards. Men urged beyond their powers arrive in the presence of their enemies in almost a helpless state, and out of breath. Napoleon found that rapidity was all in all to his troops; but that system broke down before the British soldier, and the French dash did not save them in the last war when brought face to face with the sturdy and phlegmatic Germans.

Jaded soldiers cannot fight long.

The Guards at Inkerman.

Rapidity did not do against the British or the Germans.

Napoleon said, 'The great point is to endeavour to oblige the enemy to employ all his forces whilst we husband our own, and to induce him to attack our flanks before he perceives his mistake, for the difficulty is to force him to bring forward his reserve.' Now Napoleon trusted much to his reserve, which in reality only means fresh men for a crisis. He always had plenty of troops for this purpose, and his object was to keep his foe well occupied, till he made the sudden onset with fresh

Napoleon tried always to make an enemy bring up his reserves.

Napoleon's own reserves.

His tactics at Waterloo.

troops. But at Waterloo he found the British with Wellington waiting to receive him. Then, as he could not induce the Duke to attack his flanks, he made an onset on one flank, and then on the other, and finally dashed at the centre, but all was in vain.

Colonel Hamley on Napoleon's Reserves.

Colonel Hamley says that Napoleon had 'a strong reserve composed of chosen troops of all arms, notably of the famous Imperial Guard, and kept under the Emperor's hand for the decisive moment of the engagement.' We quite agree with the same author that Reserves should not *always* be kept till the last. We understand that the object of a Reserve is not only to keep a portion of the troops fresh and ready for a final blow, but they should often be used to *relieve* those in the fight. Napoleon always keenly watched the arrival of Reserves, as that indicates that the whole are expending potential energy. We look upon the *power* of the soldier to use his weapon, as the most important point to remember in battle. 'Victory depends less upon numbers than the concentrated quantity of force thrown against a weak point, by which the smaller army outnumbers the larger at *that* point.'[1] Napoleon, in 1814, with only 40,000 men made head against Marshal Blucher and Prince Schwartzenberg with

Reserves should not always be kept out of action.

Sir C. Napier's opinion as to what tends to victory.

Quality of troops, not quantity, most important.

[1] Sir C. Napier at Meeanee.

armies amounting to 250,000 men. At the battle of Montmirail 16,000 French drove the divisions of Sacken Yorck and Kleist (numbering 40,000 men) across the Marne. Marmont's division of 4,000 held Marshal Blucher's 20,000 in check; and Prince Schwartzenberg's 100,000 were kept in check by the divisions under Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, numbering less than 18,000 men. These facts prove that it is the quality, more than the *quantity* of troops, that is most important. The main point is to strike *hard* when you do strike, and above all to strike at the *proper* time. It matters little which part of the army actually fights; the main point is to get fresh men to the front, and to let those who are relieved rest at once. Even ten minutes' rest will benefit men who are tired; but what is very important is not to have *all* tired at the *same* time. The excitement of victorious troops will carry the men over long distances; fear often adds to the feeling of fatigue experienced by a defeated army. But desperation temporarily banishes fear. 'In the retreat from Moscow, for example, when no enemy was near, the soldiers became depressed in courage and enfeebled in body, and nearly sank to the earth through exhaustion and cold; but no sooner did the report of the Russian guns sound in their ears, or the gleam of hostile

It matters little what part of the army fights.

All must not be tired at the *same* time.

Desperation banishes fear.

Retreat from Moscow an example.

bayonets flash in their eyes, than new life seemed to pervade them, and they wielded powerfully the arms which, a few minutes before, they could hardly drag along the ground. No sooner, however, were the enemy repulsed, and the nervous stimulus which animated their muscles withdrawn, than the feebleness returned.'[1]

Caution inculcated.

Straggling pursuit dangerous.

This ought to teach a commander caution in the *pursuit* of any retreating foe. All history teems with instances of victorious troops being vanquished because men allowed to pursue in hot haste have become a rabble of individuals, without any compactness, solidity, or discipline, courting only defeat.

The Guards at Talavera.

At Talavera, the 'Guards with inconsiderate ardour,'[2] pursued the French (under Lapisse), who had 'yielded in disorder,'[2] when up came the French supports and the 'beaten troops turned.'[2] Here was a critical moment; but a defeat was prevented by Wellington, who saw the 'rash charge'[2] of the Guards, and had ordered up the 48th Regiment to their support. The Guards then rallied in rear of the 48th. 'This made the British strongest at the decisive point.'[2] At Aboukir, Sir John Moore was more prudent, be-

Sir John Moore at Aboukir.

[1] Andrew Combe, 'Mental Stimulus necessary to Exercise.'

[2] Sir W. Napier.

cause, after he had driven off the enemy with the 23rd, 28th, and four companies of the 40th Regiment, he held *in* his men to get their breath, and then, pushing forward as far as he considered wise, halted to see what was being done on his left. A pursuit should be conducted with as much care as an advance, because a clever foe may be only retreating to gain an advantage. He must be followed, therefore, with caution. Now a rash officer, on horseback, may be impressed with the idea that a position can be taken at a rush. He shouts to his men, they dash after him, and get out of breath. The enemy now meets these men with a charge, and these jaded soldiers are positively at the mercy of the foe they rashly advanced upon. Is it any addition to the glory of our nation to know that hundreds of noble fellows have been sacrificed thus for an *idea?* When we have the option of first shaking an enemy, shall we not do so, instead of making all attacks like a 'forlorn hope'? Are we to make war a still greater 'science of chance,' by pertinaciously rushing into dangers that can be avoided? Are we, in short, to try and see how far we can test the pluck of our soldiers, simply because they have so often, in calamitous circumstances, been preserved by the interposition of Providence, and by their own indomitable reso-

A pursuit to be conducted with care like an advance.

Forlorn hopes.

lution? The world only sees what is immediately brought before the eye of the public. There are many 'green-room' scenes in this portion of 'Life's Drama' that the public, generally, are not the least aware of. We ourselves know that the brilliant helmets of the knights are not of pure gold! Men who are behind the scenes see of what rough materials many gorgeous displays are made up.

'Green-room' scenes in Life's Drama.

CHAPTER III.

Generalship—Latitude given to Commanders—Over-caution contrasted with too great Contempt for an Enemy—A Rash Commander—Danger of Pressing Men or Horses—Work the Enemy's Troops and save your own—When 'Dash' is dangerous, and when it need not be feared—History should be read with Judgment—Lord Dundonald's Inventive Power.

A general who allows an enemy to escape annihilation.

IF a general has had the power to annihilate an enemy, yet allows him to escape and so reinforce our enemies in the field, what shall we think of *his* generalship? 'By a bold front Goddart marched across the continent of India, and carried everything before him. Manson—by distrusting his troops, by retreating when he ought to have advanced—drew Holkar after him, and lost his army. A few hours' stand on a single march would have saved Baillie. A three-mile movement would have saved Elphinstone, even after months of insane delusion.'[1]

Goddart's march.

Manson's retreat.

La Pena's feebleness at Barossa: Graham's vigour and wisdom.

We are told that at Barossa, 'The contemptible feebleness of La Pena furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham, whose attack

[1] Sir Henry Lawrence.

was an inspiration, rather than a resolution—so wise, so sudden, so swift, so conclusive was the execution.'[1]

Too much prudence is timidity.

True it is that 'Too much prudence may degenerate into cowardice or stupidity,' and we cannot call that 'caution' which ends in disgrace.

Macaulay's example.

Macaulay said, 'The pendulum swung furiously to the left, because it had been drawn too far to the right;' and he spoke of the human mind collectively. Thus a commander who has too much caution allows his judgment to be led astray.

Calm medium.

That calm medium in weighing a subject is what we require, and by 'weighing' we do not mean

Celerity necessary.

that a man is not to act with celerity—it is the very essence of a well-ordered mind that it is capable of arriving at *just* conclusions with the rapidity of thought. Ever ready to take *instant* advantage of every favourable opportunity, the

What Pericles said.

general should bear in mind what Pericles said, viz., 'It is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honours are gained by State and individual.'

How difficulties must be met.

Difficulties will arise, but they must be met; and every difficulty becomes the less in proportion to the resolution that is brought into operation to meet or oppose it. We never can say that a thing is utterly impossible at a certain time, so long as such has been ever done at any

[1] Napier.

previous time. It is the knowledge of history and of man that gives a general confidence. We should judge by former examples before we act one way or the other. There are generally some favourable as well as unfavourable points; we must balance them quickly — constantly bearing in mind the fact, that 'there are times to respect and fear impediments, and times to set them at defiance.' Of all professions there is none which grants a greater latitude than the soldier's. In every other the man of gigantic mind is restricted. Take the classical professor, for instance; can he lay down any meaning contrary to what is in the approved Lexicon? Now the commander of ability can make his own dictionary—he fights according to his own plan, and he translates by giving his own interpretation of his official acts. No one can dispute the rendering, as absent parties are no authorities, and eye-witnesses of intelligence have a 'gag' put upon them. History points to many a man whose name deserved to be mentioned in the room of others who reaped all the honours at the time. This grows often into despotism, and we are liable to lose thereby the services of able men, simply because we are disinclined to deprive the unworthy of that which they obtained by surreptitious means. But the impartial historian has no

What gives confidence.

Points in difficulties to be weighed.

Latitude given to commanders.

Example of the classic.

History tells us little secrets!

The historian

hands us facts across the 'bridge of Time.'

fear; he furnishes us with glaring facts, an age or so after the occurrence, till we wonder at the blindness, stupidity, or injustice of our ancestors.

Obedience.

To submit when you are conquered is hard to a brave man, but military discipline and duty often oblige a man to succumb when he is really superior. Obedience is indispensable, and every honest and loyal soldier accepts the principle.

The Impartial Recorder.

Whatever may be his disappointments *here*, he may rest assured that there is a register kept of his acts of fidelity and duty in the hands of an Impartial Recorder. That record is in safe keeping, and he will assuredly obtain his full reward.

Burke on unmerited reproach.

'These thoughts will support a mind which only exists for honour, under the burthen of temporary reproach.'[1] But whilst the historian is engaged in the difficult task of searching out the merits of commanders, he is obliged to bring to our

From over-caution and from rashness what results.

notice that some men were over-cautious, whilst others were too prone to despise their enemies. In a commander no error can be more dangerous than the latter. Over-caution may stamp a general as no hero, but it is not so likely to cause disaster as under-estimation. A commander should

Commanders to expect to meet a resolute foe.

always be prepared for a resolute opposition on the part of his enemy, and act accordingly. Such a man will not be disappointed when he

[1] Burke.

meets with a really stubborn foe; but that commander will who is so presumptuous as to imagine that the soldiers of every nation in the world will run at the first view of John Bull's bayonet. 'As long as wars are carried on by men of mere earthy mould, influenced by human feelings and passions, so long must a knowledge of human character form the first requisite for an officer.' Eugène's success in war was owing to a 'just appreciation of his adversaries, to a skilful seizure of the proper time for striking with effect, and to a careful calculation of his *own* means, compared with the obstacles he had to overcome.'[1]

Knowledge of man requisite.

Why Eugène was so successful.

Marlborough, at the battle of Blenheim (1704), watching the *impression* made on the French infantry, whose fire 'seemed to slacken,'[2] instantly charged with 8,000 horsemen at Tallard's cavalry 10,000 strong. Here 'nerve' came into operation; 'the hearts of the Frenchmen failed them and they wheeled round and spurred from the field.' This was an instance of 'calculation of his own means compared with the obstacles he had to overcome.'

Marlborough at the battle of Blenheim, 1704.

'Experience in every age has demonstrated that after the protracted excitement of a great battle the bravest soldiers become unstrung, and

After protracted efforts the bravest soldiers become unstrung.

[1] General Mitchell, 'Biographies of Eminent Soldiers.'

[2] E. S. Creasy, vol. ii. p. 191.

at such a moment the attack of a few fresh troops often produces the most extraordinary results. It is *this* which so often has chained success to the effort of a reserve in the close of an obstinately disputed day; which made Kellerman's charge at Marengo snatch victory from the grasp of the triumphant Austrians; and the onset of Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade on the flank of the 'Old Guard' at Waterloo overthrow at once the military fabric of the French Empire.'[1] Rash commanders forget that the British army has always fought well when properly led, and badly when under incapable or imprudent officers. The British soldier has the utmost confidence in a brave and sensible general, and will accomplish for such a commander anything within the power of mortals; but if a rash general leads men up to attack with a whoop and a holloo like a pack of hounds, he will bring disgrace on his army. Such a course will ruin any soldiers in the world. Such conduct leads to want of confidence, the invariable prelude to defeat. The noble British soldier obeys implicitly, but he has a right to expect all reasonable precautions, on the part of his leader. Suppose your men have been brought up at 'the double,' from a great distance, what good has their hurrah done? There

What all rash commanders seem to forget.

[1] Alison, vol. viii. pp. 170, 171.

stands the enemy! He has not bolted—it is too late to wonder why. You pour in a volley, and charge. Now comes the 'tug of war,' and in the hand-to-hand combat a puffing alderman has a poor chance with an active youth who is punching him in the ribs. He may assume an angry look, but he wants the agility to chase the scamp. At the siege of Damascus, in A.D. 633, Kaled, the Saracen, gave his soldiers excellent advice when he said, 'Look to it, for your enemies are two to one, and there is no breaking them but by *outwinding* them; hold on till evening.' His men did as directed, but when they did charge, the Christians lost so many soldiers that their commander (Werdun) adopted a stratagem with the hope of gaining a victory. He utterly failed, however, and lost his own life by falling into the very ambuscade he had prepared for the wily Saracen. No less than 50,000 Christians fell in the pursuit. The cavalry charge at Talavera was unsuccessful, because the men had to ride over ground totally unsuited for cavalry movements. After having penetrated a solid column of the enemy, they lost all compactness, and had to retire. At the battle of Auerstätt, Prince William dashed at 'Morand's infantry with no effect; the foot stood like a rock, and poured in, upon the horse, such repeated volleys as emptied many saddles.' This charge

The stout alderman and the active youth, an example.

Siege of Damascus, A.D. 633.

50,000 Christians killed in the pursuit.

Auerstätt.

Cause of failure.

was made too soon; the foot were not shaken, but remained still in perfect order, full of stubborn determination.

Battle of Hohenlinden.

At the battle of Hohenlinden, it was otherwise. When Moreau saw the enemy's confusion, he said to Ney, 'C'est le moment de charger,' and it was done accordingly, in gallant style. Near the town of Neusiedel, (Wagram, 1809), the Austrian cavalry attacked Arighi's and Grouchy's cuirassiers, but were routed. Up came Hohenzollern's cuirassiers and forced Grouchy back. Montburn 'then charged the victorious Austrians, when blown by their rapid advance, with decisive effect.'[1]

Battle of Wagram, 180

Chillianwalla.

At the battle of Chillianwalla (Punjáb campaign), in the centre brigade (Pennicuik's) one British regiment lost thirteen officers and 500 men killed and wounded out of 1,100 men. This was occasioned by a too rapid advance upon a strong battery, and by meeting the enemy's infantry *unshaken* in the first instance by our artillery. At the battle of Leipsic, 1813, Kellerman, at the head of 6,000 horse, galloped over the field with furious impetuosity. Even three regiments of Prussian cuirassiers, who tried to arrest his progress, were 'overwhelmed and driven back.' At that critical moment six regiments of Austrian cuirassiers bore down upon the

Battle of Leipsic, 1813. Magnificent cavalry charges.

[1] Alison, vol. viii. p. 166.

French, now somewhat disordered in the rapid pursuit of the Prussian cavalry, and drove them back in great disorder. After that, Murat charged at the head of 4,000 cuirassiers upon the flank of the allies. He routed ten light squadrons of the Russian Guard and captured no less than twenty-six guns. But at that critical moment Alexander ordered up the Red Cossacks of the Guard and the heavy cavalry of Barclay to charge the enemy's flank. These chosen cavaliers, from the banks of the Don, came with a terrific crash on the flank of the French cuirassiers, routed them and retook twenty-four guns. Alison tells us that this occurred 'when the horses of the French cuirassiers were *blown* by their previous efforts.'

Here we have several instances of the danger of pressing either men or horses. Every officer will do well to stamp such historical facts in his memory, and ever to bear in mind what Napoleon said: 'To ensure victories we must think only of defeats;' and again: 'Victory will be on that side which can produce the last reserve,'[1] i.e. the freshest troops at the critical time. In all battles it is important to remember also Napoleon's advice,—to work the enemy's troops, and save your own.

[1] Macdougall.

Battle of Valmy, 1792

At the battle of Valmy, 1792, when the Prussians advanced the French artillerymen gave way, but Kellerman called out, 'Let the enemy close up, and then charge with the bayonet.'[1] The French shouted, 'Vive la nation!' and the Prussians became irresolute. The King of Prussia led his men on again and again, but they were always driven back, and at night the French were victors on the heights of Valmy. Here the French stood at first, and awaited the attacks. The Prussians, having had harder work, became exhausted, and were finally forced to retire. A similar case was that of the Bœotians at Syracuse, who hurled back the Athenians by their steady advance at the proper moment. The Huns under Attila attacked the Roman line (which was standing on 'high ground'), and were repulsed. The British are generally out-numbered, and then only will other troops attack ours. Ever bear in mind that an attack upon you simply means expenditure of physical energy, so that the balance of fighting power of the attackers may almost be made a matter of calculation. Every mile marched by your enemy, and every hour he has been at work should be carefully counted and considered. At Leipsic the jaded squadrons of Kellerman's cavalry might have been beaten by a far less

Remarks on the battle of Valmy.

The Huns under Attila charge the Romans.

What an attack really means.

The Austrians at Leipsic could have done with less cavalry against Kellerman.

[1] E. S. Creasy, vol. ii. p 295.

number of the Austrian cuirassiers; because, no one is more helpless than a trooper on a tired horse if attacked by another horseman freshly mounted—and what holds for one is true for the whole 6,000.

At Austerlitz, 1805, 2,000 Russian cuirassiers, led by Constantine in person, dashed at the flank of the divisions of Vandamme (of Soult's corps), and actually trampled three battalions of the French under foot. Napoleon seeing this, ordered the cavalry of the Guard to 'arrest this terrible body of horse. The Russians had hardly time to reform their squadrons (after their glorious success) when this fierce enemy was upon them. They were broken and driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline upon being reinforced by the superb regiment of Chevalier Guards, they returned to the charge. Both Imperial Guards met in full career; the shock was terrible, and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued and lasted five minutes, and the French horse were driven back; but as the Russian Chevalier Guards were pursuing with loud shouts and in some disorder, they were in their turn assailed in flank by the Grenadiers-à-cheval, under Bessières in

Austerlitz, 1805.

Tremendous charges of cavalry.

person. This powerful reserve, composed of the flower of the Guards, mounted on superb horses, immediately engaged in a desperate contest with Constantine's Chevalier Guards. They fought with invincible firmness, but at length the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French.'[1]

This glorious battle, described in such telling language by Alison, is one that should never be forgotten by soldiers. Horses even pressed too far must succumb; how then can it be otherwise with man, even in the best state of training? Bowing respectfully to the opinion of Alison, as to the 'enthusiastic valour of the French,' we think the defeat of the Russian Chevalier Guards is to be attributed simply to their having just before 'pursued with loud shouts;' and the arrival of the Grenadiers-à-cheval (a body of fresh horses and men) enabled the French to fight with every advantage on their side, in addition to their own prestige as the 'flower of the Guards.'

The Author's idea of the *cause* of the defeat of the Russian Chevalier Guards.

A very remarkable instance of the fighting power left in exhausted men is given in the account of the battle of El-Boden, September 25, 1811. The French cavalry made a raid and captured two six-pounder guns, when Major Ridge of the 5th Regiment brought his men to the

Battle of El-Boden, 1811.

French cavalry charged by British infantry.

[1] Alison, vol. vi. pp. 129, 130.

'charge,' and actually attacking the French cavalry with 'fixed bayonets,' retook the guns. This gallant officer, after making the recaptured guns over to the artillery, calmly resumed his place in the line. This was the critical moment—he feared no retaliation, for the French were tired. Their first dash at the guns had 'winded' their horses, and they were unable to get up the momentum sufficient to enable them to charge steady infantry. Again, at Fuentes-d'Onore, on May 5, 1811, the French cavalry had surrounded Captain Ramsay's troop of horse artillery. Something, as proved by the result, had 'taken it out' of the French horses; either the distance they had travelled, or the great speed required to be able to surround horse artillery. Every one thought that the whole troop had been taken prisoners, but, to the astonishment of the beholders, the noble Ramsay 'burst forth at the head of his battery, his horses breathing fire, and stretching like greyhounds along the plain—his guns bounding like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners, in close and compact order, covering the rear.' The French horses were, doubtless, winded, so the cavalry did not pursue.

Fuentes-d'Onore, 1811. British artillery charge French cavalry.

Ramsay's noble troops escape.

These two remarkable incidents, which occurred at El-Boden and Fuentes-d'Onore respectively, surely prove that British officers know when

'dash' is dangerous, and when it need not be feared? Why are horses 'weighted' at races? Is it not to make one carry a certain load more than the other, so that the extra pounds may make them nearly equal—i.e. by demanding extra potential exertion from the 'weighted' animal? Napoleon said, 'The Frenchman does not like to be attacked.' He had to 'get up the steam'—the 'nerve' that gives the impetus to the muscles. At the battle of Alma, the French under Bosquet were somewhat exhausted by their rapid movement up the steep to gain the plateau. We can safely infer this from the fact that when they joined Canrobert's force, near a 'tower,' and there met the Russian infantry, they were driven back again and again; nor was the position carried till sheer persistence made the French victorious. The Russians, being fresh at starting, speedily repulsed the French. Doubtless the French made their first rushes with their characteristic impetuosity, yet they failed as they were partially jaded, and were attacking a stubborn foe awaiting the onset. The French, however, possessed endurance, in this instance, to a greater degree than the Russians, and so were successful. Seeing that the Russians repulsed the first determined onslaughts of the French, they were wanting in dash at the critical moment, or they would have driven

Why a racer weighted, an example.

Napoleon on the French soldiers.

The French at the battle of the Alma.

What the Russians did first.

Want of dash.

the French further back while it was feasible. If the Russians could repulse the first attacks, they could also have followed the French up sharply, whereas they waited for successive charges, and allowed the enemy to retire to gain breath and renewed energy. Here was a palpable want of 'élan,' or dash. It was on *this* occasion exactly as it had been over and over again, when the Russians were opposed to Schamyl the Circassian. They rested on their oars the moment they were victorious, quite forgetful that a repulsed enemy generally retires to rally and re-form, meaning, with fresh breath, strength, and compactness, to return again with redoubled vehemence to the assault. Just as any mortal who has failed in anything, will, if he again attempts it, profit by the experience of the first failure in his second effort to accomplish his ends or desires, and will bring more 'nerve' and resolution to the task.

Want of *élan* at a critical moment.

Supineness or apathy of the Russians.

When a person fails, what he generally does.

At Mars-la-Tour the Prussians, with 37,000 resisted 80,000 or 90,000 French: and why did not the latter succeed? Because the French being 'met with *composure* eventually succumbed.'[1] The fact is that the Prussians not only were '*composed*,' but, on this occasion as well as during the whole war, reserved their fire till the French came up to 200, or at the utmost 300, yards. A hail of

Battle of Mars-la-Tour.

The fire of the Prussians was reserved.

[1] Berlin Correspondent of the 'Times,' August 30, 1870.

bullets all from well-aimed rifles at those short distances, cannot fail to have a tremendous and crushing effect on the bravest soldiers in the world, whoever they may be. How different were the Prussians in the days of Napoleon! In those days they had not the needlegun, and charges with the bayonet enabled the French to do wonders; now such rushes are out of date.

No needlegun in the days of Napoleon.

German army in Napoleon's day.

As regards the Prussians in olden days, 'The whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer-boy, were alike ignorant of the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoleon had introduced into modern war, by the union of consummate skill at head-quarters with enormous masses, and a vast application of physical force, combining the talent of Cæsar or Turenne with the fierceness of the sweep of Scythian warfare. Applying then to the present the experience of the past age (the usual error of second-rate men), they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them, and advanced as against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in the presence of Napoleon and 150,000 effective men.'[1]

The grand mistake of the French.

The French in the last war 'applied the experience of the past to the present,' without any abatement or qualification, which Alison terms

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 254.

'the error of second-rate men.' The Prussians did the very opposite, and therefore they were victorious. The French beat the Austrians at Solferino, and continued to believe that they were able to try the same 'Scythian sweep' against the Prussians, notwithstanding that '*Sadowa*' had been fought and the Austrians defeated by the needlegun. Here was the grand, but unfortunate mistake that the French made. The Prussians were well aware of the French tactics, and adopted the proper mode of repelling such vehement rushes by calmly reserving their fire and then crushing the head of all the French columns—first by a tremendous storm of shot and shell, followed by a hail of bullets. Had the Emperor added to the number and weight of his artillery, and adopted another system of attack, the results might have been totally different.

Prussians aware of French tactics.

The Emperor had better have looked to his artillery.

It is curious to remember here that the cry of the French in the last war was exactly the same as in 1792, 'Nous sommes trahis.' But then it was from quite another cause. And now who can say that the Germans are doing quite right in educating their army to such a superlative degree? In 1792, 'The Prussians conceived the utmost contempt for their opponents, and called them "the army of lawyers."'[1] The 'peril of soldiers

Cry of the French in 1792

In 1792 the Prussians despised the French.

1. Vide Alison, vol. ii.

Soldier politicians dangerous.

becoming politicians'[1] before they have much stability of mind by proportionate moral training, is worth the consideration of the rulers of armies. There is an old saying, that 'It takes two generations to make a *gentleman*;' whilst circumstances, self-conceit, self-interest, or public fanaticism may tend in a single day to cause a revolution in the minds of large masses of men, who, without nobility of thought and sentiment, become imbued with a sudden idea (however wrong) that they have further claims on a just government. Misfortunes may come, but there is warning in the examples of history; and past events should be read with care, lest we apply too indiscriminately —without qualification or abatement—to the present that which was done in former days. 'In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations, any more than to individuals. *No misfortunes are irremediable* as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken, no *calamities irreparable*, but those which undermine their virtue.'[2] Let the rulers of France and Germany weigh these words *well*.

History to be read with judgment and care.

What resulted from the battle of Jena.

Dr. Russell, on the Crimean War, at page 141

[1] *Vide* Alison, vol. ii. [2] *Ibid.*

says, with reference to the battle of Alma: 'In fact, the advance of the Guards, though magnificent, was somewhat slow.' But we find further on that this very slowness made them steady, for at page 144 he adds: 'The Coldstreams and Grenadiers never lost their beautiful regularity and order.' Then the pressing appeal of the French (mentioned at page 146) by "Milord, je vous prie pour l'amour de Dieu, venez aux Français; nous sommes massacrés,' shows that the enemy had still a most formidable body to hurl at either the French or the British; and from this it will be seen that the solidity of the Guards had a wonderful effect on the French. If it be argued that the English attack did not take place till the Russian left was completely turned, how are we to account for this piteous appeal made by a French staff officer to a British general? These words prove that the French were in a dangerous position at the time alluded to. It is one thing to rush up to a mass of men, and quite another to hold your own when there! The British soldier is led so as to *take* and to *hold*. A rapid advance is often absolutely necessary; men are saved by it, as they span the space under fire more quickly, but the proper time for it will rest with the commander. Often the ordinary rules are set aside, and something quite novel is

Advance of the Guards at Alma.

Appeal of a French staff officer.

English did not delay the attack.

One thing to rush up to a position, and another to hold it.

Times for rapidity of march.

Pace at Marathon.

introduced with the happiest results, as, for instance, at Marathon: 'Instead of advancing at the usual slow pace of the phalanx, Miltiades brought his men on at the *run*.'[1] Nevertheless, the slow advance, in a calm and deliberate manner, has a wonderful moral effect on troops awaiting the onset. Men naturally get anxious when they observe determination in the very tramp or step of the foes coming nearer and nearer. The Life of Lord Dundonald gives one a good idea of the British character, and proves not only what a commander *can* do, but tells us the description of material he has at his disposal. That great man was full of the 'inventive power.' He turned ship's carpenter, and worked at mending pumps. He attacked the 'Gamo' frigate of thirty-two guns and 319 men with the little 'Speedy' of fourteen 4-pounders. Such a man never waited for the time to arrive when he should be able to act according to precedent or established custom! In this naval engagement he says: 'Knowing that the final struggle would be a desperate one, and calculating on the superstitious wonder which forms an element in the Spanish character, a portion of the crew were ordered to blacken their faces, and what with this and the excitement of combat, more ferocious-looking objects could

Lord Dundonald.

How Lord Dundonald took the Spanish frigate 'Gamo.'

[1] E. S. Creasy, vol. i. p. 42.

scarcely be imagined. The fellows thus disguised were directed to 'board' by the head, and the effect produced was precisely that calculated on. The greater portion of the Spaniard crew was prepared to repel boarders in that direction, but stood for a few moments as if transfixed to the deck by the apparition of so many diabolical figures emerging from the white smoke of the bow guns; whilst our other men who boarded by the waist, rushed on them from behind before they could recover from the surprise at the unexpected phenomenon!' Having lost such a large ship when opposed to the little 'Speedy,' the commander asked Lord Dundonald for a certificate that he had done his duty, when he got a document stating that 'his conduct was *worthy* of a *Don!*'

During the sixth crusade the French attack the Tartars and are defeated.

During the 6th Crusade Joannice ordered the Tartar horsemen to provoke the Franks. The Barons were aware of the danger and forbad the Crusaders to fight, but the French considered 'that prudence deprived valour of its lustre,' so Count Blois charged the enemy, and pursued for two leagues, when the Tartars suddenly rallied, and forced back the Crusaders in disorder.

At the battle of Hastings (1066) Duke

At the battle of Hastings, 1066, 'The Normans by little and little fled, the English follow-

William defeats the English.

ing them.'[1] The English thought and cried out 'The men of France fled and would never return;' but at that moment Duke William rode at the English with a thousand horsemen, and broke and scattered them. At the battle of Blenheim, when the Irish in foreign pay drove back the Hanoverians, under the Prince of Holstein Beck, 'their ardour in pursuit led them too far;'[2] at this the critical moment Marlborough swooped down on them with some squadrons of British cavalry, and 'the Irish reeled back' discomfited.

At the battle of Blenheim (1704) Marlborough defeats the Irish.

Battle of Pultawa, 1709.

At Pultawa in 1709, Charles XII. attacked the Russians in their fortifications, because 'he deemed his dignity required that he himself should be the assailant,'[3] but whilst his men raised the shout of victory, the Russians hurled them back.

French, English, and Irish rashness.

The French under Count Blois; the English at the battle of Hastings, and the Irish at Blenheim, were all defeated by their rashness, or 'dash' at the wrong time. The French, considering that 'prudence deprived valour of its lustre,' committed a rash act; whilst Charles XII. attacked the Russians at Pultawa because he considered that 'his *dignity* required it.' If the French idea of prudence be true, we might as

Why Charles XII. attacked.

Why the French did.

[1] E. S. Creasy, vol. ii. p. 46. [2] *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 191.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 217.

well put our swords to the grindstone every day to keep them clean, instead of merely polishing them. If we ground our swords every day, there soon would be no blade left. Now, prudence is the 'polish' to our courage or valour; it tends to add to its 'lustre,' whilst it does not wear away its metal. The example of Charles the XII. has been, unfortunately, acted upon far too often since 1709, and with that saddest of results—immense loss of life. In battle, to think of one's 'dignity' in that sense, is to despise *men*.

Whatprudence is—an example.

The example of Charles XII. has been followed.

CHAPTER IV.

The Conservancy of Force or Energy—Heat Convertible into Force—The Replenishment of Vital Heat—Cæsar on Rashness—Composition of the Roman Armies—Reliefs of Fresh Troops Important—Necessity for one Supreme Directing Mind—Instance in German Army in late War—No Parallel in History to these German Successes—Obedience Imperative—The Important Moments in Battle—The One Tug More—Anything Unusual is Perplexing—Comparative Value of Numbers—Night Attacks.

Pluck useless to jaded men.

THESE gleanings from history are meant to prove that all the 'pluck' in the world is of no use when men are exhausted. You might, as reasonably, expect a sick giant to rise and fight, as to imagine that a tired soldier can combat a foe. In the number of 'Once a Week' dated November 1, 1866, there is a splendid article on the 'Conservancy of Force or Energy,' a subject we have never before seen handled on such scientific grounds. We have ever considered the human body a mere 'thermic machine;' deprive it of food which acts as fuel, or take away its breathing power, and it is a 'steam-engine' with the fire out. We read that there is a 'certain *definite* amount of force distributed throughout nature, which is *invariable* in

'Conservancy of force or energy.'

amount, and which can be converted over and over again from one form to another.' 'Force,' we are told, 'is *never lost*, but changed;' and again, 'When the *moving* body is arrested, the motion of the mass is transferred to the motion of the molecules, or particles composing it; and this molecular motion is *heat*.' Again, 'As motion or force is convertible into *heat*, so conversely is heat convertible into force.'

Examples of how men are defeated.

Now when a moving mass of humanity is suddenly arrested by 'nerve:' by superior nerve, that is to say, and potential energy on the part of a stubborn enemy, the 'nerves' of the multitude in motion suffer; despondency sets in, and like a flash of lightning this despondency is transferred to the individuals who are the 'molecules,' or 'particles,' of the mass. Hence it is that overspent masses, if suddenly arrested when in motion, are defeated. Now molecular motion is heat; and heat is convertible into force. Therefore, so long as the men have heat, they have force; expend that heat, and *where* is the force or the potential energy?

Molecular motion is *heat*.

The destruction of the world by fire reasonable.

In a number of the 'Cornhill,' we read, 'If the motion of the earth (revolving at the rate of 63,000 miles an hour) were suddenly arrested, an amount of heat would be developed sufficient to heat a globe of lead, the size of the world, to a

Intense heat generated by friction.

temperature of 690,000 degrees, an intensity of heat 200 times as great as that required to melt iron,' and the writer adds, 'The very motion of the earth embraces the conditions of the fulfilment of the prophecy: that the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also, and the works therein be burned up.'

The replenishment of vital heat.

That is to say, on the fiat from Omnipotence —at the mere word 'Stop' to the celestial bodies, and to the globe we live in—all the world would be consumed. So when men rush at others they expend by energy or force a certain quantity of the fire or vital heat of the 'thermic machine,' and, by an established law of nature, man must replenish that *heat* before he can again work with effect. As great rapidity of movement uses up that heat, so the force, or energy, of the human being or the animal is also expended.

Argument supported by the blood theory.

'The blood is the agency by which the oxygen gas of the atmosphere is absorbed in the lungs, and which coming in contact with the carbonaceous matters of the system (previously prepared in the liver), unites with them, forming carbonic acid gas, and generating the *heat* of the animal system. The blood carries the carbonic acid gas to the lungs, where it is expelled at the same time that the oxygen gas is taken in.' Now as oxygen is pumped out in running, a man must get in a

further supply before he can do his work, or get up the heat or force again. Then there is the yellow substance floating in the blood, called 'fibrine,' which substance is the very basis of muscle; deprive the body of oxygen and you affect the muscles at once through the blood. This is what happens when a man's breath is too suddenly and lavishly exhausted.

The 'fibrine' of the blood.

'Every operation of the muscles, or nerves, involves the disintegration and death of a certain part of the substance. We cannot lift a finger without a change in certain of the atoms which compose the muscles executing the movement and in those of the nerves conveying the stimulus which directed them to contract. The loss then of the body and of each part being in relation to its activity, a second process is necessary to replace the loss, i.e., the reparative process performed by the nutritive system.'[1]

What any movement of a muscle causes.

Let us then recollect this, whenever we are called to march men to battle.

'An advance in action in a long thin line formation requires that phlegmatic kind of courage which we believe to be peculiarly inherent in the British soldier; to preserve the proper order, the

The British army in line, by Sir J. Burgoyne.

[1] Physical education by Archld Maclibaaren, i. e. 'Oxford Gymnasium.'

progress must be *slow* till the *last closing rush.*'[1]

The Golden Mean by Horace.

'Whoever loves the golden mean is secure from the sordidness of an antiquated cell and is too prudent to have a palace that might open him to envy. A well provided breast hopes in adversity and fears in prosperity.'[2] A commander who fears in his prosperity will not pursue too rashly in the field; another meeting a stubborn foe gains hope from the very difficulty, and this with the fortitude that he possesses in his heart braces him up to redoubled efforts.

It must be noted here that the remarks as regards 'dash,' are meant to allude to British troops opposed to soldiers of other European nations. Against the wild tribes, or natives of India generally, a little extra risk may sometimes be incurred with safety.

French tactics not suitable against the Germans.

The French made the great mistake of bringing the tactics they practised in Algeria into the field against the Germans. All their heroic dash and dauntless impetuosity were as nothing, when face to face with the phlegmatic Prussians. It was their Algerian fighting and the success at Solferino which spoilt their splendid army. They were behind the age. As the system of war is

[1] Sir John Burgoyne, Bart., G.C.B.
[2] 'Horace,' Ode x. book 2.

one perpetual change, we must keep our eyes wide open, and also our ears, for it is 'the early bird that gets the worm.'

Heavy odds at Plassy.

At the battle of Plassy, Clive, with only 1,000 British soldiers and 2,000 native Sepoys, beat nearly 68,000 men under Suraj-o-Dowlah, who had also fifty 'pieces of ordnance of the largest size.'

Napoleon's 'hazardous' manœuvre at the battle of Friedland.

Napoleon won the battle of Friedland by 'a hazardous manœuvre,' directing a portion of his force to hold a peninsula against the entire Russian line. He admitted that that was 'one of the most anxious periods of his life.'

We all know that 'omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs,' nor can battles be won without loss of life. Yet we need not 'carry all our eggs in one basket,' as we should do if we were rash or imprudent.

Cæsar's rebuke for rashness.'

At Chapter lii. in Book vii. of Cæsar, we find how the rashness of his soldiers was rebuked. 'He censured their licentiousness and arrogance, because they thought that they knew more than their general concerning victory and the issue of actions, and said that he required in his soldiers forbearance and self-command, not less than valour and magnanimity.' It was the Tenth Legion, as a reserve, that checked the Gauls, who were in pursuit of Cæsar's men.

The attack on Pompey's camp.

In the assault on Pompey's camp, Cæsar ordered his

soldiers to advance but really to await the attack. As Pompey's men did not come out to meet them, Cæsar's soldiers at once repressed their speed and halted. Then after a short respite (by command of Cæsar), they drew their swords and went forward.[1] Here, when Pompey's cavalry had defeated that of Cæsar, the fourth line of Cæsar's fresh troops drove back Pompey's cavalry in their turn.

Napoleon's body-guard at the battle of Eylau, 1807.

At Eylau, in 1807, Napoleon arrested the advance of a Russian division with his body-guard of only 100 men; and in the same action the

The Cossacks defeat and destroy the cuirassiers.

French cuirassiers were defeated by the Cossacks under Platoff. 'Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge; their long lances in rest; their blood-horses at speed. In an instant the French cuirassiers were broken, pierced through and scattered. Retreat was impossible, through the again-closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit; while 530 Cossacks returned, each cased in the shining armour he had stripped from the dead body of an opponent. The cause of

The cause.

the defeat was that the French pursued too hastily; the cuirassiers were carried too far, and the wind taken out of the horses. Here a dreadful punishment clearly resulted from want of

[1] Chaps. xcii. xciii.

common prudence and the knowledge of a horse's power of endurance.

At Maida, 1806, Reynier, with 7,500 French, rushed forward with 'fixed bayonets' to meet the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 81st, and 85th Regiments, who *awaited* the attack. 'The bayonets literally crossed,' but here, 'at that appalling moment French enthusiasm sunk before British intrepidity.'[1] Here no reserve seems to have been near at hand, or an advance, just then, of fresh troops might have changed the state of affairs.

Battle of Maida, 1806.

Manlius won a battle by holding back part of the reserve, viz. the 'Triarii' and the 'Rorarii,' and sending on the 'Accensi.' A Roman army was composed as follows. In the first division were the 'Hastati,' consisting of two-thirds heavy-armed soldiers and one-third light troops. The second part, called the 'Principes,' contained the flower of the army, all heavy-armed men, in the vigour of their age. Then came the Reserve, consisting of one-third *veteran* troops—heavy-armed soldiers (the 'Triarii'); one-third of light troops (the 'Rorarii'), and the remainder were the 'Accensi,' or supernumeraries to fill the places of the fallen. The plan of having the strongest men in the second line was excellent,

How Manlius acted.

Composition of the Roman armies.

An excellent arrangement.

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 209.

as it enabled the 'Hastati' to ply the enemy, and tire him out before the flower of the army was engaged.

The work should fall equally on the soldiers.

It is necessary to make the work fall as equally as possible on all the troops, and not to keep a huge number merely to look on. Reliefs of fresh men are most important. Life is as dear to one man as it is to another, and the soldier, naturally looking to his commander for fair play, expects that the burthen of the day shall be equally shared by all. Yet military discipline and duty will carry the brave soldier to the very cannon's mouth; and everyone advances cheerfully, knowing that perfect obedience is indispensable. A soldier's duty is clear, he obeys without question, never asking who is his superior; content to know that the commander he serves is placed by the Government in that responsible position. Macaulay says with truth, 'Experience has fully proved that in war every operation, from the greatest to the smallest, ought to be under the absolute direction of *one* mind, and that every subordinate agent, in his degree, ought to obey implicitly, strenuously, and with the show of cheerfulness, orders which he disapproves, or of which the reasons are kept secret from him.' Napoleon considered the Commander-in-chief the very 'soul' of the army. The German Army has of late acted splendidly on this

How we ought to obey our commanders.

Macaulay's opinion.

The splendid discipline of the Prussian army.

principle, and with wonderful and glorious results, as we have seen. Who can read of Metz, Strasbourg, Sedan, Wissemburg, Woerth, Gravelotte, Vionvelle, and the battles around Paris, without realizing the presence and power of one directing head? Then the way in which all orders were carried out, the way that information was procured, the knowledge of the roads, of the villages, of the places to get supplies—all these things will prove how, from the lowest to the highest, every man worked cheerfully, and most 'implicitly' and 'strenuously' to do his duty. In all history it will be very difficult to find parallels to such triumphant victories. We may match the battles fought in the days of the Great Napoleon, but we shall find nothing that can equal or surpass Sedan.

No parallel in history.

'The desperate defence of Saragossa, the obstinate valour of Aspern, the enthusiastic gallantry of the Tyrol, have all parallels in the annals of Indian warfare; and the heroism with which Napoleon and his redoubtable followers resisted and overcame these varied forms of hostility, was not greater than that which the British soldiers, and their worthy native allies, have combated on the plateau of Mysore, the hills of Nepaul, the plains of Hindostan, the mountains of Affghanistan, or the intricacies of the Punjâb. The

Napoleon's victories compared with ours in India.

harassing hostility and terrible sweep of the Cossacks were fully equalled by the squadrons of Hyder and the Pindaree horsemen. The free-born valour of the Tyrolese was rivalled by the heroic resistance of the Goorkhas; the storm of Badajos, the devotion of Saragossa, have their parallels in the defence of Bhurtpore and the conquest of Seringapatam; the decision and skill which converted the perils of Assaye into a decisive victory were not outdone by the most illustrious deeds of Napoleon. And the conqueror of the French legions at Albuera had yet a ruder conflict to sustain on the banks of the Sutlej with the desperate valour of the Seiks.'[1]

Position of the British in India in 1857.

It is not impossible to understand either what took place in India during the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The position of about 25,000 British in a country numbering 150,000,000 of inhabitants, amongst whom were men like those of Hyder's army, like the Pindarees, the Goorkhas, and the Seiks, men who from time to time had previously been met and conquered, is not without a parallel. But where shall we find a counterpart to a war in which 11,650 splendid officers and 363,000 rank and file were taken prisoners? In these wonderful German triumphs we look for the cause, and find it close at hand; it is apparent in the discipline

The cause of these victories.

[1] Alison, vol. vii. p. 72.

and equipment of an army, acting as *one* man, and guided by one head of prodigious mental capacity —a head which, if we may say so, was rather three wise heads in one, with brains fitted for such an unparalleled epoch. 'It was not the Roman army which conquered Gaul, but *Cæsar*.' Why do soldiers cling to their colours? Is it not because they are our emblems of honour? It matters not whether the stuff is silk or cotton, they must be defended. So also as regards our commanders, they may be prudent or the reverse, wise or foolish, yet our sense of duty tells us they must be obeyed. Not that we deny to any man the right to hold his own private opinions on all matters. Reason was given us by God, and each individual may think as he pleases; but although he may not applaud the acts of his commander in the field, he is bound by honour, by duty, and all that is right, to support him—discipline demands the strictest obedience. Bad commanders will meet with their own punishments, but subordinates who obey can never be blamed. In 1759, the King of Prussia lost a splendid victory after he had actually captured seventy-two guns from the Austrians. He threw it away by an act of rashness; he drove panting and exhausted soldiers to an attack beyond their powers at a most critical moment. Not content with his seventy-two cap-

Why do our soldiers cling to their colours?

Obedience imperative.

How the King of Prussia lost a victory.

tured guns, he pressed on his jaded heroes, to attempt what flesh and blood could never accomplish. Shall we blame his good and obedient officers, or his splendid men, because at his dictation they essayed an impossibility? History has no doubt allotted the blame to the commander, but consider how many valuable lives were lost by this rash act?

Who get the blame?

Not too hastily to think a thing impossible.

Yet we must not assume too hastily that an act is impossible; it may be that the opportunity is ill-timed. On another occasion successful execution may be confidently expected. 'There is the time to fear impediments, and a time to set *all* impediments aside.' The wise and prudent leader awaits the auspicious moment; he then strikes with all his might. Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, at Barcelona, 'had to execute a project he had constantly represented as impracticable.'[1] He even announced his fixed determination to raise the siege,[1] and in Barcelona there were great rejoicings at this deliverance. The heavy cannon were sent on board. But at midnight of September 12, 1705, Peterborough called on the Prince of Hesse, and said, 'I have resolved, sir, to attempt an assault.' 'On the following morning, the English flag was flying on the ramparts of

The Earl of Peterborough at Barcelona, 1705.

[1] Macaulay, in his 'Lord Mahon's War of Succession in Spain.'

Monjuich. The genius and the energy of the man had supplied the place of forty battalions.'[1]

Had Clive attended to the advice of the Council of War the battle of Plassy would never have been fought; yet it was reasonable for him to *pause* ere he met 60,000, with only 1,000 British soldiers and 2,000 Sepoys. It proved as feasible, nevertheless, as had been the capture of Monjuich. Dr. Russell tells us at page 144 that the Light Division retreated behind the Guards to reform, at the Alma; that the Scots Fusiliers wavered, and lost order for a few minutes; and that the Duke of Cambridge thought of halting to dress the line, but Sir Colin Campbell begged his Highness not to hesitate, but to push on at once at the enemy. We humbly opine that the time to set all impediments aside had then arrived. Victory oscillated at that critical moment, and the least signs of indecision, on the part of the men at that juncture, might have ended in fatal consequences. The coolness of the Duke in wishing to dress the line under such a fire was peculiarly British; but it was absolutely necessary to push on—to keep advancing. A halt then might have been easily misconstrued by the Russians into a check. Our foes would have

Lord Clive at Plassy.

Terrific struggle at the Alma.

Sir Colin Campbell's advice.

A *wrong* impression might have entered the minds of the Russians.

[1] Macaulay, in his 'Lord Mahon's War of Succession in Spain.'

gained heart at the very moment it was so necessary that their terror and awe should be maintained at the highest pitch, to the extent even of forcing them eventually to give way. The struggle of the 'nerve' between two bodies of brave men was then at its height; but that struggle, if it assumes the intensity produced only when all a man's 'pluck' is brought into play, seldom lasts more than a few moments. But during that short interval victory holds out the palm of conquest for either side to grasp. These, the momentous periods in the heat of action, should be closely watched. It is the '*one* pull more,' then, that repays the gallant soldier for all the anxiety and labour of the past struggle. 'Tis like the last few but desperate strides of two horses running 'neck and neck' at the finish. One more rapid bound and the race is won. These, we repeat, are the moments to be regarded as most important. All the other parts of a battle, such as getting into position, shaking the enemy with cannon or musketry, merely make up the overture; they are like the first attitudes of pugilists, who dodge from side to side till they close in with fiercely delivered blows. These are the times, however, when the British soldier proves of what tough unyielding metal he is made. All our discipline, and all our training, come into play at such moments.

The most important moments in battle.

The one tug more.

Our discipline.

And these critical periods will most certainly arrive so long as war lasts.

Anything unusual in battle, perplexing.

The astonishment at Sadowa, at the rapid firing of the Prussian needle-gun, was great. The Austrians were bewildered at the havoc made in their ranks. In the very same way it has been, and will be whenever anything unusual takes place in battles to come. Men are prepared for what is customary, but perplexed at anything new. This was proved by the 'Card System,' fortunately forbidden by Sir Charles Napier. Some commanders of corps practised half a dozen manœuvres, day by day, for months before an inspection, and did them well; if however any new manœuvre was asked for it was imperfectly carried out, or merely blundered through. Drill is only for a purpose; and on the field of battle we cannot prepare our 'card of manœuvres.' A corps that has 'rehearsals,' of certain manœuvres only, working in one groove, will be useless for service because, as we have said, anything new causes them bewilderment. In the campaign in Flanders the 25th Regiment was 'staggered by the French firing with fixed bayonets.' Our men at that time used to fasten their bayonets into their musket-muzzles, but it so happened that three French regiments had their bayonets fixed according to our present fashion. The 25th could not use

The 'card system.'

Rehearsals absurd.

Incident during the campaign in Flanders.

their pieces, whereas the French fired a volley. This was quite a new plan and it succeeded.

Who will benefit by the new rifle.

The new rifle will benefit those who can be trusted in the 'thin red line' formation. Attacks in columns will be almost impossible. Victory will favour those men who have the most confidence in themselves and in the valour of their comrades on their right and left. In battles to come the advantage will not be all on one side, as at Sadowa. We shall all be nearly equal, as regards the weapons.

Napoleon and Wellington's respective forces compared.

And here we would observe that whenever Napoleon and Wellington are compared, we do not see sufficient stress placed on the actual number of the British engaged. This is very important, however, in weighing the merits of a commander and the valour of his soldiers. At

Numbers of French and British at Waterloo.

Waterloo the French had 71,947 men and 246 guns; the soldiers were 'the very *elite* of the national forces of France.' Wellington had 67,655 men, and 156 guns only. Napoleon thus had ninety more guns than the Iron Duke; and, counting all Wellington's army, Napoleon had 4,292 more men. But of Wellington's force only

24,000 British combat 72,000 French at Waterloo.

24,000 were British soldiers. It was they who mainly withstood the assault of some 72,000 men until the Prussians arrived upon the field. The

battle, then, was not only won, but won by a mere handful of British troops.

Other European armies much larger.

Other European nations take the field with 300,000 or 400,000 men; but it remains to be proved how many men would be needed to conquer 100,000 British soldiers. We do not boast when we say, no other nation can be *more* confidently trusted in line than the British.

The art of night attacks to be studied.

It appears to us that we should pay some attention to drilling men for 'night-attacks;' more might come from it, we imagine, than from instruction in making 'shelter trenches.' Such attacks are doubtless perilous; but war forces perils as well as changes upon us. The manœuvring should be both for 'attack' and for 'defence' at night. The new rifle makes us seek shelter, but the darkness of night of itself forms the best of screens. Men worked by signals, by certain indications, by telegraphs, &c., could generally attack positions with success. But it would require practice and a knowledge of the position to be attacked. Thus one part of the corps might be sent out ten miles, and the other ordered to try and force an entrance. This would teach commanders to judge the time to accomplish a task of this kind, and point out where confusion is most likely to occur. We think that night attacks will yet be tried where troops can be trusted. A small force

Great practice necessary.

A small force

might make a terrible impression on a large one.

might make a terrible impression on a huge unwieldy one, and even retire in good order without the prospect of a rapid pursuit. Consternation would spread in a large army; all things would be magnified in the dark. After driving in the picquets on the supports, the attackers might lie down and fire right into the enemy's camp, causing immense havoc, without much loss to themselves. If charged we would trust the British soldier to do his duty with the bayonet—a weapon he knows so well how to use; though this bayonet on which he relies so much is now grown almost unnecessary as regards resistance to cavalry, while its value is also deteriorated considerably by the difficulty that exists of getting men up to 'charging distance' without great loss of life. But in night attacks there would be more chance of reaching the enemy with a weapon essentially British. At the same time, we should be trained and prepared how to act if attacked ourselves at night; because this method, for the reasons above specified, will certainly be attempted in future warfare.

How the bayonet would then come into operation.

Night attacks will take place in future wars.

Loose order suggested till near enough to *charge*.

There appears no reason that we should not charge positions with intervals between files of, say, a pace or a pace and a half; because each of these gaps gives room for bullets to pass harmlessly through the ranks. The British always

have fought in line, but that close packing of men, shoulder to shoulder, is not required till the moment to charge arrives. 'The Brigade of Highlanders, commanded by Sir Colin Campbell, advanced in admirable order, which it did not for one moment lose, though disturbed by the terrible fire of the Russian musketry and artillery. One would imagine to see this body of men, so cool and so precise, that they were manœuvring at a review, rather than under the fearful hail of the battle-field. Our allies, in admirable line of battle, marched with their usual step, extinguishing the fire of the formidable positions they had to carry, and without slackening or accelerating their march, and facing every difficulty in *front* rather than seeking to attack it in flank.'[1]

The grand Highland Brigade in battle.

[1] Baron de Bazancourt.

CHAPTER V.

Magnanimity in taking Advice from an Inferior—Lord Hardinge's Intelligence when a Young Officer—Murat's Advice to Napoleon —The Probable Effect of its Rejection in the Retreat from Moscow—Barclay de Tolly—Movements of both sides in Campaign of Russia—Borodino—French Losses and Napoleon's Errors—Lord Clive compared with Washington—Men sometimes wrongly judged—Harshness often only on the Surface—Timidity and Brazen Effrontery—Real Courage and Mental Fortitude—Chain of Coherence between Mortals.

The wisest commanders may be unguarded.

THE wisest, or the best commander, may be sometimes off his guard; or relying too confidently on the British soldier, he may be tempted to execute a dangerous manœuvre in the very face of the enemy. Again he may risk something on purpose, simply to impress his men with a feeling that he is calm and collected. This often has been found advantageous, from the moral effect of his behaviour upon the minds of the soldiers. But that commander is indeed magnanimous who accepts a really valuable hint from another—his inferior in rank. Many a battle has been won by the quickness and intelligence of comparatively young officers. Alluding to Colonel Hardinge,

Lord Hardinge at Albuera 1811

we read, 'It was at Albuera that his (Lord Hardinge's) brightest wreath was won. The

fight had gone against a handful of British soldiers. Half of those under fire had fallen, when Colonel Hardinge, on his own responsibility, pointed out to Major-General Sir Lowry Cole that on his moving up his division depended the fortunes of the day. These fresh troops were on the instant hurled against the enemy's left flank, while Colonel Hardinge caused the right to be simultaneously assailed by the re-inspirited brigade of Abercrombie. The heavy columns of the superb French infantry were thus checked, rolled back, and broken. The British guns, already limbered up and ready for retreat, were again brought into action, and the enemy driven from that fierce field.'[1] This glorious turn in the tide of the Peninsular war was the achievement of Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge (then only twenty-five years of age) who is immortalized by Alison, in his record of Albuera, as the 'young soldier with the eye of a general and the soul of a hero.' On the retreat from Moscow, we verily believe that Napoleon was wrong in listening to the timid advice of the commander of the Imperial Guard (Bessières), instead of instantly adopting the bold suggestion of the brave Murat. The latter officer with his usual

Advice given to Napoleon on the retreat from Moscow 1812.

[1] Henry Lawrence's 'Essay on Lord Hardinge's Administration,' p. 53.

boldness, said, 'Why should we fear the Russians? Give me but the remains of the cavalry and that of the Imperial Guard, and *I will* plunge into their forests, and open the road to Kalouga at the sword's point.' Why did Napoleon not adopt the advice of Murat? Simply because he believed him to be 'an imbecile without judgment, when left to himself, although a Paladin in the field.' A sad mistake was made here; the mind of Murat produced on this occasion a sensible notion. Napoleon made no allowances, he never qualified his assertions. He despised Murat as regards his mental attainments, but deeply respected him for his bravery. In this instance, he did not treat Murat as a man but as a miserable idiot. A man cannot always be wrong; he must be right sometimes. The man who knew the proper time to head a charge, and who could carry it into execution with the best results, was certainly no fool. The danger of despising men too far has been the cause of much disaster. By taking the Kalouga route Napoleon would of course have had to face the Russians; but by adopting the Smolensko line, he had to traverse a wasted country, with no hope of procuring any supplies, and, what was of more importance, he placed his brave soldiers with their backs to the Russians. The moral

Napoleon's opinion of Murat.

The Kalouga route was decidedly the safest and best.

effect of this was enough to crush such men. Besides this, he was pursued by an enemy who had never felt the shock of so many thousand desperate men at bay, making a dash to open up the way to retreat. We have further reason to be certain that Murat's was the soundest advice, from the fact that, as soon as Napoleon began to retire viâ Smolensko, Kutusoff became so apprehensive that he fell back in the direction of Kalouga, and actually gave up the strong position he previously held, his possession of which was the sole argument against Murat's proposal. Thus two great armies were then retreating from each other! On comparing dates, we find that it was on October 25, 1812, Napoleon decided on retiring, viâ Smolensko, to avoid the Russians who were on the Kalouga line. He dreaded, though with, comparatively speaking, a large army, to attempt to force his passage that way; yet, after marching till November 25, a full month later, and fighting a battle every day, when his soldiers had become but a mere foot-sore, starved, and dispirited rabble, he did not hesitate to force the Beresina, so as to make himself master of the defiles leading to Zembin. On December 10, when Napoleon reached Warsaw, he said boastfully, 'I have always beaten the Russians, they never venture to stand against me.' Again, he remarked (allud-

Bad moral effect on the soldiers.

Napoleon and Kutusoff retire from each other!

Napoleon ultimately passes the Beresina.

What he said at Warsaw and his experience of Marengo.

ing to the passage of the Beresina), 'Their position was superb, but what *then?* I got through them all. It is then you see who have strong minds. I have often been harder pushed before. At Marengo, I was beaten at six o'clock at night: next day I was master of all Italy.' Why did not that truly great commander recollect all this at that critical time when Murat volunteered to cut his way through and open the Kalouga route? Success would have given him a passage through a rich country, and he would have avoided the disastrous retreat by Smolensko, which ended in the remnant of a splendid army numbering 500,000 superb soldiers, being chased out of the Russian territories by a mere detachment of cavalry. The general who forced the Beresina with a mere rabble might have opened out *any* route with such soldiers as those the noble Murat commanded when his advice was rejected. Judging Napoleon from what has so often dropped from his lips, we may exclaim with all truth,

Had Napoleon only followed Murat's advice all might have been well.

'Even victors are by *victories* undone.'[1]

That great commander did not think of his own prowess or of the fighting qualities of his magnificent soldiers. He seems to have forgotten what he once said, viz., 'You thus see that two armies

[1] Dryden.

are two bodies which meet and endeavour to frighten each other; a moment of panic occurs, and that moment must be turned to advantage, and when a man has been present in many actions he distinguishes that moment without difficulty.'

Barclay de Tolly.

Barclay de Tolly, who conducted the retreat of the Russians from the camp at Drissa to Borodino, was descended from an old Scottish family —the Barclays of Towe, in Aberdeenshire.[1] He was then fifty-seven years of age. Alison says, 'We could hardly recognize the dauntless hero who vanquished Sweden (1809), by marching across the Gulf of Bothnia, accompanied by heavy trains of artillery and cavalry in the depth of winter, in the consummate general who saved Russia by his immortal retreat before Napoleon in 1812, did we not perceive the same diversity in Wellington, striking with seemingly *rash*, but *really* wise daring at Assaye, and restraining the uplifted load of retribution at Torres Vedras. Success in him was not the free gift of rapid intuition (i.e., such genius as Wellington had), but the deserved reward of laborious study.'[2] This Barclay evacuated the camp at Drissa, which had 400 pieces of cannon in it, and had been made almost impregnable after two years of intense labour. There were no bridges over the Dwina,

He vanquished Sweden in 1809.

Camp at Drissa evacuated, and why.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 3.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 3.

and it was liable to be turned. The wooden sheds holding immense supplies of provisions might have been set on fire by shells, and Napoleon 'threatened to sever it from its communications with the heart of the empire.'[1] He also wanted to join Bagrathion, and accordingly he retired by the right bank of the Dwina to Witepsk. 'On finding Drissa evacuated, Napoleon halted six days at Glubokee: he then moved on to Witepsk, and reached the Dwina on July 24.'[2]

Barclay retires.

Effect of Napoleon's six days' halt at Glubokee.

'No movement in the campaign was of more vital importance to the Russians than this advance upon Witespk, and if Napoleon had not delayed six days (apparently without a cause) at Glubokee, he could with ease have anticipated the enemy at that important point, permanently interposed the bulk of his force *between* Barclay and Bagrathion, and (throwing back the former towards St. Petersburg and the latter on Smolensko and Moscow) have cut off the former from the southern provinces, and the principal resources of the country.'[3] Bagrathion now unable to get to Orcha, being arrested by Davoust and another general, crossed the Dnieper, and moved towards Smolensko. This retreat was performed in a masterly manner, 'not a weapon, not a baggage waggon, not a straggler had been left behind. Brilliant watch-

Bagrathion crosses the Dnieper and moves on Smolensko.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 4. [2] *Ibid.* p. 9. [3] *Ibid.* p. 10.

fires were kept up in the Russian lines during the night,'[1] and on the 28th Murat found the place deserted!

'By a singular coincidence at the very moment that Napoleon was adopting the resolution to advance into the interior of Russia, a similar resolution to assume the offensive had been taken at the Russian head-quarters.'[2] Ney and Murat overtook General Newerofskoi with the Russian rear-guard of 6,000 foot and 1,200 horse, and engaged him with 18,000 horse. The Russian general formed 'hollow squares,' and these were charged more than forty times. Yet he got safe to Kortinia, with a loss of 1,100 men and five pieces of cannon.[3] On the following day Newerofskoi effected a junction with Raeffskoi, and they both moved on to Smolensko. Barclay and Bagrathion fortunately reached Smolensko just as the French were preparing to attack.[4] The Russian general-in-chief resolved to retreat, and sent Bagrathion in the direction of Jelina to secure the road to the capital. On the morning of the 17th August, Bagrathion took post with the main body of the army behind the little stream of Kolodina about four miles distant; while Barclay, with the corps of Doctoroff and Baga-

Both armies determine to advance at the same time.

Ney and Murat overtake the Russian rear-guard.

Barclay reaches Smolensko.

Gallant defence of Smolensko.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 11.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 17.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 19.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 24.

worth, still held the ramparts of Smolensko. Napoleon now ordered a 'coup-de-main.' Yet his 70,000 men were unable to beat 30,000, and he lost 15,000 in the assaults and the Russians only 10,000. Next morning the place was empty! All the magazines were destroyed, the bridges broken down, and nothing left but the naked walls and the cannon which were mounted on them.[1] Barclay, to avoid the French guns, moved off by the St. Petersburg road, but every mile he advanced he went farther from his comrades; but finally he regained the Moscow road, and the united forces moved on towards Moscow.[2]

Barclay evacuates Smolensko.

Kutusoff supersedes Barclay.

His character.

At this period of the campaign Barclay was superseded by Kutusoff, a man described as follows:—'He had studied war in the closet, and had brought an extensive theoretic acquaintance with military principles, to bear on the experience which a long and active life in harness had given of actual details.' He was then nearly seventy years of age, having been born in 1795. The army was now hardly fifty leagues from Moscow, and that capital could only be saved by a general action.[3] But, in the course of this retreat no strong position could be found till they reached Borodino. Here the Russians had 132,000 men and 640

Battle of Borodino, 1812.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 24. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.* p. 29.

guns; while the French had 133,000 men (of whom 30,000 were cavalry) and 590 guns. Of the Imperial Guard 20,000 were not engaged. The Russians lost 15,000 killed and 30,000 wounded. The French 12,000 killed and 38,000 wounded; but the French captured ten guns, the Russians thirteen.[1]

Loss on both sides.

Napoleon said, 'I felt the necessity of preserving them (the Imperial Guard, 20,000 strong) to strike a decisive blow in the great battle which the enemy will probably give us in the plains in front of Moscow.'[2] This was on the night of the battle of Borodino.

Napoleon's reason for keeping 20,000 of the Imperial Guard out of action.

'The success of the action in which we have been engaged (i.e., Borodino) was secured; but it was my duty to think of the general result of the campaign, and it was for *that* I spared my reserve.'[2]

'It is one thing to hazard a reserve in a situation when the loss it may sustain can easily be repaired; it is another, and a very *different* thing to risk its existence in the centre of an enemy's country, at a distance from reinforcements, when its ruin may endanger the whole army. The fatal result to the French at Waterloo demonstrates the extreme peril of engaging the reserves before the strength of the enemy's force has been finally

Alison on the danger of using the reserves too soon.

[1] Alison, vol. x. pp. 40, 41.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 41.

broken, and the risk of a rout at Borodino was incomparably greater than on the French frontier.'[1]

Loss during the campaign.

The loss in the campaign to the French alone was 550,000 men and 900 cannon. Montesquieu says, with great truth, that 'distant expeditions fail from the very magnitude of the measures to carry them into execution.' The Russians should remember the retreat from Moscow when they think of invading India, by way of Cabul or Affghanistan. Sir H. Lawrence said, 'A large army entering such a country would be starved to death; a small one would be cut to pieces,' or words to the same effect. The Russian light horse rendered the attempt of the French to maintain themselves in the interior of the country utterly impracticable.[2] If the Russians came to India our cavalry would be equally useful. Five-sixths of the losses in the French army had been sustained before the cold weather began. Out of 302,000 men which Napoleon, in person, led across the Niemen, there remained only 55,000 men and 12,000 horses when the frost set in; that is, he had lost 247,000 men before 'a flake of snow fell.'[3] The grand mistakes made by Napoleon in this memorable campaign were, shortly, these:—First, in risking his army so far from his magazines and supplies; second, in

Lesson for the Russians if they contemplate the invasion of India.

Russian light horse so useful.

Mistakes of Napoleon in the Moscow campaign.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 41. [2] *Ibid.* vol. x.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. x. p. 100.

advancing on Moscow after the battle of Borodino, where his cavalry suffered so much; third, in having no light horse, so that the Cossacks were free to cut off all supplies; fourth, in retreating by separate corps.[1]

'If an European army advances in good order, forming magazines as it goes, it may doubtless be able to withstand the utmost attacks of the Asiatic cavalry; and it was because they took these precautions, that the armies of Alexander and the Romans in ancient, and the British and Russians in modern times have so often prevailed over innumerable swarms of Eastern horse. But when an army rushes headlong into the middle of Scythian cavalry, without having the means of providing itself with subsistence and forage, it is certain to be destroyed. Alexander the Great wisely avoided such a danger, and contenting himself with a barren victory over the Scythians on the banks of the Oxus, turned aside from their inhospitable territory. Darius, with all the forces of Persia, penetrated into it and perished. The legions of Mark Antony and Crassus sank under the incessant attacks of the Parthian horse. The heroism of Richard Cœur-de-Lion was shattered against the innumerable squadrons of Saladin.'[2]

Remarks on Asiatic cavalry.

And again, 'The very multitude of carriages

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 103. [2] *Ibid.* p. 104.

Remarks on the parallel march of Kutusoff.

with which a European army invades an Asiatic territory proves the immediate cause of defeat.'[1] Kutusoff's parallel march in pursuit was a great 'military achievement,' and should be remembered by all commanders when following up an enemy. It was cautious, yet highly effectual; he ran no risk, the poor French were at a good trot all along while his own men were always well in hand.

Despair during a retreat.

'Despair rapidly restores the courage of an army; a disorderly crowd of stragglers often resumes the strictest military order, and is capable of the greatest efforts when the animation of a battle is at hand. The passage of the Beresina, the battle of Corunna, the victory of Hanau, are sufficient to demonstrate this important truth.'[1]

Splendid retreat of the Allies from Lutzen.

At Lutzen (1813), the artillery under Drouot, and fourteen battalions of the Young Guard, regained Kaia, and drove back the Prussians and Russians. The guns preceded the advance. From Kaia to Klein Görshen the Allies fell back in good order, and kept 'firing without intermission.' The result was that 'the whole surface of the ground between these two places was covered with the slain, of whom *two-thirds* were French.'[2] This tells us how carefully a retreating army should be pursued. The highest of human intellects have been, and must often be, operated

French loss.

Pursuit of a retiring foe demands the utmost caution.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 104. [2] *Ibid.* p. 177.

upon by circumstances; it was however to the mind of Bessières and not to the mind of Napoleon, that we must attribute that unfortunate retreat, viâ Smolensko, instead of by Kalouga.

Lord Clive's discrimination.

To the acute sense of discrimination on the part of Lord Clive we are indebted for all our after triumphs in India. That great man by a bold manœuvre saved Hindostan at the moment that the representatives of the East India Company were actually led as prisoners through the streets of Pondicherry. Like Banner, the noble Swede, 'He was fertile in expedients, which he planned with secrecy, and executed with boldness; cautious in the midst of dangers, greater in adversity than in prosperity, and never more formidable than when on the brink of destruction.' Here is a noble specimen of a man and a warrior for other soldiers to imitate. He suggested an attack on Arcot, and, with a meagre force of 200 Europeans and 300 Sepoys, forthwith dashed at the place. The enemy fled panic-stricken at his sudden approach. Thus, by one grand move, India became British instead of French, though British officers at the time were in the hands of a French escort at Pondicherry. It is on such occasions that the man of genius shines; delay then would have lost us our Indian Empire. There is a great similarity in the characters of Clive and Washing-

His character.

His dash at Arcot.

Here genius shines.

Clive like Washington.

ton. 'Perhaps the strongest feature in his (Washington's) character was prudence, never acting until every circumstance, every consideration, was maturely weighed; refraining if he saw a doubt, but when once decided, going through with his purpose whatever obstacles offered.'[1]

Proofs of the Duke of Wellington's daring.

We have ample proof to convince us that the Duke of Wellington well knew when to fear impediments and when to disregard them altogether. He always acted on the sound principle, 'That unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of boldness.' To what must we attribute all his success? Was it not that he had studied *men*, and made the history of past battles and the acts of commanders his study? Thus he defeated the Great Napoleon. Let us see what the Iron Duke when a Colonel did at Mallavelly in 1799. A body of 2,000 of the enemy came down in excellent order upon his regiment—the 33rd. But he ordered his men to remain steady and reserve their fire; then when the foe came to about forty yards, he charged and routed them completely. Again, at Assaye, with 2,000 British soldiers and 3,000 Sepoys, he attacked and defeated 40,000 of the enemy. It must be remembered too that the enemy had 100 guns in this battle, and, moreover, the assistance of several French

How he was so successful.

The Duke at Mallavelly.

Again, at Assaye,

[1] Thomas Jefferson.

officers and engineers. Let any reflecting man weigh this fully. In the first instance, the Duke runs no risk, but makes victory certain. He knew right well that the 33rd Regiment could have charged and driven back the 2,000 natives, but he preferred to let the enemy rush on to destruction; and as they came panting up to about forty yards the charge of the 33rd carried all before it. In the latter case, with 2,000 Europeans and 3,000 Sepoys, he does not hesitate to dash with 5,000 at 40,000 men. He did so because the enemy's powerful artillery could not be silenced by our guns. He saw the danger, and, as there was no alternative, at once ordered an immediate advance. Had he continued to return the fire of the enemy's guns with his light pieces from a distance, his own men would have been destroyed by the crushing fire, and a noble little force would have been beaten without a chance of using the bayonet—that weapon in which the British soldier has such confidence.

The Duke makes victory certain.

'Dash' at Assaye required.

Before the action the Duke reconnoitred with the 19th Dragoons. To his astonishment, instead of finding merely infantry, he observed '30,000 horsemen crowded on their right, a dense array of infantry, and a hundred pieces of cannon in front, to vomit death upon the assailants.' We are told 'that he paused for a moment, impressed

The Duke reconnoitres.

but not daunted by the sight.' His eagle eye took all in at a glance. He saw that Scindiah's foot was in such a confined position that the Mahratta cavalry would not be able to manœuvre, if they attempted to come to the assistance of the infantry; so he at once completely changed his plan of attack, and, like lightning, dashed at the left, instead of at their right as he first intended.

Scindiah's infantry in a very confined position.

We are informed that the 'English cavalry brigade, scarcely numbering 1,600 sabres, took up its position with all the boldness of a body ten times the force. Scindiah's cavalry were *twenty to one.*' Here we have the master mind. These are some of the acts of a commander whose caution was such that Prince Lieven said, he was a 'Singulier mélange de timidité et d'audace.' We can well afford to permit a foreigner to call such a hero 'a singular mixture of timidity and audacity.' Our foes need not be reminded that the Iron Duke lost nothing by his 'timidity,' as they pleased to term it. It is amusing to observe how often men are judged wrongly. Sir Robert Peel was called timid, but we read, 'Far from being timid and wary, he was audacious and even headstrong. It was his cold and constrained demeanour that misled the public. There never was a man who did such *rash* things in so *circumspect* a manner.'[1]

The British cavalry only 1,600 sabres, faces 32,000.

The Duke called both timid and audacious.

[1] 'Lord George Bentinck, a Political Biography,' by Disraeli.

There are many of our readers who can remember a certain General (a most distinguished officer), who died in Calcutta some time ago, who was ever considered a 'harsh' man to serve under. The Author had the honour to be under his command for a whole year, and found him a tender-hearted, just, and good man. His was all manner; under the morose appearance there was a kind and noble heart. He was seldom seen to smile. But once, when a little child came into the room where several officers had been assembled, the General said, 'Go away!' in an assumed harsh tone; the child replied, 'I will *not*.' Upon which the General said, 'These gentlemen have *swords*, and may cut your head off.' The sweet little girl said, 'I am not afraid, when *you* are here.' The speech woke up a smile upon the General's face, and saying, 'Go away like a *good* girl,' the child instantly obeyed. The Author knew from that instant that the gruffness was all on the surface and that there was doubtless a very kind heart beneath that stern and severe exterior. But there is also another species of timidity—the modesty that makes a man awkward and nervous in a room full of the fair sex, or in the presence of sarcastic individuals of his own. Napoleon suffered from this and when called upon to address twenty ladies in a room he could only say, 'It is hot.' But we

A good kind heart under an austere countenance.

The little girl and the General.

Another form of timidity or modesty.

admire this timidity if the same individual remains undaunted in the uproar of battle, and the crash of artillery. And the sarcastic man should bear in mind that 'He who wishes his friend not to take offence at his own protuberances, will excuse his friend's little *warts*.'[1] But there is, on the other hand, a 'matchless intrepidity of face,' which while it can brazen out anything amidst society, alters wonderfully in the presence of danger. What gives boldness in battle teaches mildness and modesty in the drawing-room. He who without these qualities presumes too much, should be reminded of the saying of 'Sadi,' the Persian, 'Think not that every wilderness is empty, perhaps a tiger may be there.' But we have seen plenty of sour, vinegar-faced men in society who have no kindness of heart whatever. The ferocity that they assume may alarm quiet, homely people, but it will not 'go down' with those who have a knowledge of men. We have seen a man often in face a lion, but at heart a deer. The Hindostanees say of such, 'that it thunders, but it does not *rain*.' A man of courage is not perpetually snarling at everybody; but when it is required he can show that he is brave indeed.

A 'matchless intrepidity of face.'

A Persian saying.

What the Hindostanees say of a man with a 'lion's face and a deer's heart.'

An officer or soldier who has seen hard service may reasonably be permitted to allude to his past

One man generally as brave as another.

[1] 'Horace,' book I. satire iii.

life; but it will be found that brave men will unhesitatingly admit that under similar circumstances other honourable men would have acted equally well. There are millions of heroes who have never had an opportunity. Loaded cannons cannot go off without the port-fire! Our experience tells us that a brave man is uncommonly like an Arab horse. Look at that animal in the stable, and he seems a very 'cow' in humility. Get on his back, touch him with the spur, and you then see the war-horse full of life and action. You cannot play tricks with him then; his blood is up. The British Lion requires to be roused; till then he sleeps—but not unconscious of his powers. The hyæna, on the other hand, shows his teeth at everyone approaching his cage. You meet with glorious fellows of the Agamemnon type, men who are gentle, affable, and kind—men whom we know to have performed the noblest deeds, who are yet modest, quiet, and ever agreeable —Lord Chesterfields in society, Agamemnons in battle. The very type of the British soldier is found in such nobleness of heart and modesty of behaviour. Human beings with the 'hyæna' temperament are generally those who have merely 'surface courage,' and have not the lion heart. Richard Cœur-de-Lion, requires a Saladin to be his antagonist, and we say with pride that we can

A brave man is like an Arab horse.

The English lion sleeps till roused.

Glorious men in our army.

boast of tens of thousands of such soldiers, as regards *heart*, in our glorious British army.

Real courage in the private soldier.

Where do we see a greater degree of real courage than in the humble uneducated private? Manliness or courage is given by our Maker; it is like electricity, visible only when it gleams. 'The nearer to nature, the nearer to truth,' is a homely adage.

Mental fortitude.

That mental fortitude comes ready burnished from the 'workshop' of creation. The poorest man may possess it. All we require is prudence with it. What advantage did the French dash give them at Vimiera? The 50th Regiment drove them back on the left, and the 97th did the same on the right.

Busaco, 1810.

At Busaco the steady charge of the 43rd and 52nd, just as the French arrived 'breathless, and begrimed with powder,' tended to decide the battle. Ney advanced with 25,000 men on the British left. 'The shout of victory was already heard, when suddenly Crawfurd, with the 43rd and 52nd, springing out of a hollow behind the highest part of a ridge, appeared on the summit, and eighteen hundred bayonets sparkled on the crest of the hill. The head of the French column instantly fired in vain. It was driven back. Renier's corps had routed the Portuguese regiment, and carried the position, but here Generals Leith and Picton brought up the

45th and 88th Regiments, who charged and hurled the enemy down the hill.'[1]

At Linano, about fifteen miles from Milan, in 1176, the 'Company of Death,' consisting of 900 men, charged and drove back the Germans. This was after the German cavalry had made the Lombards give way. Thus 900 men gave heart to the retreating and dispirited soldiers by a dashing manœuvre at the critical time. Between the minds of all mortals there seems to be a sort of electric band or chain of coherence—a link, in fact, that holds humanity together. We have observed that this universality of mind seems to permeate the entire intellectual portion of nature. When a sudden impulse seizes upon a body of men, who can say that this very impulse is not the pervading potency of nature?—and no legislation, no justice, no security from harm, no considerations of the consequences, will hinder men from following out such a passion to the utmost. This is proved by all history, all previous knowledge of mankind. There is the efflux and its opposite; and these sudden derangements of the minds of multitudes, as in rebellions or revolutions, may be compared to similar changes in the weather. The Power that directs one has the other as securely

Linano, 1176.

Chain of coherence between mortals.

[1] Alison, vol. viii. p. 329.

in His omnipotent grasp; and as the results of a storm, after the cessation of the tumult of the elements, are generally beneficial, so also is the change that ever takes place after an outbreak or revolution. So in all revolutions of the human mind, the after results prove that all was supervised and permitted for a good purpose. What thoughtful man, the student of history, can deny the truth of this?—

Good out of evil.

'All nature is but art unknown to thee,
All chance, direction, which thou canst not see,
All discord harmony not understood,
All partial evil, universal good.'

Creator's Concordia Discors.

Who can doubt for an instant that the Creator permits his agents to act in these cases so far as He sees is good, for the *end* to be accomplished?

'The great object of the Creator is the maintenance of the whole system of creation in order and beauty, and this He is pleased to accomplish not always by the concord, but by the *seeming* discord, of the agents He employs.'[1]

Soldiers who are deep thinkers.

Amongst soldiers we have found many men who are profound thinkers; and although their faulty education may not have stamped their conversations, or writings, with that philosophic power or eloquence that a deeper knowledge of

[1] 'Bridgewater Treatises,' vol. i. p. 157.

literature might ensure, yet they have said enough and written enough to convince us that they have marked the direct hand of Providence in all mundane affairs. It should be remembered too that the profession of a soldier is of all others the most calculated to make one thoughtful, because in it everyone is liable to be brought face to face with death at any time, quite irrespective of the ordinary risks that surround us mortals in this life.

Soldiers have to face death suddenly.

CHAPTER VI.

Panics caused by Shock to Sensitive Nerve—The real Cause of all Success—Prudence and Daring Combined—Nelson at Trafalgar—Albuera—Losses with Old and New Weapons Compared—Victory Justifies Risk, but no Men can afford to Despise others—Even Saladin turned to Dust—Danger of Despising our Enemies instanced by Schamyl, Frederick the Great, Alexander; in the Balaclava Charge; at Ferozeshah, Assaye, and Seetabuldee—Critical moments in Crimean Campaign, and in Retreat from Chinhut on Lucknow.

The human mind a twisted web.

WHEN we endeavour to follow the human mind through its intricate ramifications, we move in a labyrinth of astonishment. We find a twisted web one cannot easily disentangle. And yet there is a certain sameness in all, which tends to prove the existence of the one all-powerful and guiding Mind, overlooking and constantly directing the actions of men; just as it guides the movement of the supernal or celestial bodies in the firmament above. It is then to the 'electric chain' already mentioned that we attribute those sudden panics that affect instantaneously large bodies of men. The *sensitive* nerve of a dispirited army is touched at one point, and, as by an electric shock, the entire mass is penetrated. Hence it is 'nerve' we have to deal with on all occasions when man

meets man with weapons in his hands. Overcome that nerve, and the weapon of defence seems for the moment to be utterly forgotten; or how is it that strong, able-bodied men, in tens of thousands, when still unhurt will retire in utter confusion and disorder, or submit to be all taken prisoners?

British 'nerve' difficult to overcome.

Napoleon knew the difficulty of overcoming the British 'nerve,' and the absolute necessity of rousing the enthusiasm of the French soldiers; but Wellington, relying upon it, felt that his men were not to be daunted by the impetuosity of the French. The 'nerve of an army' may be touched therefore either by actual loss of men or by some sudden device that causes a moral effect.

Out-of-the-way devices: capture of the frigate Garno.

'In doubtful attacks by sea (and the odds of fifty men to 320 comes within their description) no device can be too minute, even if apparently absurd, provided it have the effect of diverting the enemy's attention while you are concentrating your own force. In this and other successes against odds I have no hesitation in saying that success, in no slight degree, depended on out-of-the-way devices, which the enemy, not suspecting, were in some measure thrown off their guard.'[1] These are the words of a man who well understood human nature, and who overcame Spanish

[1] Earl of Dundonald's capture of the Garno frigate of 32 guns.

'nerve' with fourteen four-pounders and 54 men, against twenty-two twelve-pounders, two twenty-pounders, and eight long eight-pounders, and 319 men. The Garno frigate's broadside was 190 pounds, and tonnage 600. The little Speedy's broadside was only twenty-eight pounds, and tonnage 158. Our object then in battle should be to husband the '*nerve*' in our men, as well as their *strength*.

Size of the Garno and the Speedy.

The roar of a caged lion will make a deep impression on a nervous person; but a cool sportsman who has shot these animals on foot will be quite unconcerned. A sudden dash, with loud shouts, may strike young recruits with awe, but will be despised by the old soldier. The latter know the value of steadiness and correct aims, and will not be too easily deprived of their self-possession. We should ever bear in mind in battle that the men rushing at us are after all but flesh and blood. They may show a bold front, but as they come closer and closer, so in the same proportion will their hope or despondency increase as they see you unsteady or otherwise. The appearance of your steady advance or bold attitude compels an enemy to feel less and less hopeful of his power to defeat you. He becomes more and more dubious as the distance diminishes between you, if your line remain firm and steady. That

The cool sportsman cares little for the tiger's *roar*.

What to bear in mind in battle.

knack of having 'a just appreciation of his adversaries' strength,' and 'a careful calculation of his own means compared with the obstacles to be overcome,' which was the basis of all Eugène's success, will be found to have been, more or less, the very basis of all success on the part of the most renowned commanders. Lord Dundonald says that Nelson's frequent injunctions were, 'Never mind manœuvres, *always go at them;*' but from this we must not conclude that Nelson was *rash*. The same author says, he considered Nelson as being 'an embodiment of dashing courage, which would not take much trouble to circumvent an enemy, but, being confronted with one, would regard victory so much a matter of course as hardly to deem the chance of defeat worth consideration. This was, in fact, the case, for though the enemy's ships, for the most part, were superior to ours in build, the discipline and seamanship of their crews were in that day so inferior as to leave little room for doubt of victory on our part.' Again he says, 'It has been remarked that Trafalgar was a rash action, and that had Nelson lost it and lived he would have been brought to a court-martial, for the way in which the action was conducted. But such cavillers forget that from previous experience he had *calculated* both the nature and amount of resistance to be expected; such calcula-

The real cause of all success the same as Eugène's.

Lord Dundonald on Lord Nelson.

Trafalgar no *rash* action.

tion forming as essential a part of his plan of attack as even his own means for making it. The result justified his expectations of victory, which were not only well founded, but *certain.*' A more noble tribute to the character of Lord Nelson could hardly be found. He *always did calculate beforehand.*

Nelson only thought of his duty to his God, to his king, and to his country.

Nelson made all his officers acquainted with his general plan of operations.

'Like all great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make all his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his *general* plan of operations; but intrusted them with full *discretionary* powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye, which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the capacity for skilful combination, which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action.'[1]

The character of Nelson, by Alison.

'Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most profound and intrepid of leaders.'[2] Alison assures us that Napoleon calculated that thirty ships of the line (with their guns and complement of men complete) corresponded, at sea, to an army of 120,000 men on land.[1] By this standard the twenty-five ships rendered useless must, as Alison says, be considered equivalent to a victory

The value of the victory at Trafalgar.

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 59. [2] *Ibid.* p. 60.

where 90,000 men out of 120,000 were destroyed. The total loss at Trafalgar was 1,690 men, at Waterloo nearly 9,000, at Talavera 5,000 out of 19,000, at Albuera 4,500 out of 7,500, and at Badajos 4,000 out of 16,000.[1]

Battle of Albuera, 1811.

At the glorious battle of Albuera, 1811, when the Spaniards were driven back in confusion, Beresford ordered up the British divisions from the centre. General Stewart was in the act of charging, when they were attacked by two regiments of Hussars and one of Polish Lancers. 'The Buffs, 66th, and 2nd battalion 48th, were instantly pierced in many different quarters by the Lancers from behind, and almost all slain on the spot or driven forward into the enemy's line and made prisoners.'[2]

Buffs are overwhelmed by masses of the French.

After Colonel Hardinge had ordered up Cole's Division, it was met by a terrific fire from Gerard's infantry, 'and the whole brigade, staggered by the iron tempest, reeled like a sinking ship.'

Napier's brilliant description of the battle of Albuera.

'Suddenly recovering, however,' says Colonel Napier, 'they closed on their terrible enemy; and then was seen with what strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain Soult, by voice and gesture, tried to animate his Frenchmen. In vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded column, sacrifice their

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 61. [2] *Ibid.* vol. ix. p. 143.

Col. Napier on Albuera, 1811.

lives to gain time and space for the mass to open out on such a fair field. In vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately on friends and foes, while the horsemen, hovering on the flanks, threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation; their deafening shouts overpowered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultuous crowd, as foot by foot, and with a horrid carnage, it was driven, by the incessant vigour of the attack, to the furthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endeavour to sustain the fight; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass at length giving way, like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the steep: the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood; and eighteen hundred unwounded men —the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers—stood triumphant on the fatal hill.'[1]

[1] 'Peninsular War,' vol. iii. p. 170.

In four hours the French lost 8,000, and the British 4,300. The British, therefore, killed more than their own total number. After the battle of Albuera, 'When the Buffs were called together, only *three* privates and *one* drummer answered the roll call, though great numbers, who had been made prisoners, and escaped in the confusion, joined during the night and next day.'[1] If Brown Bess took four hours to kill 8,000 men, what could not be done in fifteen minutes with the new rifle? A line of 50,000 men might have 7,500,000 bullets in the air in a quarter of an hour at ten shots a minute, or 3,750,000 bullets, at five shots per minute. Now 7,500 men firing one shot in two minutes gives 56,250 bullets fired in a quarter of an hour. But it was for four hours, or sixteen times 56,250, or 900,000, or a little more than 112 bullets expended to one man killed. Then 3,750,000 give, at 112 for each man, a sum of 66,954, as killed by 7,500 men in a quarter of an hour. It is well to consider this matter, because there cannot be a doubt that our good marksmen would kill far more than one man in 112 shots. Again, if 7,500 men could kill 66,964 men in fifteen minutes, what is sixteen times that number—i.e. for four hours? it makes the enormous sum of 1,071,424.

Loss at Albuera.

What might be the loss (by *comparison*) with the new rifle in 1872?

Now the battles of Plassey under Clive, of

[1] Alison, vol. ix. p. 147.

Assaye, Plassey, and Albuera, no more rash than Trafalgar.

Assaye or Albuera under Wellington, were no more rash than Trafalgar. All obstacles having been well weighed, 'dash' became necessary, because 'It is from the greatest hazards that the greatest honours are also gained, both by State and individuals.'

Victory justifies the risk.

When the result is victory, there could have been no more hazard than usually attends all mundane transactions—that common uncertainty which has to be well weighed, considered, understood, and calmly reflected upon ere the attack is permitted. All is in the hands of Providence. The greatest prudence, the utmost of human foresight or calculation, is of no avail if God wills it otherwise than we wish. But it is too true that 'Providence helps those who help themselves.'[1]

Providence helps those who do their best.

What very desperate men do.

Sudden difficulties are the cause of directing the minds of observing men to *other* channels of thought—a condemned felon, to save his life, may make a dangerous drop from a window which would daunt another, and escape unhurt after all. He thus takes the *chance* of death in preference to the certainty of being executed if he does not escape from prison. Thus a wise commander sees the result ere he commences a bold project, and the very rapidity of his decision to attack may in the end be the real cause of suc-

Rapidity of decision cause of good results.

[1] Sir Henry Lawrence.

cess. Our Indian commanders have ever had to meet vast odds. Look at Rose, Havelock, Colin Campbell, Lake, Clive, and a thousand others! It all depends on skilful preparations, and a proper confidence in the soldiers, accompanied by a just appreciation of the strength and quality of the foes we have to deal with.

All depends on skilful preparations, &c.

A portly John Bull is far too prone to estimate his enemy's capabilities or courage by the rotundity of his own body, or the length of his own legs, rather than by calmly weighing the capacity of his adversary's brain. Often we hear a huge ignorant fellow talking of 'those insignificant little Frenchmen,' and pointing out a lank Guardsman, as a person 'who would put half-a-dozen such pigmies to flight.' Such critics are generally persons who have never seen any actual service,—who have not felt what it is to come face to face with a line of men with loaded muskets or rifles. They forget that a bullet makes no distinction between a giant and a dwarf, only that the giant exposes a larger target for the bullet to hit. By looking then to the minds, and not the bodies of men, we are bound to acknowledge the wisdom of that Being who bestowed intelligence on other nations as well as on the British; and remembering this, we should naturally learn not to despise even the most abject-looking enemy. The mind is to

John Bull too prone to judge of a man by his stature.

The safest way of judging of men, is by their minds.

The mind is to the body as the main-spring to the watch.

the body as the mainspring to the watch. A man who judges his enemy by his stature, and respects or fears him accordingly, is like a child who prefers the large silver turnip to the small gold repeater! The purest and most precious diamond in the world may have been wrapt in filthy rags in the most loathsome lazaretto. The most gorgeous butterfly only starts into its new and beauteous existence when it has burst the trammels of its unsightly chrysalis. Omnipotence may place an immortal spirit as the fleeting tenant of an earthy tenement which possesses the manly and symmetrical proportions of an Apollo Belvidere, an Achilles, or an Agamemnon; but He may also confine a spirit as noble and as proud within the ungainly and unprepossessing exterior of a dwarfish hunchback. No man ever lived who was so powerful that he could despise other human beings with impunity. God will not permit His noblest work to be treated with contempt by poor, helpless man. Every contemplative mind possesses its own inward and special herald, to proclaim perpetually that dissolution is certain; and just as the famous warrior's crier bore his noble master's 'winding sheet' through the streets of Damascus, it is constantly announcing, even to the mightiest of commanders, that 'This is *all* that remains to the mighty Saladin, the conqueror of the East!'

Appearances deceitful.

No man can despise humanity.

The inward herald.

What Saladin took to the grave.

This is the harbinger that clears a man's ways of life of the many obstacles that might otherwise impede his progress. This is the silent voice that must be heard—the voice that urges men to the performance of brave, generous, noble, and magnanimous deeds. This is the inward counsellor who *must* be heard; and there has not lived a potentate who dared assert that he never felt its influence. It teaches more; it leads us to be just, to be truthful.

What conscience does for us.

> Truth is the little 'globule' that floats upon the mind,
> And as it tends to *centre* to *ever* is inclined;
> But when uneven justice, or falsehood, gains the sway,
> That 'globule' from its centre *ever* darts away.

Truth the spirit level of the mind.

How much can the best of heroes boast of, if the mighty Saladin, preparing for death, knew that all he could take to the grave was but a 'winding-sheet'? The commander has his power from above, and the Almighty arm that places a king on the throne can as easily reverse the process and put a beggar in his place. If, then, the winding-sheet is indeed the banner of Mortality, surely every soldier, who fights under it, should remember that he is but *dust*, even if he be the Dictator of a realm. The Lacedæmonians said truly, 'They are indeed wise men who cautiously regard their good things as doubtful (the same men would also deal with misfortunes more

Merely dust!

What the Lacedæmonians said of war.

discreetly than others) and who think that war does not confine itself to that measure on which men may wish to meddle with it. Such men too will meet with the fewest failures, because they are not elated by confiding in their military success.' The Duke of Marlborough 'never fought a battle that he did not gain, and never besieged a fortress that he did not take. He possessed the coolest head, and the warmest heart of his time.'

The Duke of Marlborough.

Let us be prepared.

Let us then be prepared for the worst, but let us never despise our enemies. To be prepared is to have a 'cool head,' and resources in reserve. To despise our foes, is to be blinded by arrogance to such a degree as to forget that we ourselves are only men, and then it is that we approach other mortals rashly and unguardedly, instead of cautiously and with circumspection.

Speech of Archidamus.

'Frequently too has the less number, through being afraid, more successfully repelled the more numerous, through their being unprepared, in consequence of contempt.'[1] When Marchmount Pacha retired from Napoli to Corinth, Colcotroni, with a mere handful of men, attacked and defeated 20,000 of the Turks, slaughtering no less than 5,000 of them. The Turks lost 25,000 men in the second campaign in the Morea. Marco Botzaris,

Colcotroni defeats Marchmount Pacha.

[1] Archidamus, King of the Lacedæmonians.

who commanded the Greeks at Crionero, having made a forced march with only 2,000 men, attacked Mustapha at the head of 20,000 Turks. His confidence as to the result of that night attack was so great that he said, 'If you lose sight of me during the combat, seek me in the Pacha's tent!' He sounded a bugle, as soon as he reached the centre, upon which the Turks were seized with a panic, and fled.

Marco Botzaris defeats Mustapha.

Schamyl, the brave Circassian, is a noble example of what a really bold but cautious man can do by merely watching for the critical moment. His gallant and devoted followers were always kept 'well in hand,' but the instant they were hurled at the foe, they rushed on like lions. Thus it was that this gallant commander performed prodigies of valour, and, with a mere handful of determined men, was generally victorious. He never made a dash till the proper time, but commencing with a full confidence that he would succeed, he could see on to the end of the action. At one time, when, attacked in front and rear simultaneously, he was obliged to face two armies at the same time, he charged a Russian square, and threw it into utter disorder. Again we see the brave Schamyl swooping down with his sturdy mountaineers upon the lethargic Russians who are intoxicated with some trivial success. The

Schamyl, the Circassian,

defeats a Russian square.

bold Circassian comes not in a listless, apathetic manner, but like a thunderbolt, and cuts them to pieces. Or, observe him surrounded by a host of enemies elated with their seeming certainty of success; unwise enough to despise such a foe at such a time, they are consequently less energetic in their further endeavours to secure what they flatter themselves is an easy victory quite within their grasp. As they abate their efforts, Schamyl flashing past like a meteor darts suddenly down upon the now bewildered Russians, and they fly panic-stricken before the very man they had so recently looked upon with contempt, and counted —too soon—a feeble or already prostrate foe.

Schamyl defeats the Russians.

Battle of Tagliacozzo, 1268.

At Tagliacozzo on August 23, 1268, Charles of Anjou defeated Conradin, by charging with his reserve when the enemy were dispersed in pursuit of two divisions that had given way. At Marengo, the Austrian general Melas was actually writing a report of his victory at the very moment that Kellermann's cavalry was carrying all before them. Melas was so astonished that it was long before he would believe that his army was beaten. Exactly the same occurred to Frederick the Great at Kunnersdorf. 'Half the Russian guns were taken.' The king sent off a courier to Berlin with two lines announcing a victory.'[1] But the

Melas at Marengo.

Frederick the Great at Kunnersdorf.

[1] Macaulay's 'Essay on Frederick the Great.

Russians were stubborn, and the Prussians were exhausted, and gave way; then the 'terror began to spread from man to man.' The second despatch was very different from the first. Frederick now wrote 'Send the archives to Potsdam. The town may make terms with the enemy.'

Battle of Cowpens, 1780.

At the battle of Cowpens, December 17, 1780, Colonel Tarlton 'pierced the American regulars,' when they suddenly rallied and checked their pursuers. General Morgan thus won a victory, and killed 400 out of 900 of Tarlton's force. It is wonderful to observe how little things change the tide of battle; how frequently a very few fresh men, properly led, have gained a victory. When Cyrus saw his Greeks were victorious, he was not enticed thereby into a straggling pursuit; but keeping a band of 600 cavalry drawn up in close order, he waited for what might happen. Suddenly he observed that the Persian king, in the centre of the army, wheeled round to take the pursuing Greeks in *rear*, intending to cut them to pieces. Then it was that Cyrus charged with his 600 horsemen and put the bewildered Persians to flight.

Cyrus defeats the Persians.

The Persians were handed equally as roughly by another great commander.

Alexander defeats the Persians.

'While Alexander thus met and baffled all the flanking attacks of the enemy with troops brought

up from his second line, he kept his own horse-guards and the rest of the front line *fresh*, and ready to take advantage of the first opportunity of striking a decisive blow. This soon came: a large body of horse, who were posted on the Persian left wing, nearest the centre, quitted their station, and rode off to help their comrades in the fight that was still going on at the extreme right of Alexander's wing, against the detachments from his second line. Alexander instantly charged with his guard and all the cavalry of his wing.'[1] Darius fled because his 'nerve' utterly failed him.

King Brudus defeats King Alpin.

King Alpin of the Scots, with an army superior in military skill, was defeated by Brudus, king of the Picts. Brudus made all his 'attendants, male and female, assemble and show themselves at a distance as a powerful reinforcement coming to the Picts,' and the Scots, on seeing them, were seized with a panic, and fled! We ask does this not all prove the mere test of *nerve*? So in a siege when an enemy advances close enough for you to see his *eye*, then is the time to test the nerve. The history of the Indian Mutiny of 1857 is full of cases where victory was won by prudence and boldness combined. Again the 'Heavy Brigade' at Balaclava, after tremendous efforts to break the Russian masses, was only saved by the

Test of 'Nerve.'

Heavy Brigade at Balaclava.

[1] E S. Creasy, vol. i, p. 141.

well-timed, but resolute, charge of the First Dragoon Guards and the Inniskillings. This charge was successful because it was sharp, and well directed. A few fresh men, in fact, dashed suddenly at the Russians who had wheeled rapidly round in an attempt to surround and crush the Scotch Greys. We must recollect that the Russian cavalry had previously swept down upon our Greys and Lancers; the terrific shock had been met and resisted, and then came the 'critical moment.' One grand and simultaneous dash of our splendid Dragoon Guards and Inniskillings concluded the affair. Men who sweep down in full hope of carrying all before them are dreadfully crest-fallen when charged by a body of fresh troops coming from an unexpected quarter. Wellington was enabled to cross the Douro in the face of the French army simply because the enemy in their anxiety to reach the threatened point rushed out of Oporto perfectly regardless of all order. A panic may seize the bravest; even victorious troops will bolt away, often in opposite directions. Such are the absurdities and chances in war.

How the Duke of Wellington crossed the Douro.

The 'nerve' once shaken, man forgets he *is* a man. When nerve is preserved, almost anything reasonable can be done in battle. During the military operations on the Mediterranean

Operations on the coast of the Mediterranean.

coast, when the Grenadiers and Inniskillings were bathing, a troop of scampering buffaloes caused a laughable but temporary commotion. A staff officer having reported that 'the French cavalry were coming down,' the steady men of 'Cole's brawny brigade rushed out of the sea, and throwing their belts over their shoulders, grasped their muskets and drew up in line without attempting to put on a stitch of clothing!' This proves what 'presence of mind'—only another term for nerve—the British soldier possesses on the emergency. At the battle of Yarmouk, 636, the Saracen women belaboured their husbands, and forced them to return three successive times to the charge. The Saracen commanders told their men that 'Paradise was before them, and the devil and hell-fire were behind.' Yet Abu Sofian (one of the leaders who used these encouraging words) was himself forced to retreat, and was saluted by one of the women with a blow in the face, administered with a tent-pole, for his cowardice. Had the Greeks known that the Saracens required this cudgelling from the rear to keep them up in front, they would hardly have let such men win a victory over them. Abdula Ebin Kort says, 'Although some of the Saracen generals fought desperately, yet after all they would have been beaten but for the *women!*'

Battle of Yarmouk, 636.

The Saracen women the cause of victory.

As these Saracen leaders lived as far back as the year 636, it is possible that this incident may have given rise to the expression that wives are the '*better* halves!'

At the battle of Ferozeshah, a Seik chieftain in command of an immense force of cavalry did not bring a single horseman into action, because he supposed the retrograde movement of our guns towards Ferozepore was a trick to outflank him. Battle of Ferozeshah.

At the battle of Assaye, the 74th was placed in a most perilous position. When the enemy's sabres were crossing the bayonets of the 74th, Colonel Maxwell charged at the head of a little band of British cavalry, 'and down went the Mahrattas by hundreds, and the 74th rallied, re-formed, and pushed on.' The promptitude of that grand charge saved the 74th, though the regiment lost severely; one company went into action with one officer and fifty men, but in the evening only *four* rank and file survived. Here we would say with Pericles, 'I am more afraid of our *own* mistakes than of the enemy's plans.' Battle of Assaye, 74th in a perilous position. Speech of Pericles.

At the charge of Setabuldee Lieutenant J. B. Hearsey saved our force. This young officer seeing that the enemy's guns at one flank would assuredly interfere with a charge of cavalry that was intended for the other flank, asked permission, with a weak troop of sixty native horsemen, to Charge of Setabuldee, Lieut. J. B. Hearsey.

dash at the enemy. He was permitted to do so, and he rode right at the guns and captured them. The other charge having failed, he then, to cover the repulse, opened fire with his captured guns and threw the victorious body of natives into confusion. This young officer was cut down by the subadar who commanded the guns, and was left on the field for six hours. Afterwards, fainting from loss of blood, his body was placed amongst the *slain* ready for interment the following morning; but he was rescued and lived to be a distinguished general in the Company's Indian Army. Here were prudence and dash both combined.

Bosquet at Inkerman.

At Inkerman, Bosquet with his Chasseurs and Zouaves took advantage of the 'critical moment,' and converted a probable defeat into a victory. Dr. Russell tells us, on the authority of a Russian officer, that if our army had moved on the 25th, (after the battle of Alma) to Baksi Serai, we should have found 'the whole Russian army in a state of complete demoralization, and that if we had advanced directly on Sebastopol the town (after a slight show of resistance) would have surrendered.' Russell seems to have considered that the auspicious moment had been disregarded, as he adds: 'To rush into an enemy's territories, to fight such a battle, to repulse such

Dr. Russell's ideas as to the capture of Sebastopol by a *coup de main*.

an immense force, was the precursor of a long siege, of bloody battles and great losses.' Time may tell who was right. The obstacles to be encountered, and the great risks that must necessarily have been run to do as the Russian officer had suggested are the points to be considered. With all due deference to the opinions of Dr. Russell, we think that the advance then on Sebastopol would have been a grave error. The 'long siege,' the 'bloody battles,' and the 'great losses,' all go to prove the stubborn character of the foe. To have gone right at the tremendous defences immediately after the battle of Alma might have brought our jaded, but triumphant, army, face to face with tens of thousands of fresh men, who would very probably have rallied those who had been in action, and have made more than *a slight show of resistance*. It might have ended in a most dreadful repulse; and this we have a full right to infer from the desperate determination of the Russians in all the after engagements. The enemy was not shaken to the fullest degree. A portion only of the army had been defeated; and who can tell that the retreat was not ordered as a mere *feint* just to tempt our commanders to hurl partially worn-out men upon others in a strong position calmly awaiting the attack? If the whole army of Sebastopol had been routed, and utterly

Reasons for disagreeing with Dr. Russell.

Enemy not all shaken.

demoralized, then perhaps the onward movement might have been successful. But there was a fine army intrenched inside, and certainly not so 'shaken' as to give in quietly, or indeed without a most terrific struggle. After the disastrous retreat at Chinhut, (Lucknow, June 30, 1857), the garrison did not quietly surrender. The enemy came up with our poor fellows in retreat, but lost immensely in endeavouring to take the place at once by assault. They were repulsed at every point over a space of about one mile and a quarter, along a front of irregular form, re-entering at some parts, salient in others. Had our whole force, however, been defeated at Chinhut, the panic and demoralisation might have been so great as to allow the rebels to have forced their way into the 'Presidency Position' along with the retiring mass of our troops.

Chinhut retreat, Lucknow, 1857.

CHAPTER VII.

Energetic Measures generally successful when employed with Judgment—The Scale of Victory easily turned; instanced at Balaclava, Waterloo, Salamanca, Corunna, Friedland—Critical Moments further Illustrated: Alarcos, Naseby, Monengo, Jena, &c.—Trivial instances causes of disaster—Dara and Arungzebe, Tippoo Sahib, &c.—Nothing new under the Sun—Even the Breech-loader was known 300 years ago—Strange Blindness of Scientific Men to the value of this weapon.

Energetic measures are generally successful.

WE quite agree that 'Decisive and energetic measures have never failed, though contrary courses have brought us very near destruction.'[1] But these words of Sir Henry Lawrence allude to not taking advantage of the 'critical time.' He himself was not the man to want in energy. He saved Lucknow by his decision. It was only by a false report that he was induced to let the small force proceed to Chinhut, where some immense masses of the enemy were ready to overwhelm his little band of the brave soldiers of the 32nd Regiment. Individuals of the highest repute cannot always be relied on when giving their opinions on matters relative to war, if they are not fully acquainted with the motives of com-

A commander's plans should be known to be criticised.

[1] Sir Henry Lawrence.

manders. They cannot be accepted as perfect authorities. Though meaning well, their opinions may be erroneous, because they cannot know the thousand and one obstacles that may have prevented a general from doing what others thought feasible, or 'on the cards.' We ourselves were quite satisfied with the results of Alma, and after such a victory we could well afford to let our men rest. A repulse from Sebastopol would have injured the 'nerve' of our magnificent soldiers who felt such confidence after their success. Not that they were less confident before the battle, but after it they had full proof of their prowess.

A repulse from Sebastopol would have injured the 'nerve' of our men.

When we think of the 'critical moments' in battles, let us not forget Waterloo. The French Cuirassiers, all splendid men, were the terror of the field up to the time they found that they were unable, in spite of their impetuosity, to penetrate a single British square. They had, however, driven back our 'Light Cavalry' and the German Legion; it was when they met our huge Life Guards, Oxford Blues, and Greys, that they fairly gave way under the shock, and were literally ridden down. The French Cuirassiers had, however, galloped all over the field before they met these fresh men of their own size. There is no doubt that the bodily strength of the British cavalry 'was pre-eminent in the hand to hand

Waterloo. Splendid charge of the French cuirassiers.

struggle,' yet, in mere justice to the French, it must be said, that a body of *fresh* cavalry, charging headlong against jaded horsemen, has an obvious advantage. A very similar case this to that of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava. Fresh men hurled at noble fellows who have come over much ground already, must be successful. At Waterloo, when Ponsonby was killed, and four-fifths of the cavalry brigade had fallen, Vandeleur's horse charged the French in flank, and drove Jaquenot's light cavalry back with great slaughter.[1] The Hanoverian battalion of Kilmansegge's Brigade, when in hot pursuit, was suddenly attacked by Milhaud's cuirassiers, and was almost destroyed, when Lord Somerset's brigade of Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards, and 1st Dragoon Guards, bore down upon the cuirassiers and defeated them.[2] 12,000 French horse filled up the whole open space between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont. 'The first line was composed of cuirassiers in burnished steel; in the second line were the red lancers of the guard in brilliant uniform; in the third, the chasseurs of the guard, in rich furred costume of green and gold, with black bear-skin shakos on their heads.'[3]

French cavalry jaded.

The Heavy Brigade at Balaclava.

Milhaud's cuirassiers defeated by Lord Somerset's brigade.

'The gunners issued forth from our squares,

Artillery at Waterloo.

[1] Alison, vol. xii. p. 247. [2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.* p. 249.

quickly reloaded their pieces, and sent a destructive storm of grape after the retiring squadrons. Then were the British cavalry let loose in pursuit, and hurled the assailing columns in confusion to the bottom of the slope.' The Duke of Wellington said, 'Stand fast, 95th, we must not be beaten. What would they say of us in England?' 'Never fear, sir,' replied the men of the heroic 95th, 'we know our *duty*.' The gunners at Waterloo always dismounted the rear wheel of each gun before running into our squares, so that the French cavalry had no chance of carrying off our cannon!

Duke of Wellington and the '95th!'

Napoleon uses his cavalry too soon.

Alison points out 'the imprudent use he (Napoleon) made of nearly his whole cavalry in a desperate strife during the middle of the action, whereby it became, notwithstanding its great numerical strength, so diminished in numbers, depressed in spirit, and worn out by fatigue, that it was unable to oppose any effectual resistance to the incursion of the British horse, in part comparatively fresh at the close of the day.'[1]

British at Waterloo.

Before the Prussians arrived on the field of Waterloo, 37,000 of the British and the King's German Legion,—with the Hanoverians, in all 52,000,—faced 80,000 French veteran troops for above five hours.[2]

Strength of our forces.

The British army at Waterloo was 67,000 men

[1] Alison, vol. xii. p. 270. [2] *Ibid.*

and 156 guns. Of these only 15,181 infantry, 5,843 cavalry, and 2,967 artillery, or a total of 23,991, were actually British troops.

The French had 252 guns, and 80,000 veterans, the very flower of their army; of these 15,000 were most magnificent horsemen. The fact that 24,000 stood for five long hours before 80,000 French, will prove what our men can do. What odds might not 100,000 British soldiers face?

24,000 British stand up against 80,000 French.

At Salamanca (1812), the French drove off Pack's Portuguese, and thus threw Cole's and Leith's Divisions into disorder. This was the crisis of the battle. Clausel pursued, but Beresford checked him with a brigade of the 5th Division, whilst Wellington ordered up Clinton's Division from the rear, and 'their charge upon the enemy, already somewhat disordered by success, proved entirely successful.'[1]

Salamanca, 1812.

'The allied host righting itself like a gallant ship after a sudden gust of wind, again bore onward in blood and gloom. For though the air, purified by the storm of the night, was peculiarly clear, one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it was the battle with all the sights and sounds of terror.'[2]

[1] Alison, vol. ix. p. 246.

[2] Napier, Pen. War, vol. iv. p. 272.

French loss at Salamanca.

The loss of the allies was 5,200, of whom 3,176 were British, 2,018 Portuguese, and only eight Spanish. The French lost 7,000, but including prisoners, about 14,000. Clausel in the retreat got over forty miles in a little more than twelve hours. What a *pace* he must have gone at! At La Serna the French rear-guard was attacked by Bock's Germans and Anson's brigade of English dragoons, who broke three French squares, one after the other, and sabred or made all prisoners. Such was the deep depression of the enemy.

Three squares destroyed.

The catastrophe to the first square caused the 'nerve' of the men in the second to be utterly shaken, while the fugitives from the first and second made the third square waver. In these charges the loss of the Germans was only 100 men.[1] There are times, as in this case, when an enemy in retreat may be closely pressed, yet it cannot always be done. Massena 'paused at the sight of the formidable barrier' of Torres Vedras; and when he retreated, Wellington 'did not press his rear-guard with any great force.'[2] Nor did Wellington attack Massena when he halted at the strong position called Santarem, as it could not be done 'without immense loss.'[3] Here was caution

Massena at Torres Vedras.

[1] Alison, vol. ix. p. 242.

[2] *Ibid.* p. 333. [3] *Ibid.*

exemplified in both cases by these wary and prudent commanders.

At Elvina (1809), about a mile from Corunna, the French came on with such dash that they drove in the outposts and made themselves masters of Elvina, but they were driven out by the 42nd and 50th Regiments. These brave troops, however, pursued too far, and were assailed by fresh Frenchmen in their turn, and were driven a second time through Elvina. Sir John Moore seeing this shouted, 'Highlanders, remember Egypt!' and bringing up a battalion of Guards in support, led all again forward to the charge. The shock was irresistible. Borne back at the point of the bayonet, the enemy were once more driven into Elvina, from whence, after a desperate struggle, they were finally expelled with slaughter. In this decisive contest, however, Sir John Moore received a mortal wound from a cannon-shot.

Elvina, 1809. Corunna.

Highlanders at Elvina, Corunna, 1809.

Death of Sir John Moore.

'Here the victorious troops were broken by the enclosures and stone walls on the other side of the village.'[1] In this instance disaster was doubtless caused by first rashness. Sir John Moore lost his life in rectifying the mistake, and changing the tide of the contest.

At Friedland (1807), 'On came Ney's column

Battle of

[1] Alison, vol. viii. p. 30.

Friedland, 1807.

with the fury of a tempest, driving before them, like foam before the waves, the Russian chasseurs of the guard, and several regiments of cavalry and Cossacks, who were placed in advance. Some regiments of militia, stationed on the low ground near the Alle, also broke and fled towards the bridges, spreading alarm and confusion through the whole rear of the enemy.' Ney's advanced guards were already close to Friedland, when the Russian Imperial Guard was ordered to advance. 'Immediately these noble troops rushed forward with fixed bayonets, not in compact order, but with such vigour that the leading divisions of Ney's corps, assailed in front and flank, were pierced through, trodden down, and driven back with prodigious slaughter. As they hurried on in pursuit of Ney, they came upon the reserve under Victor, which had advanced to his support, and one of his divisions, under Dupont, charged them so opportunely in flank, while disordered by the vehemence of their pursuit, that they were in *their* turn repulsed to the edge of the town.'[1] Here Ney made a mistake which the Russians actually copied in the same action. Two divisions of the Russians actually fought their way from the ford to the bridge, which they found broken, whereupon they attacked the French, and gloriously cut their

Two mistakes.

[1] Alison, vol. vii. pp. 34, 35.

way clean through the streets of Friedland, though the place was defended by both Ney's and Victor's triumphant troops.

It seems wonderful how men allow such gross mistakes to occur. If the Russians could all have done what these two divisions in desperation accomplished, the tide might have again changed in their favour; but men seized by a panic lose 'nerve,' and fear for the moment removes all obstacles from the human being's mind. Thousands of battles have been lost, which would have been certain victories had the defeated men fought half as well, or as stubbornly, before they retired as they did, in desperation, immediately afterwards. But once the enemy sees the back of his foe he takes heart, and he is harder to conquer then than before he knows he is winning; although something new, such as a sudden check from fresh men, as in the above cases, may often on the instant turn the day. In the account of the battle of Alarcos, 1195, we find again how rashness and impetuosity will lead to defeat even in the very moment of victory. It will there be seen how men in hot pursuit often forget that the retiring army may suddenly halt and make a desperate stand. We read that 'a column of cavalry, consisting of not less than 7,000 horse, commenced the battle. The riders, as well as the

The results of a panic.

Battle of Alarcos, 1195.

horses, were covered with defences of iron; the breastplates, cuirasses, and helmets of the cavaliers shone glittering in the sun. They came thundering onwards, their steel panoply guarding them from every harm, and, with a fearful clangour, threw their impetuous force upon the Moslem ranks.' After three successive charges, the 'Christians broke and disordered the Moslems,' and in the pursuit 'a fearful carnage ensued.' But at that critical moment, Abdulla-ben-Senanid, at the head of his Andalusian Moors, charged the Christian cavalry under the immediate command of Alfonso the Eighth, and threw them into irremediable confusion. The tide of the battle had now turned, and the Christians, in their turn fled, and were pursued with terrific slaughter. These losses included 10,000 cavaliers, the flower of Alfonso's army, who had sworn by their crosses, never to turn their backs as long as one man among them remained alive. 'This was fulfilled to the letter,' remarks the Mohammedan historian; so we may safely infer that not a single cavalier escaped. Doubtless, the Christians spreading out in the hasty pursuit had no time to regain order and compactness before they were furiously charged by the full weight of the fresh Andalusian horse. Here, again we find the victors vanquished by indulging in a mad, headlong pursuit, regardless of all dis-

The Christians pursue.

The Crusaders are vanquished.

Cause of the Christian defeat.

cipline. There is little doubt that if, after he had driven the left wing of the Parliamentary army in disorder through the streets of Naseby, Prince Rupert had at once galloped back to join the 'King's reserve,' the final charge of Cromwell's 'iron-troopers' would not have so easily turned the day; because, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Fairfax and Skippon, the 'Roundheads' were 'faltering.' 'The whole fate of the day depended upon which side should first see its cavalry return.' Cromwell first broke the Royal Horse, under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and then returned, after his success, to charge the Royalists on the flank.

Battle of Naseby.

Cromwell defeats the Royal Horse.

The 'critical moment' that decided the battle of Marengo, was when Dessaix saw the crowd of Victor's division in full retreat, with Napoleon himself at their head. Dessaix said to Napoleon, 'The battle is lost; I suppose I can do no more than secure your retreat?' It must be remembered that this force under Dessaix was then Napoleon's last reserve, yet that great commander replied, 'By no means; the battle is, I trust, gained: push forward your column.' This order was instantly obeyed, and the Austrians, wearied by a too rapid pursuit of the French, were at once driven back in confusion.

Dessaix at Marengo.

Dessaix's orders from Napoleon.

The fierce and well-timed assault of the French

Murat at Jena.

cavalry and cuirassiers, under Murat, decided the terrible battle of Jena. The battle of Borodino proves that fresh troops can do wonders if only advanced at the proper moment. Kutusoff, finding his left wing giving way after a combat of three hours, drove back the French by charging with his reserve cavalry and grenadiers.

Borodino.

Battle of Lonato, 1796.

In 1796 Napoleon retook Lonato by charging 'with a column of infantry upon his (Quasadonovich's) centre when extending themselves towards Salo. Lonato was taken by assault, and the Austrian army cut asunder, being weakened by extending its wings.'[1] At Turcoing, West Flanders, in 1794, the Duke of York only saved himself by the fleetness of his horse, and the Allies lost 3,000 men and 60 pieces of cannon by dividing their forces into six columns, by which the French 'had the advantage of numbers at the point of attack.'[2]

Battle of Turcoing, 1794.

Battle of Fleurus, 1794.

At the battle of Fleurus 1794, the Imperialists adhering to their system of attacking the enemy at all points, broke up their army into five columns. In the centre at the great redoubt of Fleurus, 'the French cavalry under Dubois, made a furious charge upon the Imperial infantry, overthrew them, and captured fifty pieces of

Dubois's cavalry defeated by Austrian cuirassiers.

[1] Alison, vol. iii. pp. 290, 291.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 139, 140.

cannon; but being disordered by their rapid advance they were immediately after attacked by the Austrian cuirassiers, who not only retook the whole artillery, but routed the victors, and drove them back in confusion upon their own lines."[1]

When Napoleon was making his dispositions to attack in mass at Jena with above 100,000 men, the Duke of Brunswick on the other hand divided his forces, and while Hohenlohe was left in position with 40,000 men at Jena as a rear-guard of the army, the principal body, with the king at its head, moving at daylight for Suiza, arrived at night on the heights of Auberstadt.[2] Duke of Brunswick's mistake.

At Rio Seco, 1808, Cuesta drew up his troops in two lines, a mile and a half from each other! When the force under Blake was overpowered by the dash of the French, Cuesta came upon them, while still in some disorder from the pursuit of Blake's troops, overthrew them and took four guns. But while the Spanish troops were in full cry after the French, they were themselves charged by no less than 12,000 of the Imperial Guard (cavalry), and defeated, so that a mere massacre and rout was the result.[3] At Salamanca, 1812, Wellington saw the mistake made by Thomières and Clausel, who by advancing too rapidly made a chasm Battle of Rio Seco, 1808. Salamanca, 1812.

[1] Alison, vol. iii. p. 144. [2] *Ibid.* vol. vi. p. 261.
[3] *Ibid.* vol. vii. pp. 354, 355.

between their own divisions and that of Bonnet.[1] This was exactly the same error as that perpetrated by the Russian centre at Austerlitz, in performing a similar flank movement in the presence of an active enemy. The Duke (at Salamanca) said to the Spanish general 'Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu.' The Reserve and Light Divisions were placed behind the Arapiles hill; the Fifth was moved from the left to the centre. When this disposition was completed, the army formed line in 'echelon' with the right in front. 'The British bayonets were upon them before Marmont, before Clausel and Bonnet, could move to the support. The line of the British formed the chord while they were toiling round the arc, and consequently his dispositions were made with much greater celerity.'[2]

Mistake of the French.

In this action Le Marchant's heavy dragoons routed Clausel's Division, when the French, 'in whole companies, threw down their arms and fled.'[3] A single horse which dashed forward and fell upon the bayonets made the opening in the first square. How differently these brave French acted in 1807! 'Ney retreated on Deppen by echelons of squares, each delivering its fire, opening out and retiring on either side of the square in rear which stood firm and performed a similar evolution, while the

Ney's retreat on Deppen, 1807.

[1] Alison, vol. ix. p. 242. [2] *Ibid.* p. 243.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 244.

entire formation of the first was effected.' Thus they retired for miles in good order and with the utmost steadiness.[1] Here is an instance of great presence of mind, and although Alison says, 'Ney in separate command seldom achieved anything worthy of reputation,' yet he frankly admits that 'the distinctive characteristic of Ney was his perfect calmness and self-possession in the midst of danger, and the invincible energy with which he pursued his object.'[2] This retreat on Deppen was a most wonderful feat, and when a man has both 'self-possession' and 'invincible energy,' he is worth his weight of diamonds in times of danger, even if he has little intellectual acumen.

Ney's character.

Want of 'self-possession' has caused innumerable disasters. In the siege of Samaria A.C. 907, we find that 'At the moment Adad thought victory within his grasp, the foot-men of the Prince of Israel advanced and attacked his vanguard and killed many of them, and pursued the rest to camp.' Here the men who felt secure of victory lost all self-possession, on account of the enemy's unexpected advance.

Siege of Samaria, A.C. 907.

At the siege of Messina, A.C. 264, it is recorded that 'Appius taking advantage of his victory, attacked the camp of the Carthaginians, but he was repulsed with some loss, and forced to retreat.'

Siege of Messina, A.C. 264.

[1] Alison, vol. vii. p. 24. [2] *Ibid.* vol. x. p. 306.

This might have been the very same with the British, had they pressed on after the Alma on Sebastopol. Appius was 'hotly pursued, which he desired and expected. He faced about and fortune seemed to change with the situation of the place. The Carthaginians could not stand against the courage of the Romans, but took to flight in their turn, after losing many men.' Appius thus made amends for his rashness, while the Carthaginian general did not evince much prudence in permitting his men to pursue the Romans too closely.

Appius rallies.

The Carthaginians defeated.

Dara lost the battle against Arungzebe by dismounting from his elephant, from which a rumour spread over the field that Dara had been killed, and his troops were seized with a panic. 'In a few minutes the army seemed disbanded, and (strange and sudden reverse) the conqueror became the vanquished. Aurungzebe remained during a quarter of an hour steadily on his elephant, and was rewarded with the crown. Dara left his own elephant a few minutes too soon, and was hurried from the pinnacle of glory to be numbered amongst the most miserable of princes. So short-sighted is man, and so mighty the consequences which sometimes flow from the most trivial incidents.'[1]

Battle between Dara and Arungzebe.

Dara's mistake.

[1] Bernier, physician to Aurungzebe.

These 'trivial incidents' are generally the causes of disaster. It is the 'unexpected' that men cannot face; the commander who can invent the 'unexpected' at the critical time is almost sure to gain by it. That leaving the elephant ruined Dara, because, as is well known, in former days the loss of the 'King' generally gave victory to the other side. Tippoo Sultan knew this, and always had six or eight men dressed exactly like himself, who were made to parade in various parts of the battle-field, so there was always one Tippoo in sight of his army somewhere or other. In one of the Durannee invasions of Hindostan a battle was lost to them by a trifling incident. The Durannees were victorious, when suddenly a number of carts, loaded with rockets taken from their enemies, were set on fire, and the rockets plunging in and out of the Durannee ranks caused the utmost consternation. The noise they made was said to be 'Shā-ko?' 'Shā-ko?' which, in Persian means, 'Where's the King?' —and supernatural awe causing a panic, the Durannes fled. Such is war; these trifles will upset thousands of brave and daring men. He then is the good commander who can turn them to account,—who can keep himself calm, and by that very calmness and self-possession instil a feeling of

Trivial incidents cause disaster.

Tippoo Sultan in battle.

Incident in a battle of Durannees with Hindostanees.

Self-possession in battle is everything.

confidence into the soldiers around him, in the midst of danger.

Battle of Tours, A.D. 732.

One of the principal causes of the victory of Tours, A.D. 732, was because the Moslems rode off to protect their tents, and the men under Charles Martel thought the Saracens were in flight. The Christians killed or captured 375,000 Arabs in this battle.[1] This is the only parallel, perhaps, to Sedan, as regards terrific loss. We find that at the battle of Campaldino, fought on June 11, 1289, the army of Arezzo, although consisting of only 8,000 infantry and 900 cavalry, gained a victory over the Florentine army, mustering 12,000 foot and 2,000 horsemen, which they lost in turn by a too rapid pursuit. The cavalry of the army of Arezzo put the 2,000 horsemen of the Florentine army to flight; but after the latter had retreated a great distance, they rallied, and crushing first the cavalry of the army of Arezzo, followed up their success by beating the infantry also, killing 3,000 of them, and capturing 2,000 prisoners. Here, again, a victory was madly thrown away by sheer want of common prudence.

Battle of Campaldino. 1289.

The army of Arezzo defeats the Florentine army.

And is in turn defeated.

Third siege of Antioch, A.D. 1097.

During the third siege of Antioch, A.D. 1097, there was a moment when the ranks of the Christians were broken. At that critical time Bishop Adhemar proclaimed 'celestial succour,'

[1] E. S. Creasy, M.A. vol. i. p. 287.

and forthwith the Crusaders shouted aloud, 'Dieu le veut,' and charged. The Saracens were shaken, pierced, and overwhelmed, and 100,000 corpses lay on the field of battle. We must make every allowance for the exaggerated reports of the ancient historians, yet there is no doubt that, where masses of men fought hand to hand, the slaughter was far greater before the introduction of fire-arms than since. A retreat then meant sheer massacre. But the losses at Sadowa were very great, though the Austrian cavalry sacrificed themselves to save their noble infantry, when driven back by the rapidity of firing of the Prussian needle-gun. And the losses during the war between North and South America afford another good test of the number of men who may be put *hors de combat.*

Sadowa.

We have previously alluded to that 'potence of nature,' and that general similarity which seems to permeate the entire intellectual portion of creation. He who said, 'There is nothing new under the sun,' taught all mankind a lesson. It is by knowing *man*, that the general gains his influence over his soldiers. There is nothing new, nothing in the present that we cannot find a parallel to, if we read the past carefully. Thus the speech of Cambyses to his son Cyrus is worth attention. He said, 'You say

Potence of nature.

Speech of Cambyses to Cyrus.

well, that is the way (by rewards and punishments) to make them obey you by force, but the chief point is to make them (the soldiers) obey you *willingly* and freely. Now the sure method of effecting this is to convince those you command that you know *better* what is for their advantage than they do themselves, for all mankind readily submit to those of whom they have that opinion. This is the principle from whence that blind submission proceeds which you see sick persons pay to their physicians, travellers to their guide, and a ship's company to the pilot. Their obedience is only founded upon the persuasion that all these are more skilful and knowing, in their respective callings, than themselves. He must really be so (said Cambyses), and in order to be so he must apply himself closely to his profession, diligently study all the rules of it, consult the most able and experienced masters, and have recourse to the protection of the gods, from whom alone we receive all our wisdom and our success.'[1]

A 'breech-loading' gun in 1537.

After the tremendous array of armies at Sadowa, after all the amazement at the fearful loss of life—by the operation of the needle-gun, what is the real truth? Was the weapon a new one? No; for we find that in the days of Henry VII., in the year 1537, some 300 years ago,

[1] Rollin's 'Ancient History,' vol. ii. p. 259.

that is to say, a smooth-bored '*breech-loading* matchlock harquebus,' was already invented and known.

In the Reports of the Archæological Institute of the year 1868, it is stated that this weapon was exhibited by General Lefroy, and that it had the year 1537 *marked* upon it. What were all the wise and scientific men of Europe about that they should be blind to the effects of this kind of weapon as exemplified in the Danish war? We raised our humble cry in the Indian papers in those days. We pointed out then the necessity of looking into the causes that made the Danes succumb though holding such a strong and well-defended position. Then came Sadowa, which had the desired effect; but alas, too late for poor Austria. Thus, by blindness a great nation met with a severe humiliation, and the other Powers learnt a lesson never to be forgotten. It set all the armouries of Europe to work day and night in the active manufacture of a new weapon. But the Prussians, seeing that their secret was now laid bare, and observing that their previous enormous advantage was gone, at once directed their whole attention, instead, to the attainment of a great preponderance in artillery; and then came Sedan with far more crushing effect than ten Sadowas put together. A voice raised in India

What the Author pointed out.

What the Prussians did.

never reached Europe, or both Austria and France might have been spared much misery and misfortune. As remarked before, the Author of this work predicted the misfortune to France a whole year before war was proclaimed, and the editor of the 'Pioneer' can prove this satisfactorily, if any reader has a doubt on this matter. Alas! official status is required to back one's opinion, and the Author being but a poor 'brevet lieutenant-colonel,' and failing to get the number of subscribers to enable him to meet the expenses of printing, &c., had not the means to publish this work (which was in manuscript at the 'Pioneer Press,' long before the end of 1870) as he earnestly desired.

A prediction verified.

CHAPTER VIII.

Necessity for study—Wisdom taught by humiliation—No general will succeed who works in a groove—Expenditure of force instanced by the trajectory of a bullet—Velocity gained at expense of carrying power—Imprudence of despising an enemy—Boldest project carried out by most trifling agencies—Opportunity makes the man—The knowledge of a soldier's wants among the first duties of a commander—Rash commanders much to blame—Soldiers reasoning beings, and should be treated as such—Instances—How to gain a knowledge of the soldier's character—A single word often enough to rule them—Others do not care for corporal punishment—Amenable to discipline if told they have broken the law—At heart good and generous, devoted to their comrades and their officers.

How study is to be applied.

'FACTS are stubborn things!' and this work is intended to be a mere record of *facts*. Young men should study their own profession; and 'those studies which in their youth they have perused promiscuously must be brought before them in *one* view, that they may see the science of the *whole* with each other, and with the nature of real being.'[1] It is for this purpose that the Author has worked for thirty years. He hopes his labour will not be in vain, for the glory of our Army is his sole ambition. His intention is not to dictate, but humbly to bring History as his unbiassed and

[1] Printed at Allahabad.

trustworthy witness to astounding facts relative to war. What is the use of reading Cæsar, if we do not take notes? Why pore over Napoleon's triumphs, or the glorious career of Wellington, of Nelson, of Eugène, Frederick the Great, and a thousand more, if we do not stamp them on our memory, and see the *object* at a glance of each manœuvre of these noble commanders? How many of the hundreds of thousands of youths that leave school, ever look at Cæsar again? 'It is, therefore,' said Sir Alexander Ball, one of Nelson's commanders, 'as absurd to hold book knowledge at present in contempt, as it would be for a man to avail himself only of his own eyes and ears, and to aim at nothing which could be performed exclusively by his own arms. The use and necessity of personal experience, consisted in the power of *choosing* and *applying* what had been read, and of discriminating, by the light of *analogy*, the *practicable*, and *probability* from mere *plausibility*. Without a judgment matured and steadied by actual experience, a man would read to little or perhaps *no* purpose.' A soldier who takes notes at the age of seventeen would hardly be an utter fool at forty if he can judge by mere analogy, and has common sense and discrimination as regards matters connected with his profession.

Reading Cæsar without notes is useless.

Sir Alexander Ball on book knowledge.

Thucydides.

We find a good example in Thucydides of the

danger of despising an enemy, and the caprices of fortune in turning the tide of battles. Brasidas said, 'For I conjecture that it is through contempt of us, and their not expecting anyone to march out against them to battle, that the enemy went up to their present position, and are now thinking nothing of us, while without any order they are engaged in looking about them. But whoever best observes such mistakes in his opponents, and also plans his attack upon them with regard to his own power, not so much in an open manner, and in regular battle array, as with reference to his present advantage, that man should be most successful. And these stratagems, by which one would most deceive his enemies and benefit his friends, have the highest reputation. While, then, they are still unprepared, yet confident, and are thinking, from what I see, of retiring rather than remaining, while their minds are irresolute, and before their plans are more definitely arranged, I will take my own division and surprise them, if I can, by falling at full speed in the centre of their forces. And you, Clearidas, opening the gates, rush out against them, and close as quickly as possible. For we may expect that in this way they will be most alarmed, since the force that follows up an attack is more terrible to an enemy than that which is already before them and engaged with him. I

on the danger of contempt for enemies.

Speech of Brasidas to Clearidas.

will show you that I am not better able to give advice to others than to carry it out in action *myself*.'

The result was that, after Brasidas routed the Athenians, Clearidas followed up and threw the enemy into the utmost confusion.

Battle of Mantinæa.

At the battle of Mantinæa, after 1,000 picked men of the Argives had cut up the Lacedæmonians, King Agis charged with only 300 horsemen, and put the veterans of the Argives to flight.

Battle of Saarbrück.

At the battle of Saarbrück the Prussian commander (no doubt purposely), by drawing off the attention of the French to *their* right, forced them to reinforce their right and right centre, when suddenly, as if by magic, a cannonade was heard in a different direction. The Prussians now appeared, much to the enemy's amazement, on the French left just at the critical moment. The French, by their previous hasty movement to their right, had denuded their left of troops, and an opportunity was lost never to be recovered. Supports could not arrive in time, and thus at that point the Prussians gained the advantage. The advice given by Brasidas before the battle of Amphipolis is worth recollecting. We can call to mind some sad mishaps that occurred during the Mutiny of 1857, which could not have happened had the officers concerned ever read the speech of Brasidas

to Clearidas. A calm retrospective glance into the occurrences of 1857, will show us that sometimes the rebels found our officers, though overconfident, yet unprepared. Were we not in more than one instance 'taught wisdom by humiliation'? May not some of these rebel leaders have said what the Czar of Russia once remarked with reference to the Swedes?—'I know very well that they have had the advantage over us for a considerable time, but they will *teach* us at length to beat *them*.' May not the French some day gain wisdom by humiliation and learn discipline from a school more adapted to the period? The pluck of that glorious nation has not suffered, but flesh and blood had no chance against such odds as regards superiority of the Prussian artillery. Such a catastrophe as Sedan might have fallen on any nation so unprepared. The France that recovered after Moscow and Waterloo, is a nation that will stand high yet on the scroll of Fame. France, if reorganized, may yet do anything; but peace is what the country should pray for and endeavour to maintain in its fullest integrity.

The Czar of Russia on the Swedes.

The future of France.

Officers who know the proneness of Asiatics to adopt all kinds of stratagems, should be ever prepared against their wily manœuvres. However brave the nation may be, however well supported,

Caution required.

however confident of success, we must remember that war is a progressive science. Natives become more intelligent every day, and every battle gives our foes a still further insight into our tactics and mode of operations. New methods therefore should be invented, on the spur of the moment, to bewilder our enemies, and to hide our own intentions. No general will succeed who works in *one groove*. To put in practice the *new*, the unusual, with rapidity, and at the critical time, is what is required, in a commander. At the Secunder Baugh at Lucknow, the rebels expected John Bull as usual would attack their guns in front, but Sir Colin battered down a part of the wall, at another side, and through this let loose upon them the Highlanders and Brazier's Sikhs. The only outlet was the gateway, and the guns there prevented the rebels from getting out. Their own guns, that is to say, prevented egress. Escape was now impossible. The rebels were caught in a huge trap,—pent up in a place surrounded by a high wall, the only issue from which was jammed up with their own cannon which they had expected would have been charged in *front*. The result was that the very flower of the old native army, 2,000 men, all nearly six foot high, were killed in that garden. The Author, in the year 1870, when visiting the spot, saw a huge heap of

Natives become more intelligent.

2,000 rebels killed at Secunder Baugh.

Caught in a trap!

Sad remains.

thigh-bones, which had been dug up where some vines were about to be planted. Those bones, one and all, indicated that they were the sad remains of men who must have been perfect giants in stature. These mutineers were known to be men of the two finest Sepoy corps in the service. They lay in the trenches of that garden three and four deep, and the place resembled a 'slaughter-house,' in some parts inches deep in blood. The walls to this day testify to the tempest of bullets, proving what 'volleys' must have been fired at these masses of mad desperate men flying utterly bewildered from spot to spot. The loss of the Highlanders and Sikhs was nothing wonderful considering the terrible resistance which the rebels made—until they saw that all was hopeless and became panic-stricken at the fearful loss they were sustaining.

This taught the mutineers no doubt a fearful lesson; but it is to be hoped that the claim of civilisation may avert such evils for the future. Still let us ever be prepared for any emergency, remembering that 'the use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for the moment, but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again—and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered.'[1]

A dreadful lesson.

Burke on force to conquer a nation.

Swedes defeated at Cronslot.

The Czar of Russia admitted that the Swedes beat his troops, yet was content, as he learnt a lesson each time. By-and-by when the Swedes, landing at Cronslot, went right at the Russian position, they were defeated, because Colonel Tolbeguin, ordering his men to lie flat on their stomachs, gave a signal for the Russians to rise suddenly and deliver their fire just as the enemy approached. This was done with such precision that the Swedes had to retire in great disorder.

The study of men requisite.

Our commanders require to study men. No set rules can be laid down for war. The best general is the one who can devise a plan at the instant. Great commanders have ever taken advantage of circumstances, and have struck boldly whenever the opportunity arrived.

Battle of Narva: defeat of the Russians.

At the battle of Narva, Charles XII. of Sweden, with only 9,000 men and ten guns, defeated the Russians, who had 80,000 men and 145 guns. The Swedes had however, a great advantage, as a snow-storm blew directly into the faces of the Russians.

Capture of Gamala, A.D. 69.

It is recorded in Josephus that at the capture of Gamala, A.D. 69, by Vespasian and Titus, a strong wind blew the Roman darts into the place, while the darts thrown by the Jews were 'driven obliquely away' from the Romans.

Battle of Nordlingen: Swedes lose 12,000 men.

At Nordlingen the remonstrances of Gustavus Horn, which were suggestions dictated by prudence,

were mistaken for the voice of timidity, and the result was that the Swedish army lost 12,000 men. Socrates said, 'Unless prudence is present, fortitude is only a kind of boldness,' and we opine that the 'mélange de timidité et d'audace' is what makes the great commander. But for 'timidité' read *prudence*. The whole world seems a mixture of extremes—a perfect 'Concordia Discors,' in fact. At page 21 of the 'Musketry Regulations' we find that the 'force of gravity (a power that draws all unsupported bodies to the earth) commences to draw the bullet towards the ground the instant it quits the muzzle, and with greater velocity in proportion to the time it is exposed to its influence. The bullet moves in a curved line called the "trajectory," but we find that, for a short distance, in consequence of the great velocity of the bullet, and the comparatively short time that gravity has had to act, the course of the bullet scarcely deviates from the line of fire, and that the curve increases more and more in proportion as the bullet becomes more distant from the muzzle.' Can we not compare man to the bullet and the 'nerve' to the powder? The dash at the 'short distances scarcely deviates from the line of fire,' because the force of the nerve overcomes the force of gravity; but continue that speed to a still greater distance, and then the 'nerve' (like the powder) has

Socrates on prudence.

Force of gravity.

Comparisons.

The 'human trajectory.'

expended its force to overcome another opposing force,—hence the 'human trajectory,' or curved dispirited impulse, that results. There is a law of nature man cannot overcome, and that force, like the cause of the trajectory, comes into operation the instant that the nervous power given to the muscular is expended—when, that is to say, through the distance traversed by the moving body, there is a vast expenditure of the nervous impulse; and, as from the loss of the propelling power of the powder comes a diminution in the range of the shot, so from the amount of nervous energy and power of endurance expended in a protracted struggle comes a corresponding loss of the muscular force. Hence the 'giving way' before men in better wind and fresher for the 'close-quarters' combat.

The nervous impulse.

Dr. Parkes on the air we breathe.

Dr. Parkes tells us that, 'Under ordinary circumstances, a man draws in 480 cubic inches of air per minute. If he walks four miles an hour, he draws 480 × 5 = 2,400 cubic inches: if he moves at six miles an hour, 480 × 7 = 3,360.' And also that 'The work becomes heavier too—i.e. *more exhausting*, if it is done in a shorter time, or, in other words, *velocity is gained at the expense of carrying power*.'

What is thus proved?

Is it not, then, clearly evident why men fail who are pressed just when, by the very velocity with

which they advanced, they have actually expended all their carrying power? The contrast between 480 cubic inches of air and 3,360 cubic inches, in other words, the difference between being at rest and going at six miles an hour, shows what a vast commotion is in the latter case existing in the human body. The 'thermic machine' is at high pressure. Indeed, a good runner who has only his body to carry can only run a few hundred yards at full speed; while the poor soldier carries extra weight—he has his musket and all his ammunition besides. Take the case of the prize-fighters, Sayers and Heenan: calculate the number of rounds they fought, and then you will see that, notwithstanding months of training, these two strong, athletic men could only exert their full force for a few minutes at a time. At the conclusion of each round they were drawn back to take breath before they could renew the combat. Now we will venture to assert that if after a certain number of rounds a second-rate prize-fighter had been set at either Sayers or Heenan, he, from being quite fresh, would have easily beat either of them. But if Sayers or Heenan had taken breath ere the other came on, his chance of winning would then have been small. How often a 'plucky' boy is beaten by another with 'longer wind.' It is an established fact that the boy who can stand a good pounding

Comparisons, Sayers and Heenan.

The use of 'long wind' at school.

the longest, and has 'wind' enough to return the blows of his adversary, is almost sure to win. The French take only the most athletic men into the Zouave regiments, testing severely their powers of endurance first before they admit them into these crack corps. But the days for dash are gone. The present weapon can be fired so rapidly that swiftness is of little avail over long distances. Again, in a long run some men are behind. The attackers will straggle, more or less, whilst those in position 'press home' with a solid compact front. Rome held her supremacy so long as she encouraged manly or gymnastic exercises, but declined when the Romans became effeminate in their habits. 'At Rome the sole motive of action was glory, the principal occupation war, and the first duty military service.'[1] Let us not over-work our men too soon. Let us, above all things, never despise our enemies.

How Rome held her supremacy.

To despise is to be unprepared, should the foe turn out more stubborn than we suppose him to be. 'But we should always provide indeed against our adversaries, with the expectation of their planning well, and must not rest our hopes on the probability of their blundering, but on the belief of our own cautious forethought.'[2] At the

Ever expect your enemy to plan *well*.

[1] 'Julius Cæsar,' by Napoléon, vol. i. p. 165.
[2] Archidamus, King of the Lacedæmonians.

proper time, we need pay little attention to numerical or physical superiority, provided we have well weighed the results.

Pericles on daring and on caution.

The British may say with Pericles, 'For we have this characteristic also in a remarkable degree, that we are at the same time most daring and most calculating in what we take in hand, whereas to other men it is ignorance that brings daring, while calculation brings fear.' The great mistake we made in the first Nepaul war was, 'Too great contempt for untried enemies.' The arrangements for the Abyssinian war on the other hand were made with admirable foresight and prudence, and with splendid results, as we know.

Gasca's character.

Gasca 'was a commander who moved with deliberation, patiently waiting his time, but when that came, bold, prompt, and decisive.'[1]

Sir Walter Scott says of his countrymen, 'Their headlong and impatient courage uniformly induced them to rush into action, without weighing either their own situation or that of their enemies, and the inevitable consequence was frequent defeat.' There is indeed a very fragile bridge between victory and defeat, and the commander who despises an enemy, is like one who having such a bridge in his rear to secure a retreat, blows it up before he attacks. No general should

A fragile bridge between victory and defeat.

[1] History of the Conquest of Peru.

ignore any precaution, never mind how certain he may be of victory. It is not prudent to fight with a river in the rear, though often commanders have been forced to do so. It is still more imprudent to despise an enemy and not to avail yourself of every little precaution. 'For the events of war are uncertain, and attacks are generally made in it with short notice. Though some may think we are making the attack with superior numbers, and that it is very certain our adversaries will not meet us in battle, we must not for this reason go at all less carefully prepared, but both the general and the soldier of each state should, as far as concerns himself, be always expecting danger.'[1]

King Archidamus.

When we fight men whom we look upon as savages, we are prone to imagine ourselves immensely superior, and then we are tempted to act unguardedly, instead of circumspectly. The prudence that inculcates the constant recollection of past disasters, while it teaches us to prepare for obstacles and difficulties, is what is required of the soldier.

Men not to be looked on as mere savages.

The fort itself may be made to form only the chief obstacle, the crowning difficulty, in a course of prepared obstacles, which may embrace every form of ditch, bank, wall, or palisade—surmountable by leap, vault, or climb, to be, in fact, the

Military gymnastics.

[1] King Archidamus.

goal of the race, requiring the highest physical efforts of speed, agility, dexterity, strength, and endurance.'[1] If then it requires so much training to prepare our men to storm such a fort, and to overcome such obstacles, do we not run a great risk if we urge men beyond their powers? We have our 'Race with obstacles' indeed, and there is no severer or harder race than the one where a victory is to be secured. This to a commander is the 'crowning difficulty.' All the men in a brigade are not equally fleet or strong, each man who is not up with the foremost ones is a broken link in the chain with which we wish to capture or vanquish our enemies. It must ever be dangerous to traverse great distances at speed in the presence of a determined enemy.

Race with obstacles.

All men cannot go at the same speed.

'At the siege of Sebastopol the French made their first assault on the Malakoff, from the distance of four hundred yards. They were repulsed with the loss of 2,500 killed and wounded. They continued their approaches until, in their final assault, they had but thirty paces to run over. They then carried the work, with the loss of but *eleven men*.'[2] Determined men of the Garibaldi type have done wonders with inadequate means. But they have to consider so as

The French repulsed at the Malakoff.

Their final success.

[1] 'Military System of Gymnastics,' by Archibald Maclaren, p. 194.

[2] Lippitt, 'A Treatise on Intrenchments,' p. 119.

to make their force go as far as possible. They do not allow their pride to interfere with their judgment or reason, but calmly conclude that they are about to meet brave opponents. The general who has inadequate means is like the man who having 500*l.* a year, lives near another with 5,000*l.* a year. The former by care avoids debt, the latter by imprudence or carelessness gets into difficulties. Exactly in the same way it is with haughty commanders who have huge armies at their disposal. Napoleon, at the head of 500,000 men, despised the Russians, and was driven from Moscow. A commander must never despise the meanest aid that he finds at his disposal.

The general with small means.

Napoleon despised the Russians.

How insane would be the engineer who permitted a huge machine to go on working if he observed a 'bolt' or a 'nut' loose? The passage of the Douro was decided upon simply because a poor 'barber' of Oporto who had eluded Soult's patrols, tendered his services and lent his skiff. This barber, with the prior of Amarante and Colonel Walters, 'crossed, and in half-an-hour returned unperceived with several large barges.' In these the British troops passed the river. Thus, by the aid of such 'unmilitary associates' the Iron Duke was enabled to partake at four o'clock of the very dinner that had been prepared for Marshal Soult!

Passage of the Douro.

The Duke captures Soult's dinner.

'By what trifling agencies have the boldest projects been successfully carried out,' says the writer, and tells us, in the same page, that the Duke captured no less than fifty-five guns in addition to his dinner! If Schamyl the Circassian, dashing through with a mere handful of men, could put a Russian square to flight—if the hero Garibaldi, at the head of a few raw recruits, has beaten complete regiments of the Neapolitan army, we have a just right to conclude that a lifetime of the study of war is of little avail, when the commanders are not able to decide at the instant.

Also takes 55 guns.

The general who hesitates when he should dash on, or who dashes on when caution is necessary, will never gain much celebrity. Who can regulate or trammel the mind? When that is set in motion is it not possible to take the retrospect of almost a lifetime in a few short minutes? If so, all that has been stored up must be produced at the instant to be of any use. It is then that an opportunity is given a man to develope by acts the intellectual store of invisible resources treasured up in his mind during the quiet days of peace. Because many men who have written on military tactics have not been conspicuous in the field, it is no reason that every man who studies is to be doubted. How many men study medicine, yet how few, out of the mass, rise to the highest

The mind is untrammelled.

Opportunity makes the man.

The reading man.

places? The man who reads, with the hope that some day he may be called upon to act, will be sure to act with judgment. He will not in face of such weapons as we now have to contend with, bring up his men as in days of yore. The artillery is *the* branch of the service for war, now, as before. It was to the artillery fire that we are mainly indebted for the victory of Barrosa. 'Victor's Division tried to rally, 'but Duncan's guns were moved forward and opened a close and murderous fire that prevented a possibility of re-forming. Nothing could save the shattered battalions from that exterminating cannonade, but instant retreat.'

Artillery *the* arm of our service.

Battle of Inkerman, 1854.

In November 1854 the battle of Inkerman was fought, and it will be recollected that the turn of the battle against the Russians was chiefly owing to the fire of two 18-pounder guns, weighing two tons each, and which, by an almost superhuman effort, were at a late hour brought into the field, and by their superior range crushed the Russian fire.[1] 'Nothing more completely demoralizes a garrison than a constant shower of shells.'[2] It was thus that the French carried the Malakoff with the loss of only eleven men. Galloper guns, with cavalry, tended to confound the Mahratta Horse under Perron at Cöel (Allyghur),

Lippett on shells.

Galloper guns at Cöel, and Delhi, 1803.

[1] J. Timbs' 'Year-Book of Facts for 1864,' p. 7.
[2] Lippitt, p. 126.

in August 1803. They also were of immense use at the battle of Delhi, September 11, 1803. We think that in battles to come, not three guns per thousand men, but perhaps one to every hundred men, will not be considered too much. Previous to the charge of the Guards and Highlanders at the battle of Alma, 'A few large guns were brought to bear upon the dense mass (i.e. of Russians), and these by a well-directed fire broke it, and forced the infantry to retire in various directions. Then came the moment for the grand charge of the Guards and Highlanders.' These little facts should not be overlooked, when we next go into action. We read also that 'The artillery was brought effectively to bear on such points as it could command, and contributed materially to the success of the day's achievements.' After the fall of Sebastopol, 4,000 cannon were found in the place. Doubtless the Russians depended much on their artillery, though the firing, as a rule, was admitted to be bad. 'First come first served,' is a homely adage, and as the Prussians were the first in the field with the 'breech-loader,' they derived, as we know, both in the Danish war and at Sadowa incalculable benefits from the same. Again, they were the first with the preponderance of artillery, and won the triumphant victory of Sedan by enclosing the French with an iron

Artillery at Alma.

4,000 guns found in Sebastopol.

Prussian foresight.

belt of cannon,' which it was found quite impossible to break through.

Artillery in the navy.

When ships of war are compelled to carry such armour, is it not plain that artillery is *the* arm to depend on most? Something must be done to protect our infantry at long ranges, for the grand charges of former days at guns in position are now utterly out of the question. Artillery will have to pound artillery, and the accuracy of fire will depend on the training of the men, more particularly on the 'nerve' of the gunners. In the campaign on the Danube, Achmed Pasha's army defeated the Russians at Maglovet by their tremendous artillery fire, 'Every shot telling with fearful effect upon the close ranks of the columns.' The 'Russians for some minutes bore up bravely, but soon the column wavered, and then turned and fled pell-mell across the plain, casting aside everything.' The Russians lost 1,500 men killed, and 'an untold number of wounded.'

Artillery in the campaign on the Danube

Russians defeated.

Bombardment of Bomarsund.

At the bombardment of Bomarsund, we read that Sir Charles Napier said, 'Give them a shot and shell every five minutes,' and that 'This iron torrent, in conjunction with that poured out by the French breaching battery, was too much to be borne long. A flag of truce was held out, and the place surrendered.' At the battle of Alma Bosquet's force was most considerably aided by

French fleet at Alma.

the French fleet shelling the heights at the same time, for these 'terrible missiles' shook the Russian battalions. The loss in Sir de Lacy Evans's Division was excessive from the destructive fire of the Russian artillery, and the battle was far advanced before we had even brought two guns to reply to that cannonade. Our losses in the Punjab were mostly from the terrible artillery fire of the Seiks, who fought their guns with the most stubborn obstinacy, and sent their shot clean over and past our batteries, even of the 18-pounders! We have lots of the physical muscle, and abundance of 'nerve' in our ranks, but our men are mortal, and if placed under a murderous fire, at long range, they will be dispirited at not being able to reach the enemy.

Artillery in the Punjab.

What we require is the intellectual power in our commanders. Can the learned physician find time to compound all the medicines he prescribes? Is the general expected to do the duties of a sergeant-major? The mind is the helm that guides the ship: it was not necessary for Nelson to pull the ropes. What is the necessity of bothering about 'pipe-clay' and 'buttons'? It needs no head to arrange all these matters, but it requires 'mind' to make the soldier contented. It is not every leader who understands the actual wants of his men, or who tries to make them pleased

The intellectual power in commanders.

Wants of the soldier.

and contented with their profession. When a commander does *this*, he renders good service to his Government, and his soldiers will be found full of ardour in time of need, and will serve him with all their hearts. You have only to observe the regiments where the commanding officer is kind and considerate to see the effect. We could point out many British corps in which the commanding officers are not only obeyed, but really loved and respected by all the officers and men; though it must be remembered that being considerate is one thing, and foolishly kind is another. On the other hand we have seen whole regiments drilled for two hours simply on account of the unsteadiness of a *few* stupid individuals, and we have wondered why the offenders were not made over to the drill instructors, instead of punishing the whole body of officers and men. We can hardly consider the latter procedure necessary; it is at least injudicious and makes men disgusted. It knocks all the cheerfulness out of them. We hardly think commanders who do such things would shine on service; when in difficulty, a 'soul above buttons' is indeed required. Look at the hero Nicholson of Delhi. When coming down with a British regiment and two native corps to Delhi, he heard that these Sepoys intended to make a dash at the 'treasure' he was escorting.

Good corps.

Absurdities at drill.

Nicholson at Delhi.

He therefore placed the British corps at the head, and ordered the Sepoy corps to march off at an interval of 200 yards. On passing a caravanserai on the road, he drew up the Europeans in a line facing the road, but off it, and screened by the wall of the 'serai.' He placed some guns also in a good position, and as the first native corps passed the serai, they were halted, ordered to pile arms and move on. The one in the rear came up in due time (not knowing what had happened to the other), and it was quietly disarmed in like manner. Here a body of, say 2,000, men were rendered harmless by just a little foresight and invention on the part of the commander. Such able deeds deserve to be recorded. Here the massacre which would have resulted had those misguided Sepoys attacked the Europeans, was prevented.

Nicholson disarms two suspected corps.

General Sir Stewart Corbett disarmed a large force by acting in a prompt manner. He evinced so little anxiety that he would not even allow a ball at the station to be put off, although that very night he made all his arrangements. On the following morning, the whole of the suspected troops fell in as for an ordinary general parade, and found artillery ready to fire on them as they stood in column! They then gave up their arms at once.

General Corbett disarms a large force.

How was it, we ask, that the presence of the

Hodson had a noble mind.

hero Major Hodson at Delhi with his corps of 600 horsemen was considered worth 10,000 soldiers? Because the gallant Hodson had a noble mind. No man got before him in the cavalry charge, but he was always steady and to be relied on. He had, as De Brack says, 'the courage which carries a man foremost into the fray, which delivers the coolest and surest cuts, which is the last in covering a retreat.' In the hand-to-hand encounter he was seen to smile, he even joked with his enemy; 'Do you call yourself a swordsman?' said he, as a huge rebel made a furious cut at him, and found a splendid guard offered. Then he added playfully, 'Try again.' Mild and playful indeed at a time when most men are excited. He well knew that the fine cord that suspended his savage enemy's life over the abyss of death could only be severed by an Omnipotent Power, who could also divide his own thread of existence if He so wished. Therefore, although duty demanded that Hodson should slay his enemy, he did not gloat over acts that the law of self-preservation alone can justify. A generous, manly heart abhors such sights and even wonders how long God may consider that such a state of things must last to carry out His own wise, just, but to us unintelligible, decrees. There are men who talk of 'clap-trap' on these matters, but those who have seen the powerful man die, without *hope*, know what a

De Brack on courage in battle.

Hodson and the rebel.

Law of self-preservation.

solemn hour that is when the soul is about to enter the portals of eternity. The giant's strength gone, the pride of youth vanished—Oh, then we do indeed see how little man is, and we can all the more admire him who is good. Hodson, we are assured, had, with a lion's heart the gentleness of a woman. He was a good and affectionate husband and the most daring warrior combined. History tells us of many great men who gloried in their domestic life, and who were passionately fond of the society of their children. Men of the noble Havelock type, good Christians at heart, and brave in battle. The man who is kind, affectionate, and honourable in all his domestic duties, faithful to his wife, affable towards mankind in general, is seldom a bad soldier in matters of duty. Hodson, with only one hundred men, rode up to a huge body of some 6,000 natives and imperiously demanded the King of Delhi and his sons. In the presence of that fanatical assemblage he harangued his little band of chosen horsemen numbering only 100. He told them that these were the cowards who had butchered poor helpless British women and children,—and then and there he shot dead the last descendants of the house of Timour. We ask if our readers think that there are many men who would have dared to do so?

Cowards who killed women.

To face 6,000 with only 100 in the presence of

the fanatical population of such a large city was a brave deed. By this act Major Hodson not only punished individuals who had sanctioned murders, but also stamped out the last sparks of rebellion. This was the 'critical moment.' Major Hodson took a rapid but true view of his position. That great man kept his eye strictly fixed on justice and right, and his decision was instantaneous. No sooner had he fixed on his plan, than he carried it into execution. He knew that unswerving justice never vacillates—that death awaited all murderers, and he made the execution all the more impressive by showing the assembled multitude that a Christian soldier, supported by only 100 Pagan horsemen, dare be bold in the cause of right. Hodson remembered that 'Opportunity is swift of flight, and slow of return' (as Ali the son-in-law of Mohammed used to say), and, moreover, that 'Clemency to murderers would be attempting to interrupt the just vengeance of Omnipotence.' Or, as Burke said on another occasion, 'to have spared such men would have been to bribe high for rebellion and revolt.' A soldier is as much a cosmopolite as any other individual. His life is as dear to him as that of any other citizen, and, as our laws protect us against the attacks of ruffians, so also has the soldier a full right to expect that everything that is reasonable

Rebellion stamped out.

Unswerving justice.

Opportunity slow of return.

Burke.

shall be done to protect him from unnecessary perils. A rash commander is equally as reprehensible as an unjust judge, because many a fine body of men has been ruined by the imprudence of the leader. The shock to the nerves is often such that men are prone to lose confidence in themselves in after encounters. De Brack says, 'Do not hastily tax with cowardice the young man whose colour blanches on going into fire for the first time. His will may be indomitable, and his heart beat high, but his temperament is nervous, and the pallor of his countenance is not an index of fear. Where is the old soldier who, frankly, and with his hand on his heart, can flatter himself that he underwent the baptism of fire without emotion? It often depends on a commander to make weak and undecided young men fellows of intrepidity. Let him bring them under fire for the first time under circumstances that will tell in *their* favour. Let him act like a skilful huntsman with a young hound. Let him slip them against a wearied foe. Let him make them bite instead of being bitten, and when they return from the charge they will have no future apprehension. If he adopt the contrary line of conduct, it is to be feared that he will demoralize them and for a long time smother the excitement of their courage.' Montesquieu says, 'Generally speaking, it is not

A rash commander as reprehensible as an unjust judge.

De Brack on courage in youths.

De Brack.

Montesquieu on loss in war.

the material loss incurred in battle—a few thousand soldiers, that is to say—which is so injurious to a State; it is the imaginary loss, the moral discouragement, which deprives it of the force which fortune has left.'

Was it not the moral discouragement that told at Sedan and Woerth? Who can look at the convulsive death-struggles of hundreds of broad-shouldered youths, or strong men in the prime of life, and not feel a pang of sorrow? Who, with the slightest feeling, can witness the horrible sights in battle, and not shudder? Does not the son of the poor ploughman feel the awfulness of such a sudden transition from life to death equally as a very king? Shall we say because it is *not* the commander, there should be no national wailing over thousands of men sacrificed by rash acts? Let us remember how many a poor mother's heart has been broken by such causes; and reflect on the number of poor fatherless orphans and widows who have wretchedness and ruin brought upon them after such disasters to an army.

Horrible sights.

Widows and orphans who are ruined.

If we wish to avoid disasters let us follow in the footsteps of our best commanders, and thus we shall uphold the dignity and honour of our country. Napoleon always gave minute directions to his officers, but considered that a man would have committed a serious fault who followed the

How to avoid disasters.

letter and not the spirit of his instructions.[1] If we carefully study war, we shall have no reason to lament our disastrous losses, nor will our foes have the opportunity given them of rejoicing over our errors. Foolhardy and rash undertakings generally end in immense loss of life, and such mistakes are viewed to our detriment through huge magnifying glasses by our enemies. The general who goes into action with the full determination to look upon each soldier as his own son, will most probably be most careful of each man's valuable life; and we ask, should it not be so? Are not these the strong arms that tend to cover our commanders with glory? A man who looks to the poor soldier's wants, who does not needlessly harass him, who brings him cautiously under fire, will ever find the British soldier face any difficulties in time of need, and that he will accomplish for such a commander more than any soldier in the wide world. Discipline must be supported, but there are many ways to gain the soldier's heart, and little indulgences are never thrown away. Again, we must understand the men. They may be uneducated, or otherwise, but they are reasoning beings, and must be treated as such. The greatest ruffian in the army can be mastered by a few words applied in a proper manner. Many a man

The study of war requisite.

Generals who take their men into battle with caution.

Discipline to be supported.

What words can do.

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 29.

is made worse by harsh expressions—an appeal to a man's sense of right in temperate language, seldom fails to do good. Get hold of his reason, and then you have the man. The author has been about thirty years in the Native army, but during that period he has seen much of European troops. The siege of Lucknow told him what splendid fellows the British soldiers really were: and as he slept, for five months, in the *same* room with the men of the 32nd Regiment, he found out their ways and their feelings. There is the utmost amount of simplicity in the rough uneducated man, and all are amenable to reason, explained in simple language.

The British soldier at Lucknow.

Let them see you take an interest in them, and they will confide in you. We have known endless cases of bad characters being shamed into good behaviour. Out of hundreds, we may quote one, as an instance. The man was a very bad character, and insulted the warders in the Military Prison. The Author was field officer of the week, and was summoned by the sergeant to investigate a case against this man. On speaking to him, the prisoner was sulky and angry. The Author asked what regiment he belonged to, and found he was in one of the most distinguished corps that fought during the Sepoy Mutiny. We said, 'You who served so nobly, and fought so bravely in 1857, and

Interest in the soldier.

A bad character.

What was said to him.

now here? What a *shame?*' He replied, 'A poor devil never gets a chance, sir. These warders bully a fellow till he can't stand it.' We added, 'Come, you shall have a chance, and you shall not be punished if you promise to behave better for the future.' He said, 'You shall see, sir. I will promise you that.' The sergeant smiled and said, 'I am afraid, sir, the man requires something more than words.' We said, 'He is a *man*, sergeant, and not a wild beast as you supposed he was when you suggested to me to bring him before me with hand-cuffs on, and I told you it was quite unnecessary, as you see it was. The man had some shame, when he remembered what a noble fellow he had been in hard and perilous times.' This man became a reformed character from that day; and so will thousands of others if calmly appealed to and temperately spoken to. There is much simple wit amongst the soldiers, and the author has made it a point to get men into conversation. By this means you find out their little ways, tricks, and jokes, and no men enjoy a joke more than the brave British soldier. A colonel said to a sergeant, 'We must build a high wall to prevent the natives bringing in grog.' The sergeant said, 'It must be a very high wall, sir, that the "monkey's egg" can't get over.' 'The "monkey's egg!" what's that, sergeant?' said the

His promise.

Reformed character.

The monkey's egg!

colonel. 'Why, sir, it's only a bladder that can be thrown over any wall, and it don't break like a bottle would.' 'Then,' said the colonel, 'I'll put a steady sergeant to pick up these monkey's eggs.'

Power of grog.

'Ah,' replied the sergeant, 'it must be an uncommonly steady man, sir, that won't be bribed with *half* the liquor, and you, sir, won't know a "blow" about it.' The colonel said, '*There* you have me, sergeant; it's no use, I see, to try to stop it after that!'

A soldier's idea of the way to stop men going to the Bazar for native grog.

The man who related this wears the 'good conduct medal.' He said, 'The way to prevent the men getting native grog is to open the canteen, and pay the soldier every day. He will spend all he has, treat his chums, and be taken care of if he gets too much, instead of being found on the roadside, dead drunk with the filth he gets in the bazar.'

This old sergeant said that in his corps a man shot his comrade. The colonel paraded the regiment, and said, 'My men, I am an *old* man; I have trusted you, I have beaten the Seiks with you, I have had hard work with you, I have been a father to you, but now when you do this, when a man shoots his comrade, you will shoot your father also. Have you not fathers? What am I to do with you now? You disgrace me in my old age, you bring shame upon your protector, your

A colonel's address when a man shot his comrade.

well-wisher. I treated you as my sons, and yet now you are shooting your comrades.'

The sergeant said that many great stout fellows began to 'blubber like babies,' and he was one of them. The simple word 'father' touched their very souls; it was the word 'Quirites,' in fact, used by Cæsar with such effect. Now men who are so easily overcome, depend upon it, have something really good in them, and merely require tact and firmness. Some are simply incorrigible, yet there is a deal of 'dry wit' in even these; and little real malice at heart. One fellow who was 'drummed out' walked down the open ranks, and looked up in his comrades' faces and smiled, examined their 'boots' and 'buttons' at a glance, and when he got to the end, he said, 'Colonel, this is, without exception, the finest and cleanest body of men I ever inspected, sir; very creditable indeed, sir!' Another, after taking his lashes, said, 'The pleasantest corporal punishment I have ever undergone, colonel. Thank you, sir!' One very bad character said, 'You should get better chaps than these here to lay it on, sir. Why I'll take twice that licking any morning to give me a relish for my breakfast!' A man may in his own opinion be a remarkably fine officer, but young men who think that respect is simply due to their 'red coat' and 'sword,' should remember that the soldier is

What a single word did.

The incorrigible drummed out.

Cool!

Pleasant corporal punishment.

A nice relish for breakfast.

to be commanded by the mind, and in the most simple manner,—through the heart. Respect is gained by affection rather than by harsh or irritating language. We firmly believe that many a fine soldier has been tempted to be impertinent from the overbearing and haughty demeanour of inconsiderate officers and sergeants. We have only to converse with the men to be satisfied of this. Our experience tends to assure us that every soldier must be treated as a thinking, reasoning *man*. Because the one is poor, and the other holds a commission, it does not follow that the officer should address a private in any other way than he would a gentleman. He loses his dignity, if he loses his temper; and one man is as likely to lose his temper as the other. It is running a great risk,—it is tyranny,—to use harsh language to an old veteran. You expect that very man to be all fire and spirit when he rushes at his enemy, yet you do not hesitate to rouse his anger, and make him consider you his foe for the time being. Such harsh language would not be submitted to by a cab-driver in London; he would certainly try to knock you down.

Respect to the officer.

Severity not necessary.

Harsh words imprudent.

The duty of an officer is to curb his own temper, to impress upon all offenders in a quiet yet firm manner, that they have committed an offence. There are few soldiers so lost to all feeling of

An officer to curb his temper.

shame and honour, as not to be submissive, when they are fully made aware of their faults. Harsh, indiscriminate, and unwarrantable abuse can only weaken discipline,—because the man respects the officer as a gentleman, and expects him of course to 'act as such.'

Harsh language weakens discipline.

Sir Alexander Ball understood how to command men; he said, 'An invisible power it was that quelled them, which was therefore irresistible because it took away all power of resisting—a faculty that appealed to the offender's own being—a faculty and a presence he had not been previously made aware of. He saw when dealing with an uneducated soldier that strength may be met by strength, the power of inflicting pain (i.e. in corporal punishment) may be baffled by the pride of endurance; the eye of rage may be answered by the stare of defiance or the downcast look of dark revengeful resolve. But who dares struggle with an invisible combatant? Law commands and cannot be commanded.'

The power of law over the soldier.

This law is the most powerful weapon in the hands of the military authorities, but to have the desired effect it must be used without the remotest sign of anger or passion. Who has not seen the stare of defiance evoked when rage has made an officer forget that he is speaking to a brave, resolute, though perhaps misguided man?

The most powerful weapon.

Explanation requisite.

Explain to him the law he has broken, and in almost all cases the downcast look of mental sorrow will appear in the man's countenance—so soon as he stands self-convicted,—but never before. To act on this plan, however, requires a knowledge of *man*, and there are various modes of reasoning according to the class of offender and the circumstances of the case. There is nothing totally bad in nature. Poisons require anti-poisons. Strength of stubborn nature may be overcome by gentle treatment. 'A soft answer turneth away wrath,' and this is the sound principle to go on with all men, of every nation under heaven. An old soldier may often be inconsiderate, but that does not warrant our insulting him by harsh language, or goading him almost to insult us in return. He is tempted to do so in mere self-defence, which is assuredly the 'first law of nature,' and upon which we so much depend when the brave British private is engaged with our enemies. These humble, oft uneducated men are full of heart. They are extremely fond of each other; are generous to a degree and also most remarking. When they know you they will confide in you, and tell you all their little wants. In battle they will risk their own lives to save yours. At Lucknow the devoted conduct of the men of the 32nd baffles all description. The

Nothing totally bad in nature.

What harsh language tends to.

Good hearts.

Devotion at Lucknow of the private soldiers.

Author has seen men try to save their officers, and praying to be allowed to do what the officers considered their special duty. It would indeed be gross ingratitude to such brave men not to record their fine traits of character—if possible in letters of pure gold.

What will the brave private not do for his comrade? If he gets into trouble he tries to shelter him. If he has exceeded in his cups he will put him in his cot,[1] prevent him talking or insulting other men, and will protect him as if he were his own brother. This does not exist to the same degree in other nations,—it is peculiarly British; and it is this solid, but invisible chain that binds our splendid soldiers together in the rush of battle. 'A comrade' means 'a brother;' and that is the reason our men fight so stubbornly, for they see their brethren fall around them. The Amalgamation has brought the British and the old Company's officers more together, and we are now one body. The splendid achievements of the Indian Army are recorded in the brightest pages of history, and an army with names such as Lawrence, Clive, Outram, Nicholson, Pollock, and Hodson, with thousands of others too numerous to record, may be admitted to be worthy of a place in the noble line

What the private soldier does for his comrade.

Peculiarly British.

A comrade is a brother.

Indian officers.

[1] The soldier's iron bedstead is always called in barrack language, his 'cot.'

of Her Majesty's forces. Doubtless many a British soldier can call to mind the kind acts of numerous Company's officers during the mutiny of 1857?

And when the veteran has done with war and settled down by his humble fireside in England, he will no doubt recount often the kind and considerate acts of a body of gentlemen who shared his hardships and fought side by side with him for months together. Yet let abler pens record the deeds of our officers; it is for us to draw attention to the 'Backbone' of our Army, the glorious 'private soldier,'—the man who has carried our name through the length and breadth of the world; the man who has covered us with glory; the man who keeps our most beloved Queen on her throne, and protects our humble firesides, and all our beloved ones, from the insults of the most powerful foe. And when we say the 'private,' we include most assuredly every brave 'Jack Tar,'—indeed every man who does his duty to maintain the power of our country. Let more learned men write on our commanders—our theme shall be the noble, and—even though often unguarded and reckless,—the brave, 'private soldier.' No better men are to be found in any army, and right strong are we when we have such troops. They are as a rule mere children; they are not 'wild beasts,'—the rough exterior becomes

The Backbone of the Army.

What the 'private' does for us.

Mere children in mind.

the diamond when polished. 'The *man's* the gold for a' that,' and this is simple truth. When Napoleon said, 'Give me British officers and I will conquer the world,' he inadvertently insulted Jehovah; for God made the private too, and gave to him a soul as well as to his more highly educated superior, or officer,—not his superior as a man, but with the further reasoning power that comes from education.

Napoleon on British officers.

Everything is easy when we know it; the boy can do a difficult problem when he is instructed, and officers must learn to teach their men aright in very simple language, most particularly when they are brought up for any misconduct. A little patience, a little time spent in explanation of the seriousness of the offence, will be amply repaid by the effect it will have on the uneducated or reckless soldier.

Instruction requisite.

Patience and explanation.

CHAPTER IX.

Presence of Mind a matter of Experience—Nerves of Novices should be spared—Horrid Scenes in War—Calm Courage compared with Impetuous Rashness—We want Prudent as well as Brave Soldiers; but the Leaders should be Thoughtful Men—It takes all sorts to make an Army—The Chivalrous Soldier of the Age—Fate of French after Sedan Compared with Probable Fate of the Defenders of Lucknow had the Place fallen—How Soldiers may lose Confidence in Themselves—Death from Cholera feared more than Death in Action; the Invisible Foe dreaded more than the Visible—The Foot Soldier faces greater Danger than the Cavalry Man—Different kinds of Courage—Example only Required—Advantage of Lectures to Soldiers, recounting former Deeds of our Army.

Presence of mind.

HAVING drawn attention to the critical moment in battle, we now proceed to remark on what is generally termed 'Presence of Mind.' We are too prone to consider that a soldier only requires drill, and expect that a mere recruit will act as a veteran forthwith. A young soldier ought to be treated as carefully as a child. There is nothing so trying to the boy soldier as to see his comrades dropping about him, and to observe them groan and die in his presence. How few men there are who can witness the most trifling surgical operations for the first time, without feeling that there is something repulsive in the sight! Yet we often expect mere novices, mere boys in age, to witness the most

Trials of nerve.

Novices require experience.

awful scenes without a shudder. Many a good surgeon has fainted on his first introduction to the dissecting-room, yet the same man has, afterwards, cut up the dead body of a human being as coolly and calmly as a butcher does the carcase of an ox. Thousands of timid recruits have turned out the bravest of the brave veterans. Admitting then that all men's nerves are not strung alike, it is our duty, for humanity's sake, to make the soldier feel these horrors as little as possible. We can prevent his mind dwelling too much on such sad spectacles by keeping him fully occupied. The best plan our experience tells us is, to pour a steady fire on the enemy whenever circumstances are favourable, instead of letting the poor fellows gape and stare at their dead comrades, until they themselves feel that dispiriting sensation that comes on all who see their own side suffering loss, and know they are inflicting no injury in return. But we do not assert that it is prudent to fire at all times. There is a vast difference between covering an advance by a well directed discharge as you proceed, and reserving your volley on certain occasions to stagger an advancing foe. At Talavera, for instance, the French advanced under a fire of eighty pieces of cannon, but the British did not return a single shot till the assailants came up to within twenty paces. 'A tremendous volley was then delivered from our

Management in action.

Firing of much advantage.

How and when to be used.

Talavera, French advance and repulse.

Dreadful scenes in battle.

line, and the bayonet did the rest. To an intelligent youth, or one of strong emotions, it is a trying sight to see a comrade's body cut in two by a round shot: or, to observe another cast headless on the ground with the blood spirting out of the arteries of the neck: to witness the writhing contortions of a poor fellow shot through the abdomen: to see a friend leap up in the air with a yell and fall down dead, struck through the heart.

Different temperaments, how acted upon.

Amongst men in action the effect may be, and often is, different. Some of a phlegmatic temperament will evince no outward indication of emotion—perhaps all you observe is a sort of vacant side-glance at a dead comrade. Again, the rash 'devil-may-care' fellow will probably grind his teeth, and clutch his musket all the tighter, eager for revenge. Another, of a delicate—or highly nervous—temperament may feel the tremendous emotions of a truly sensitive mind contemplating the fearful destruction of life around him. One of these suffers from a certain obtuseness of intellect. The other feels a sort of desperation regardless of all consequences—both are somewhat incapable of realising the full danger of their position; indeed the first marches on without being able to take advantage of an opportunity, and is not alive or acute enough to avoid any sudden danger. Now the courage

of the third we consider as preferable—he feels his position, yet he remembers his duty; he advances by the force of moral influence, fully aware of the danger, yet prepared to face death in obedience to orders. He recollects what is expected of him, and is not impelled by an excitement that would unfit him for work demanding the utmost caution; nor is he lethargic or apathetic where all his acuteness is requisite. Pericles said, 'Those, however, would deservedly be deemed more courageous who know most fully what is terrible and what is pleasant, and yet do not on this account shrink from dangers.' A mad bull trusting to his immense strength, and not actually suffering any pain, will rush headlong at everything regardless of all obstacles, till felled by a blow on the head; yet, had the same powerful animal only been wary, how few would have dared to approach him! It is the same with men who are rash; we may say they have lost their 'presence of mind.' That huge fellow who cowers and bends down to avoid the trifling injury he might receive from the blow of a 'tennis-ball' will, perhaps, in his excitement, rush single-handed at a line of armed men, to be killed ere his comrades can come up. We want therefore prudent calculating men as well as brave soldiers. We require not only soldiers who will

Which kind of courage seems preferable.

Pericles, on courage.

Examples of impetuosity.

A rash soldier.

Prudence required.

advance but men with all their senses and wits about them; not cruel, relentless monsters, lost to all sense of mercy, but individuals with full possession of their reason—who know how far to press a stubborn enemy and when to avoid the least tendency to cruelty towards a wounded or prostrate foe. Brave soldiers are not fiends, and to grant quarter to an enemy who lays down his arms must ever be pleasing to any man—soldier or civilian—who is not a devil at heart. The Prussians in the late war behaved nobly, and never has any army conquered so completely by the grand system of teaching each unit of the force his duty. Irrespective of the high education inculcated, the solidity of the Prussian system is excellent. Each man may be made an excellent part of one whole huge machine by complete training for the exact work required of him.

Prussian system excellent.

The thinking element is absolutely required in the leaders, each in their several degrees, but high education is not necessary to make the subordinates good soldiers. 'It taks a' sort of folk to mak a world' and it also takes all kinds of men to make a good army. The 'plane' cannot do the work of the 'saw,' nor can the 'chisel' perform the work of the 'hammer.' The mason cannot do the work of the carpenter! Thus in the army we shall find that a simple education

All kinds of men required in an army.

A simple education sufficient in an army.

is all the 'private' requires. We do not want an army composed of men who may some day think that they know as much as their generals. We need strong arms to pull the ropes of our vessel of State, but we require our captains to understand navigation,—in other words the grand system of the division of labour, and each man to know his *own* work thoroughly. In the 'Remarks on the scope and uses of Military Literature and History,' we find the following: 'It is the moral force which constitutes the base of all human action; and it is the cultivation of a chivalrous soldier which in this age, as in every other, must ensure honour and success in wars.' When our foe is vanquished, he has been sufficiently punished; as soon as he lays down his arms he should be treated with mercy. But whilst he uses his weapons of defence, self-preservation permits us if need be to take his life. Observe the vast difference of the position of the French after 'Sedan,' and reflect how different it would have been had they been vanquished by Saracens or Sepoy mutineers. Had the garrison of Lucknow been overcome, not one man would have been spared. On the other hand the 'chivalrous soldiers' of to-day, those of the Prussian Army, looked on and saw 375,000 prisoners permitted to live,

Strong arms.

Division of labour required.

'Moral force.'

A foe vanquished to obtain quarter.

Difference in cases.

The chivalrous soldier.

whereas in times past wholesale butchery and massacre would have been inevitable.

General Havelock's men.

General Havelock had his troops in splendid order. The whole body was composed of determined and active men. The intellectual power was in the chief; but the same unanimity of thought, and similarity of action effected for that brave band just what, more or less, will tend to uphold the dignity and supremacy of the British Army so long as a sergeant or a corporal remains to command a body of our splendid soldiers. The uneducated soldier can be chivalrous when he understands that cruelty is not bravery. Savages proceed on a different system, and exterminate their foes, not excepting the women and children of the vanquished.

The uneducated private can be also chivalrous.

The British soldier as we say requires to be treated with care or he may be 'cowed,' and then he has but little confidence in himself. Take a lot of young recruits from England: place them in an Indian barrack where men are dying of cholera, and you will observe what these youths feel. It is not uncommon in such instances even to see 'plucky' men upset and agitated; you may hardly hear a single man 'whistling;' all seem melancholy and dejected. What is this but mere want of 'presence of mind'? If you went up to one and said, 'We march into action to-morrow,' it

The effect of cholera on the nerves.

Dejection engendered.

is probable his countenance would brighten up at once. Now the mind causes all this; it is not balanced properly. The *invisible* foe is dreaded; the visible is not. Yet death in the battle-field is more terrible than cholera to face. In an instant, a poor creature is hurled into eternity. In the malady, men are sometimes hours supported by hope; but in action a 'shell' bursts and hardly a fragment of the poor mortal is afterwards to be found,—if the shell has exploded close to him, perhaps a few bits of *bloody rags* are all that remains.

The opposite case.

Death in battle more terrible.

The mind of the boy soldier is often in a most excited state just as he enters the round-shot range. The terrific effect of one of these projectiles is astounding; under such fire it requires the utmost nerve to keep a man steady. We are therefore of opinion that our troops must for the future be protected with far more artillery than heretofore. But the importance of this arm is proved too by previous experience—at the battle of Borodino, 1812, at Warsaw, 1831, at the Malakoff, at Sebastopol, at the passage of the river Lech in 1632, at the battle of Friedland, 1807, at the battle of Wagram, at the battle of Lützen, 1813, at the battle of Hanau, 1813, and in numerous other battles not excepting Sedan—and we may rest assured that an army without a very overwhelming force of

Trial of nerve.

Artillery effects at Borodino and other battles.

Artillery must be increased.

artillery will be helplessly routed and driven off the field ere the infantry can reach the enemy.

What the infantry soldier has to endure.

The nerve of the infantry soldier is sorely tried in battle; he has to submit to heat, to extreme cold, to thirst, and often when jaded he has to attempt a charge. Let any one go up a hill at a sharp walk: then tell him when he is tired and breathless, that if he were in a battle, with an enemy at the top, he would be expected to fight fresh men standing there to receive him. What would such a man say? Why very likely, 'I simply could not do it. I can hardly drag my limbs along, how then could I "double-up" and fight?' The foot soldier is in a far different position from the cavalry trooper in a charge. The tramp of a thousand horses, is a sound enough to excite any man; but the cool, persevering advance of infantry requires unbounded nerve, stubborn endurance, and extreme courage. The swift horse bounds up and brings his rider fresh and full of strength to deliver the cut. The poor infantryman has had to face a storm of round shot and bullets, and at a time when wearied and out of breath he positively feels that he cannot drag himself along. When therefore a gallant corps charges up to a battery and is totally disorganised by losing half its men, we must not too hastily blame them for not carrying

Cavalry very different.

Men not to be judged rashly.

the place. Nor when we hear of a troop of horse cutting their way clean through a battery, and charging back again, should we too readily proclaim each man a hero. We believe that a coward is far more easily detected in the infantry than in the cavalry; for it seems impossible to think that a strong able-bodied man, mounted on a swift horse, and at the gallop, could be so pusillanimous as to try and shuffle out of the mass going at such an exciting and thrilling pace. The poor jaded, thirsty, and worn-out foot soldier has much more than the mere dread of the enemy to daunt his courage. It requires the utmost pluck at all times, to enable the infantry soldier to do his duty. Let the man who has travelled under an Indian sun when the thermometer indicates 120°, try to realise the feelings of a fellow-creature—of a human being who, overworn and half-dead with fatigue and maddening thirst, is instantly required to dash at an enemy. Some men can stand torture better than others, some have greater endurance, but if we pronounce men cowards who fail to do what demons could scarcely accomplish, we judge them rashly and most unjustly. The Author has himself seen what he describes, and well knows what the British soldier had to do in India in 1857, when

Nerve not so much tried in the cavalry.

Great pluck necessary.

India in 1857. Examples of trial of nerve.

men were overpowered by the sun, or, as they termed it, 'dead beat.'

The 'extreme cold' again, that the Prussians and French stood would have tested all the nerve, courage, and endurance of the bravest soldiers.

As for the word 'courage' we are at a loss to explain it, but we may be better understood if we say 'presence of mind' is the first essential, and that one man is not so immensely superior to another in actual courage. We have seen the veteran start, like a nervous woman, when a gun has gone off suddenly. Why then should not the boy soldier be treated with sympathy when he has to witness the most terrific encounters among thousands of enraged men, with shot and shell falling on all sides and, as it were, dashing his comrades to pieces? It has been wisely remarked that 'during our whole life each individual is at the mercy of his *neighbour*.' Life is dear to every man, but he who is best prepared for death is generally the most courageous because he does not fear it. Yet an unarmed, but brave man would not feel comfortable if he saw a powerful ruffian standing on the road with a drawn sword. Some men are perpetually expecting a railway collision. Others fear mad dogs. Some have no fear of mad dogs, but are terribly alarmed at the idea of being bitten by a 'cobra.' Some

Presence of mind the first essential to courage.

Who are best prepared for death.

Instances of want of presence of mind.

dare not mount a horse; others think nothing of jumping a 5-foot wall, or more. Now it is unreasonable to call any of these cowards; yet the good rider laughs at the nervous one. One pities the creature who dreads the railway collisions; in return the nervous old traveller pities the other who dreads the snake-bite. In all these instances one man is not more brave than the other,—it is simply that the nervous system is acted on through the mind, which is unsettled on that particular point. We know a clergyman who said, 'he was sure he would run away in battle;' yet from the pureness and piety of his life we know him to be no coward. Each day he encounters invisible dangers: he has to tend the death-beds of people with infectious maladies, facing indeed countless perils a thousand times worse than standing up in company with other men before a line of soldiers. But merely from imagination he lost his 'presence of mind.' In reality he was no coward, any more than the characters above alluded to. If we did not admit that such acts on the part of men are caused by want of 'presence of mind' as regards the particular cause of terror, we should judge falsely of human nature.

One man no braver than his neighbour in reality.

A clergyman no coward.

Is it probable that the Being who created the mind would have made some men so much more afraid of death than others? Is it right that a

Some men not so much braver than others.

mere youth who hesitates for a moment in battle should be called a coward any more than the nervous creature who dare not take his horse at a jump? Both are afraid of something, and that cause—or something—will disappear as soon as 'presence of mind' returns. The pallid boy-soldier may in another minute become alive to his position, and losing all anxiety will rush boldly on, just as the timid rider only wants to be forced on a horse to make him by-and-by lead the field, perhaps, when he gets confidence.

Both afraid of something.

Anecdote of a midshipman in action.

It is related that a young midshipman, when his boat in action was running towards the shore, was overcome with awe at the round shot and shell falling on all sides. He became quite pale: but the captain said, 'Never mind, youngster; I was just the same when I first went under fire.' The youth afterwards admitted that he lost all fear from that moment; and many years afterwards, when he was high up in the service, he used to point to one of our Admirals and say, 'That man *saved me* from being a coward.' We ourselves have seen a pious clergyman whom folks knew to be a mild, quiet person, walking to a funeral, during the Mutiny of 1857, with a Bible in one hand, and a double-barrelled gun in the other. Before that time many might have thought that worthy parson a poor timid creature, instead of a brave and dauntless man.

A brave clergyman in action.

We have seen the dashing private roar like a bull when his arm was amputated to save his life, just as we have observed men generally thought to be brave lose all 'pluck' and give up all hope when surrounded by perils. This occurs not only in battle, but at sea, and in all dangers that come suddenly and make men lose 'their heads,' or their presence of mind. Then again, have we not seen the powerful man who tries to bully become a wonderfully changed person when suddenly opposed by one equally as strong, or one who is determined not to submit to physical force? We know men who wear the 'Victoria Cross' of whom folks said, 'Who would have thought that *he* would have acted as he did?'—and why did they say so? Simply because we are so prone to judge men by an imaginary test as regards courage. Shall we for a moment proclaim the yelling private a coward because he did not restrain his feelings when he suffered pain that many timid women would submit to without a groan? Shall we overlook the fact that the same man rushed at his foe regardless of all fear? That, in short, though he faced death in the first instance, and then bellowed like a bull when the surgeon tried to save his life, it was only the want of 'presence of mind' that caused him to give way?

The private having a limb amputated.

Loss of presence of mind.

The bully.

The imaginary test of courage.

An Irishman who had both his legs taken off

The wounded Irishman.

by a round shot, was in the Field Hospital when a comrade was roaring out with pain in getting a bullet extracted. Pat shouted out, 'Be japers, do you think nobody's *kilt* but yourself?' A sentry during the siege of Lucknow having been killed by a round shot that passed through a loop-hole, another man was called to occupy the dead sentry's post. The new man said, 'Why, it is certain death to put a fellow in such a place.' But the officer who commanded replied, 'Well, my man, we must have a sentry there; I do not ask you to do more than I would myself; stand aside, I will stand here. Very likely another round shot will not come in at that spot for a week.' We are assured that the officer remained there till he was entreated to let the soldier be posted; eventually he gave way, but not before he had thus mounted guard for some considerable time. It has been remarked that the Russian soldier stands in the most dauntless manner to be shot down, yet how often have the Turks defeated them!

A rather dangerous post.

Russians in battle.

The fearless Chinese.

The Chinese as a race face death in the most fearless manner. We were told as one instance that 150 Chinese were about to be executed; they were placed in lines, kneeling down, with their heads bent forward. One, a mere youth of fourteen, was observed to turn a side-glance towards the man whose head was struck off to his

left, and then, the next instant, he calmly placed his own neck in a position to receive the descending stroke of the executioner's sword. Can it be supposed that aught but 'presence of mind' and resignation can cause poor mortals to face death in such a way? Men have stood to be blown away from guns during 1857, and scorned to be even tied to the cannon, saying, 'There is no necessity, we are not afraid,'—yet these very men ran in hundreds, and sometimes in thousands, before a mere handful of British soldiers. Had those men evinced such fortitude in battle what might they not have done? But when men see no hope, fortitude comes from desperation, whereas the courage that comes from 'presence of mind' considers the consequences beforehand, and enables the man to fight with greater determination. This is why moral training is necessary. Example is everything; and the fact of our possessing high-minded and intelligent officers in the army is the principal cause of our success, because, mind having sprung from the 'Supreme Being,' each man is able to make up his mind to suffer or endure what he sees his superiors bear up with. The private sees that his captain is no more exempt from risk than himself, and a man's '*pride*' comes to his aid when 'presence of mind' is predominant. We have only to

Daring mutineers in 1857.

Desperation causes a certain fortitude.

Example required.

Pride is brought into play.

read of the prodigious efforts made by the Russian officers during the Crimean War to force their men to advance, to be assured of this moral influence in action. The British soldier merely requires example—not pushing to the front. In one of those huge Russian columns, one officer, a perfect giant in stature, is mentioned, who was the *heart and soul* of the mass till he was shot down. That man was indeed a hero,—would that he had been spared!

The splendid Russian hero.

Lectures to soldiers recommended.

A suggestion of ours may not be deemed out of place here. We think that short interesting lectures on occurrences in battle would be most beneficial to the soldiers during the hot months in tropical climates and in the winter season at home. Of the thousands and tens of thousands of our army how many ever heard of Albuera, Salamanca, Vimiera, or Marathon? What number know anything about the deeds of the Crusaders, or of the retreat from Moscow? All these glorious battles teach lessons of fortitude, endurance, and 'pluck.' To hear of them would give men confidence, would raise their pride and stir them to emulate such victorious deeds. Then, it is of as much importance to tell a man how to act for himself as to teach many how to act together. History not only warns us of the mistakes in war, it also points out tous what discipline has accom-

Ignorance of history.

What history teaches.

plished : it satisfies a man that military tactics are most important. Soldiers would be delighted with such lectures, though they will not read through huge volumes of history for amusement. And such education is necessary, for we must not imagine because we take a poor man from the plough and dress him in a red coat that he necessarily becomes a soldier at heart. Nor, on the other hand, should we be right in supposing that, because others have not entered the military profession, they could not make good commanders if the opportunity offered. The American War fully proved what civilians could do when summoned to command.

Huge volumes are not looked at.

Civilians good officers.

CHAPTER X.

Looks are Deceitful—Circumstances make the Man—Men Compared—Bluster not Pluck—Strain upon the Minds of really Great Men—Soldiers like Steam-Engines require expert Handling—A Lifetime of Study may only give one Hint for the Hour of Emergency—How Carnot organised Victory, by judging Men for Himself; a Practice very Necessary with those who Command—Consequences of the Reverse shown—No Rules can be laid down for War—Precedents not always to be got, nor is it necessary to look for them—The 'Unusual' most likely to succeed—How a Noble Army is made—If the acts of a Government are just it will be zealously supported—Honesty and Dishonesty, Justice and Injustice—The Two Moral Laws of our being—Blair on the Ways of Providence—The Law of Extremes—Examples of Extremes.

Looks are deceitful.

It is by judging men too strictly by their looks alone or by their mildness of demeanour that we come to be deceived. Thus it is that men so constantly turn out the very opposite to what we imagined them to be. Many of our most sublime authors had to pawn their clothes for a meal, whilst their works at a later period have realised fortunes. Many a despised 'muff' has eventually proved himself a dauntless and intrepid man in battle. Circumstances make the man, as the 'mind of man is the man himself;' but often, in the piping days of peace, jealousy is sufficient to mar the advancement of those who have no opportunity given them to prove what they are really worth.

Poor authors.

Circumstances make the man.

Then there are those who rise under the wing of great men; who have never acted for themselves; who, when from time to time thrown upon their own resources, prove how little brains they possess.

Men who rise under great men.

The light infantry soldier requires much 'presence of mind' to pick out cover, to look out for 'cavalry,' to expose himself as little as possible to the enemy's fire. It would be madness for these men to walk slowly over a plain, or to stand deliberately in front of a battery firing grape. To send soldiers,—or let them go of their own accord,—into the very jaws of death, without using our utmost endeavours to protect and save them, is an inexcusable crime. 'Prudence in war is the indispensable condition of successful daring.' If true courage merely consists in madly rushing up to certain destruction, any aspiring man may place himself any day at the top of the list of heroes, by squatting on a barrel of gunpowder and firing it with his cigar! We have ever doubted the supernatural courage of the blustering fellow who tells nervous ladies, and quiet homely girls, that he never felt anxiety in battle. We unhesitatingly assert that it is not in human nature to be able to face death without anxiety of mind. Anxiety (or more probably the idea of future responsibility, either as regards time or eternity) is to the bravest man what real virtue is to the woman: it makes him consider and reflect, and the moment he does

The light infantry soldier must have 'presence of mind.'

What is false courage or rashness.

Blaster not 'pluck.'

Anxiety in battle.

so he is proof against all temptation to quit the paths of duty. He does not act from mere impulse. Sir Charles Napier (one of the bravest of the brave) is said to have 'trembled at his own deficiencies.' At the great battle of Volturna we are told that the hero Garibaldi was much moved, red, and wet with perspiration, and that 'his voice altered (query, faltered?) with emotion.' Now Garibaldi was doubly victorious in this affair, but the very fact of his having kept 2,000 men in reserve when he wanted every man he could spare at the front, proves that he was prepared for the worst, in fact that he was extremely nervous as to the result. With all his heroism then, he was not void of intense anxiety; he was playing a desperate game and he won it by his 'presence of mind.' It is no proof of weakness that an intellectual man should feel anxious. *All* really conscientious men are so, even when doing their utmost; because they have their doubts, and attempt to do more, if possible. Thus it is that so many great men are sacrificed by mental exertion, and the illustrious Havelock is one out of many instances. It is the same with the classic as the soldier; but ten thousand sluggish drones cannot compensate for the loss of one upright man who sacrifices himself at the sacred 'Shrine of Duty.' A generation may pass away ere we shall replace such men as Sir

Sir Charles Napier in battle.

Garibaldi at Volturna.

Garibaldi's 'presence of mind.'

All men of mind are anxious.

Havelock.

Great men not easily replaced.

Henry Lawrence, Sir Charles Napier, Sir Henry Havelock, or Sir James Outram. The death of Lawrence touched many a soldier's heart. The assassination of Lord Mayo caused a national wailing. These great men met danger with determined resolution. They faced death, not boasting that they felt no anxiety, but with a strong hope and reliance in the Being who made them. Their noble actions on earth are a guarantee that they always regulated their behaviour towards their fellow mortals under the full impression and consciousness of their own responsibility to the Great Judge of all. Full of trust in a glorious immortality, these men faced death in obedience to duty. There was doubtless, the inward satisfaction of having performed their duty honestly, justly, and strenuously; and this it was that formed a 'rainbow of hope' to illuminate the otherwise gloomy prospect of a transition from life to death. They were noble Christian warriors of the highest type of humanity.

Men of resolution.

Feeling responsibility.

Inward satisfaction of duty performed.

Fortune is, however, sadly capricious, and these men died in the very zenith of their glory; but ambition is a noble feeling for anyone to possess so long as it does not lead him astray or warp his judgment. Our noblest men prove to us that in prosperity they were more humble-minded than men of inferior calibre of mind. But without ambition these magnanimous men might have

Many good men die in the zenith of 'glory.'

been languid or apathetic soldiers in the path of Christian duty. Their real ambition was to do good; whilst to other men, how often has ambition caused their fall, as by it they have worked out their own destruction? But the labour of the mind brings a man to the grave sooner than hardships or corporeal toil, and those who ever gazed in the intellectual and care-worn faces of Lawrence or Havelock, must have had no difficulty in remarking the bold outlines of anxiety engraven on their countenances. The physical development of some men we find is very often out of all proportion to their intellectual powers; the 'engine' is powerful, but the 'regulator'—or mind—is in unskilful hands, and when no attention is paid to the 'safety valve' of discretion, excessive and increased action goes on till an explosion takes place.

Worthy ambition.

The intellectual countenances of Lawrence and Havelock.

Outlines of anxiety.

The mind the engine.

Soldiers, like steam-engines, require to be guided by experienced hands. Often the power is there, among them, when the 'head' is wanting; and where one soldier thinks, we are afraid that many go blindly and recklessly to work. Some men even invite death, acting like a drunken fellow who, when he stumbles on any obstacle tells *it* 'to get out of the road' instead of endeavouring to do so himself—and thus exemplify the saying, 'Fools rush in where angels fear to tread.' A commander

Soldiers, like engines, require expert hands.

What is

then is the person who ought to be calm and wary; ever ready to seize upon an opportunity, and never shrinking from using his full power with the utmost alacrity, at the proper moment. 'But it is only on the spot that the real significance of events can be judged.' A lifetime of study may perhaps give a hint for the procedure of a single moment in a sudden emergency; and yet all that knowledge is futile if not at the instant available. It is no use to *knock* if there is nothing inside—*in the head* that is to say! If the subjects are not arranged in order in the 'pigeon-holes' of the mind, all must be confusion within. Instead of the 'solid *bars* of gold,' we perhaps find a fluttering, jumbled mass as thin as 'gold-beater's leaf,' and such delay is occasioned before this can be arranged that an opportunity vanishes never to be offered to us again. 'For war least of all things proceeds on definite principles—but adopts most of its *contrivances* for itself to suit the occasion.'[1] How often Napoleon the Great exemplified this sound maxim? At Jena when he found that the Prussian 'left' had been beaten by Soult, and that their 'right' had fallen back on General Ruchel who was coming up with a huge reserve—he, at once recalling Soult, and attacking the Prussian 'right,' drove them back in great disorder. The rout was then, as

wanted in commanders.

Nothing there!

A man of confusion instead of order

Thucydides on war.

Napoleon at Jena.

Disorder and panic, the result.

[1] Thucydides.

he anticipated, communicated to the troops of General Zeschwitz's force that had retired on Frankendorf where the second line of General Ruchel's force had been placed.

General character of a good commander.

A really good commander we have generally found to be a man of quiet, but acute observation. He seems to understand by one expression what you wish to intimate. He even anticipates what you are about to say, and thus proves his knowledge of the world and his previous study; for during a moderate lifetime spent in close observance of men and in gaining historical information, it is strange if a man of intellect (with a tolerable memory) cannot pitch upon a parallel case to the one immediately under consideration; either as regards the position of an enemy, or the earnest representations of an officer. 'Alexander endeared himself to his officers and soldiers; treated them with the greatest familiarity, admitted them to his table, his exercises, and conversations, was deeply troubled for them when overtaken by any calamity, grieved for them when sick, rejoiced at their recovery, and shared in whatever befel them.'[1] Such men bear in mind the frailties of erring human nature, and are kind and considerate, just and merciful. But in making arrangements for battle, they keep their plans secret; the

Alexander's method.

Secret in plans.

[1] Rollin's 'Ancient History,' vol. vi. p. 297.

grand plot, at least, is not revealed, lest by an unguarded word from the Staff, they might be anticipated by the enemy at a time when it would be ruinous to change their plans. One of our most respected commanders-in-chief—since then advanced to the peerage—told the Author (when he bestowed the command of a regiment on him): 'In managing men never use *severe* measures at *first*.' In other words do not play your 'trump cards' too soon. The commanding officer loses his dignity and his power, if he is noted for awarding the severest punishments at first; because, the men know his ways. The best plan is to alter the punishments so that no one can say what the head of a corps is likely to give. A card played in proper time must be advantageous, but you need not therefore 'show your hand.' 'Carnot,' said Napoleon, 'has organised victory.' It was the maxim of this great man 'that nothing was so easy as to find excellent officers in all ranks, if they were chosen according to their capacity and their courage.' 'For this reason he took the utmost pains to make himself acquainted with their manner and character, and such was the extent of his information that it was rare for a soldier of merit to escape him, even though only a simple private. He deemed it impossible that an army commanded by officers chosen exclusively from a limited class

Trump cards to be played last.

Carnot organised victory.

of society could long maintain a contest with one led by those chosen with discernment from the inferior ranks. This principle, being founded on the eternal laws of nature, is of universal application.' [1] Carnot understood men, but he judged for himself. There is so much jealousy in the world, such differences of opinion—based often upon most unsound reasoning—that a commander only does his duty when he acts like Carnot, and finds out the real character of the men or officers for whose advancement he is responsible to the 'State.'

Jealousy a barrier.

The Author was told by an old retired officer that he left the service in utter disgust because he never got a Staff appointment, although he was most attentive to his duties and had a love for his profession. This officer on leaving the service met a friend to whom he related the circumstances that led him to retire. His friend replied, 'My dear sir, So-and-so was your enemy, and whenever you applied there was some little word put in, not exactly in your favour—and *much* can be *implied*, eh?' It turned out that, as far back as 1820 or so, this old officer had given some cause of offence (in a purely private matter) to the one who was his enemy, and who afterwards had the ear of the higher powers. Here a good and valuable officer was lost to the service.

Retired in disgust.

What caused his bad luck.

[1] Alison, vol. ii, pp. 313-4.

One of the old Governor-Generals of India used to walk up and down the verandah of Government House in Calcutta, and was heard to say, more than once, 'Everybody speaks well of this man, there *must* be *something in him.* We will at least give him a trial.' How would it have been, however, if reports had gone the *other* way? Thus Carnot's plan of ascertaining for himself is far the safest and the most just one. In a native corps we have ourselves adopted this system with advantage, by not allowing a man to give opinions of his comrades and intimating to all that it is an insult to a commanding officer to tell him that So-and-so is 'bad' or 'good;' it implies in fact that the head of the corps does not know, or takes no interest in his men or officers. The door is thus shut to all 'stabs in the dark,' direct or indirect.

Remarks of one of our Governor-Generals.

Carnot's a safe plan.

Again we consider the calling of a council of war is an anomaly. It is something like a judge who, having had the evidence before him, sentences a man to suffer death, yet holds out a hope of reprieve. If the judge, who has seen all the evidence, condemns the prisoner, why should he attempt to throw the whole responsibility on another, who cannot be better able to decide the case? Was the man guilty or not?—that is the question. Was the sentence a just

A council of war absurd as a *rule.*

one? If it was not murder, he was tried under a wrong charge; if murder, he should not escape.

Secret plans only known to the commanders.

So also with a commander of an army; all his plans are within himself, and being better aware of his entire resources than his subordinates, he should only ask advice when he admits he has lost all his self-reliance. Now the moment a commander arrives at this state, he virtually ceases to possess that superior ability for which alone his country has placed him in so important a position.

Napoleon's ruin.

Napoleon on the retreat from Moscow was ruined by taking advice. He was no longer the self-reliant conqueror he had been before, or that retreat would not have ended as it did. It seems to us that a commander should always possess certain hidden expedients uppermost in his mind; although his *general* plan of operations may be ever so apparent there should be, we conceive, *beyond* these, certain precautionary arrangements to meet all probable difficulties and to guard against all possible contingencies that might arise from want of zealous support on the part of subordinates, or from the carelessness, the mistakes, or tardiness of those on whom he depends to carry out his plans, or projects.

Hidden expedients required.

The skill of Philopœmen in war.

The skill of Philopœmen in choosing ground and leading armies is ascribed by Livy 'to his having formed his mind by perpetual meditation, in times of peace

as well as war, till *nothing* could happen which he had not considered.' This, in varying degrees must be the case with all good generals, and in none was it more conspicuous than in Napoleon, Wellington, and Eugène. With them, as with Philopœmen, nothing happened which they had not already considered and weighed by general rules. Yet even then defeats could not be always avoided.

Great commanders.

No rules can be laid down for war, any more than we can expect one ship to follow exactly the same course as another. 'Wind' and 'tide' will vary: we must look only for good navigation from the captain. Mind is requisite, and self-possession in danger. Sir Charles Napier, for instance, when he exercised 'his usual far-seeing "subtlety"' often reversed the ordinary rules of war. He is indeed a piteous commander who, fearing the responsibility of acting contrary to custom, hesitates to adopt a stratagem which from its novelty would be all the more likely to succeed. The general who boldly confronts all dangers by using his own judgment is far more likely to be above mediocrity than the one who hesitates and looks for precedents before he acts. Watch the mind of Napoleon. His army of reserve at Dijon numbered 36,000 men, but it was paraded and proclaimed to be only 8,000, and whilst the Austrians made little of these 8,000 invalids,

No rules applicable in war.

Sir Charles Napier's far-seeing subtlety.

Proper boldness necessary.

Napoleon at Dijon.

Austrians 'taken in.'

Bonaparte hurled the *real* reserve into the plains of Italy and thus won the battle of Marengo, while the Austrians were still before Geneva!

Precedents not always necessary in war.

When an intelligent General finds that some extraordinary feat is necessary, he need never hesitate for want of precedents, where his conscience tells him he is doing right. To do so evinces little-mindedness. It is by the '*un*precedented' as all history proves, that battles have been mostly gained. Men are prepared for that which is likely to happen, and will provide for the same; but the 'unusual' is a hidden enemy visible only when too late to be overcome. 'Heroic valour supplies the place of armies, and simple manhood and its own great heart will create a nation worthy of freedom.'

The 'unusual' is an invisible enemy.

Real liberty with *order*.

'The distinguishing part of our constitution is its liberty. But the liberty, the only liberty I mean is a liberty connected with order, that not only exists along *with* order and virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them. It inheres in good and steady government as its vital substance and principle.'[1]

Indian officer's work in 1857.

During 1857 it was seen how Indian officers worked. Small bodies of men were raised, and the mutineers meeting with a determined opposition were everywhere dispersed. How vastly

[1] Burke.

different it would have been had any other nation occupied our position in India.

Here we found 'that unity of purpose and genuine zeal will preserve the public security and order.' By the mutual trust, moreover, and entire confidence between a Government and its servants a noble army is made. The Government that proves by its acts that all its intentions are straightforward, and that no political intrigues or artifices are ever permitted, may rest assured of the zealous devotion and honest support of every servant, under all circumstances; besides this, as the servants naturally adopt the high principles of the Government, a body of honourable-minded and high-spirited officers will spring up, who cannot be daunted by any unforeseen difficulties that arise, and who will sacrifice themselves readily for the good of their country. Such devoted and heroic men as young Salkeld of Delhi repute, and the brave and noble Nicholson, are produced under just Governments. Any one who reads the 'Mornington Despatches' will see what a generous Government—The Honourable East India Company—obtained by broad and liberal views. In one case some misguided officers who had thrown up their commissions at once tendered their services again, because a powerful enemy had appeared in the field; and

Unity of purpose in the army.

A just Government, how it will be supported.

Lord Mornington's despatches.

they were not so mean-spirited or ignoble as to place the country in jeopardy by gross ingratitude. An old, very old, colonel told the Author that another officer said to him, 'You should all think yourselves lucky if you get six months' pay and were forced to retire.' This was after 1857, and the allusion was to Company's officers—a body of gentlemen who had fought manfully for the Government. Such an idea could never have been entertained by an enlightened and generous Government such as ours is, and the remark is one of many to show that individual opinions are to be accepted with caution. To have acted thus would have been to punish and ruin old and toil-worn veterans who could in no way be held responsible for the fanatical and diabolical acts of the Sepoy mutineers. Honesty and justice meet with their own reward, equally as dishonesty and injustice cannot fail to bring their own punishment. These are the two moral laws of our being which must be ever borne in mind, either as regards a Government or individuals:—'The first, that every irregular passion or illicit desire acquires strength from the gratification which it receives, and becomes the more uncontrollable the more it is indulged. The second, that the power of self-denial, the energy of virtue, the generosity of disposition, increase with every occasion in which

What some one wished to do with Company officers!

Such an idea never entertained by Government.

The two moral laws of our being.

they are called forth, until at length they become a formed habit, and require hardly any effort for their exercise. On the counteracting force of these two laws the whole moral administration of the universe hinges, as its physical equilibrium is dependent on the opposite influences of the centripetal and centrifugal forces.'[1]

Blair says, 'Interfering interests and jarring passions are in such a manner balanced against one another, such proper checks are placed on the violence of human pursuits, and the wrath of man is made so to hold its course, that how opposite soever the several motives at first appear to be, yet they all concur at the last in one result. While amongst the multitudes that dwell on the face of the earth, some are submissive to the Divine authority, some rise up in rebellion against it, others, absorbed in their pleasures and pursuits, are totally inattentive to it; they are all so moved by an imperceptible influence from above, that the zeal of the dutiful, the wrath of the rebellious, and the indifference of the careless, contribute finally to the glory of God. All are governed in such a manner as suits their powers, and is consistent with their moral freedom; yet the various acts of these three free agents all conspire to work out the eternal purposes of heaven.

Blair on the ways of Providence.

[1] Alison, vol. x. p. 39.

'The system upon which the Divine government plainly proceeds is that men's own wickedness should be appointed to correct them, that they should be snared in the work of their own hands. When the vices of men require punishment to be inflicted, the Almighty is at no loss for the ministers of justice. No special interpositions of power are requisite. He has no occasion to step from his throne and interrupt the majestic order of Nature.'

The Law of Extremes.

The law of extremes is worthy the contemplation of every intellectual being. It is apparent everywhere and in all things. The extremes of heat and cold, the fire and the water, mountains of snow and volcanoes; the two poles in electricity; animals inhaling oxygen gas and giving out noxious gases, these noxious gases being absorbed by plants and again given out as pure oxygen gas fit for animals. Plants draw, in fact, from the atmosphere what animals *impart*, and *supply* it with what animals consume. The colour of white is a mixture of *all* others; 'red,' 'blue,' and 'green,' and all the rest by being blended in certain proportions form what we had fancied rather to be no colour at all than *all* colours together. The diamond, again, is made of the same material as coal. The plant has its nutritive as well as its reproductive organs, equally

Examples of extremes.

as with animals. Plants feed on mineral substances, and by a wonderful power of assimilation convert these into vegetable substances for the use of man or animals. Animals possess voluntary motion, plants are stationary. In animals are organs of every form and construction, comprising prehensile machines, pumps, siphons, saws, and projectiles. For instance the talons of the eagle, the claws of the tiger, the proboscis of the elephant, are examples of prehension. The double tube of the butterfly which takes up liquid nutriment and the lancet of the gnat which at once pierces the skin and forms a tube for suction, are all examples of pumps and suckers. Many of the humble molluscs are furnished with a tongue that can rasp or saw the sea-weed so as to reduce it to a pulp. The star-fish has hundreds of tubular suckers with which to seize any unfortunate 'periwinkle,' that may come in its way. The sea-jellies have long contractile filaments by which to sting and grasp their victims. And one little fish (*Chætodon rostratus*) has a projectile apparatus which enables it to shoot with a drop of water the small flies on which it lives. Are not these marvels? Instincts of self-sustenance, self-defence, production and support of offspring; instincts of migration, nest-building, incubation, gregariousness. Thus the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms are closely

The wonders or marvels of Nature.

connected and really mutually dependent; the inorganic kingdom supports the vegetable, and the vegetable kingdom is essential to the existence and development of the animal. Then there is the gradual modification of the nervous system from the zoophyte up to man; and in man there is the mind—the connecting link between the material and mortal below, and the spiritual and immortal above.

Chemical affinity does not only combine different substances into one compound body, it also effects the opposite process, it decomposes.

'The Gulf-Stream takes its rise in the Gulf of Mexico, where the temperature is 86°; it is equal in volume to 3,000 Mississippis. Its length from its Mexican head to the Azores is 3,000 miles. It has been calculated that the quantity of heat discharged over the Atlantic from the waters of the Gulf-Stream in a winter's day would be sufficient to raise the whole column of atmosphere that rests on France and the British Isles from the freezing point up to summer heat. Here are the marks of benevolent design: but for this, England would have been a frost-bitten realm, as in point of latitude it corresponds with Labrador, where the climate is exceedingly harsh.'

Then oxygen gas supports combustion. Hydrogen is incapable of doing so, yet when set on

fire it is exceedingly combustible. Nevertheless one part by weight of hydrogen mixed with eight parts of oxygen if ignited by a taper will explode with violence, and the whole will be condensed into water.

The butterfly has 20,000 convex lenses, each supposed to be a distinct and effective eye. Living creatures nourish from their upper parts, by the mouth chiefly. Plants nourish from below. After all, '*Homo est planta inversa.*'

Then the wonders of absorption are astounding. Observe the duties of the lacteal and the 'lymphatic' vessels: one absorbing nourishment from digested food in the alimentary canal within, the other from the whole of the internal and external surface of the body—and so numerous are they that the point of the finest needle can touch no part of the body without coming in contact with a branch of this system of vessels.

Trees of the class Endogenous increase by the addition of longitudinal fibres from the *inside*. Their opposites, the Exogenous trees, increase by the addition of longitudinal fibres beneath the bark and on the *outside* of the wood near the circumference.

Let us now take the blood—here we find the 'venous' and the 'arterial;' the former is incapable of nourishing the body, the latter is the proper

nutriment and stimulant of the system. In the brain (cerebrum) we have the two equal lateral hemispheres; these are again subdivided into three,—the 'anterior,' 'middle,' and 'posterior.' 'The "cellular tissue" of the body consists of two parts: one fills up all the interstices which are left between the various organs and thus unites them with each other, the other portion closely surrounds the organs, penetrates into the interior, and contributes largely to their formation. One is the "external" the other the "internal" cellular tissue.'

We see design in the 'lama' for the crags of the Cordilleras, and the camel for the work in the desert. The former has a foot of two spring toes, completely divided, and at the tip a strong hoof, pointed at the extremity and hooked down like a claw; whereas the camel's feet are broad, extensively cushioned below and soft like a pad. These few examples of the wonderful works of creation have been introduced to draw the attention of the reader to the advantage which may be derived by cultivating a taste in the Army for acquiring general knowledge. The soldier who thinks deeply on such interesting, such inspiring and useful topics ought certainly to acquire a moral training which will lead him to think,—after all, what is mortal life?

The object of introducing the above.

What is there in it that we should care to live for except the affection of our relations and friends, and the pleasure of endeavouring to do good to all mankind, as far as in us lies,—above all, to do our duty in that position where God has placed us?

CHAPTER XI.

Advantages of reading History—How Heroes are made—Napoleon's Principle—The general Tone of Public Opinion may at times be usefully consulted—How to obtain a Huge Army in England without adopting either System of Landwehr or Landsturm—What will happen if we neglect our Artillery—Proved further: Baylen, Aspern, Sedan, Chillianwalla—To neglect this Arm as unwise as to build Wooden Ships to fight Ironclads—What Hyder Ali's notion of our Artillery was—Artillery at Priesnitz, at Fère-Champenoise, in the Balkan, and in the late War.

Advantages of reading History.

HISTORY then, dear reader, furnishes us with examples of the advantage of cultivating a high moral tone amongst the military class. It must convince us that these examples should ever come, in the first instance, from the rulers, to be transfused then as a *certain* result throughout every portion of the community. When the head of the army proves by his noble and straightforward acts that manly and honourable sentiments are ever uppermost in his mind, we may rest assured that the example is not lost—even on the most humble private in the ranks. The most ignorant or illiterate soldier carefully appreciates 'the simple majesty of a man to whose eye his fellow-men are seen as man to

Honourable sentiments.

What makes heroes.

man, stripped of every circumstance of accident or rank, and in whose soul burns nothing but the fire which makes martyrs and heroes. It is this power which gives a moral influence which nothing can approach.' 'These,' says Burke, 'are ties, though as light as air, as strong as links of iron.'

How Napoleon commanded.

Napoleon commanded his army by a different process, and the result was, that he never was regarded but with fear: had there been a closer bond of union—that trusting confidence and security from unjustifiable rebuke which exists in our army and is akin to the love and respect existing between a father and his children—it would have induced his soldiers at critical times to have made their wishes known, respectfully, to the head of the army, through their officers. At such periods the 'vox populi' is the 'vox Dei,' and valuable hints may be obtained therefrom. But with Napoleon it was otherwise, and his ruin was the result. Without appealing to his other officers or soldiers, he took the advice of a single general only and placed his army thereby in a position of the utmost jeopardy. But among them no doubt were some who dreaded the Smolensko route, and he would have obtained from the mass the reasons of their dislike. Doubtless the conqueror's heart was with the dauntless Murat, yet his presence of mind must have forsaken him when he decided to

The 'vox populi' useful.

retreat viâ Smolensko. In fact it was the mind of Murat that he despised: when apart from that general he considered him an 'imbecile,' and in this instance, allowing that feeling of prejudice to overcome him, he went too far. He seemed to overlook the fact that the bravest of the brave would not suggest what he dare not carry out. The mere moral effect of retreating by the same road he had advanced, strewed with all its melancholy relics, was enough to dispirit his noble army. He forgot that he was Napoleon, the man of genius who had raised himself to his high position by his own noble mind. Fate seemed here to hoodwink him, and thus he fell when almost conqueror of the world; he forgot that the irresistible force of his own intellectual capacity had made him what he was, and he thus too hastily adopted the opinion of another man—Bessières—in a matter that he could have far better decided himself. 'There were doubtless tens of thousands of brave fellows who would have gladly followed Murat. Common sense tells us that Napoleon's army would have cheerfully fought its way through a rich country when the same noble soldiers forced the passage of the Beresina after a weary month's march and when jaded and foot-sore. Where were the 20,000 of the Imperial Guard who took no part in the battle of Borodino? Does it re-

Moral effect of the retreat viâ Smolensko.

Napoleon hoodwinked by Fate.

Common sense view.

quire much intellectual acumen to decide which is the least of two evils? Was it easier for Napoleon to force the passage of the river after a month's march and daily battles with 30,000 or 40,000 men —or to attack an enemy with the still large army he commanded before he commenced to retreat? If we say that the Smolensko route was the only one that Napoleon dare proceed by we vilify that great commander, for he boasted at Warsaw 'that the Russians never ventured to stand against him.' The result proved that this was no idle boast. We find that the instant Napoleon left Moscow, Kutusoff became so alarmed that he abandoned his position, the holding of which *had* prevented the march of the French viâ Kalouga. A bold front then, even if the Russians had defended the road at Kalouga, would have probably been of the utmost advantage to the French. The lightning speed of Murat, and his well-known bravery, would have awed the Russians; they would have seen a body of desperate men determined to cut a passage through at all hazards. The other way the French were slowly pursued, and made to die of cold and want more than by the weapons of their foes.

Which was the reasonable course?

Napoleon's idea of the Russians.

A bold front required then.

We should not always judge our enemy's forces by the hundreds of thousands on paper. Should we be always wise in calling a smiling

acquaintance a true friend? How much has been done under the garb of friendship? No; our duty is simply to 'put two and two together,' and if we do not find acts 'dove-tail' we may be sure that there is a 'screw' loose' somewhere. A good memory has been found uncommonly useful in weighing and judging of one's neighbours. Some people have a happy knack of saying one thing one day and the very opposite the next. Notes of such little cases of forgetfulness are useful to a degree. If our enemy attempts to lead us astray by the brilliancy of his martial parade or his threatening attitude, we must go further back and judge him by his past history or acts.

To 'put two and two together.'

Forgetfulness.

'Not all gold that glitters.'

And in history we find endless examples to prove that 'all is not gold that glitters.' The mock grandeur and parade of the world is not only found amongst individual commanders—it extends also to their armies. If we want to be assured of the truth of the above adage we may find it exemplified by a glance at the helmet of a Cuirassier, or by a visit to any 'Beau Tibbs.' The insincere fop we here allude to is the type of those who apologise to a friend (whom they know cannot wait) and say broken-heartedly 'that the dinner consisting of *turbot* and *ortolan* cannot be ready for two hours,' knowing, all the time, that a 'salt herring' is all that is in course of preparation.'

Beau Tibbs.

Unfortunately, however, for truth's sake, the servant does not always come in just at the same instant, to bawl out, 'Your wife's washing the *two* shirts at the next door, because they have taken an oath against lending you the *tub* any longer.' The hungry friend of Beau Tibbs immediately saw 'how the land lay.' So also when we judge of armies or private individuals we must judge them by their antecedents and not by their appearances. We have many long muster-rolls of armies that are mere *myths*. Napoleon should have remembered that the Russians 'never ventured to stand against him,' and judging by their past acts, he should have disregarded the apparent strength of their position. Many a cold, hollow-hearted friend may caress you in prosperity, who would glory to see you unfortunate; while another who may seem cold and indifferent, may have spent his whole life in performing generous and benevolent acts. The man of judgment has no difficulty in determining which of the two is worthy of his confidence and respect. A commander must use his judgment as an angler does his fine line; he may jerk the light fish out of the water, but he will 'play' the heavy one. Yet few we think would cut the line and let a heavy fish go from fear of losing a few yards of tackle. We would prefer having a good struggle for it; to save our line and yet

How to judge of armies or men generally.

The man of judgment.

How the angler uses his thin line!

secure our fish all the same. In our humble opinion the glorious French army suffered from the style of fighting adopted in Algeria. The Arabs could not stand the dash, the brilliant *élan* of the French; but the 'heavy fish,' the enduring, stubborn, and steady Prussian was not to be caught or conquered in the same way. All the desperate attacks of the French in the last war were of no avail. No bravery can overcome a tempest of bullets and an iron shower of shot and shell besides. There was no *reaching* the enemy. Remember what happened to that superb Austrian army at Sadowa. Yet the unfortunate French had to go up against enormous numbers of artillery, and it was utterly impossible for any troops to reach an enemy backed up by such an overwhelming superiority in guns. As the Austrians were defeated by the needle-gun, so were the French by the Prussian artillery.

French tactics wrong.

Awful artillery fire.

Remember Sadowa.

French worse off.

Too much dependence on the 'Mitrailleuse.'

Too much confidence was placed in the 'Mitrailleuse' an excellent weapon for street fighting, or to defend strong positions, but *never* intended to take the place of field guns, as was apparently attempted in the late war. All glory to the bravery of both armies, but the contest was unequal. It was 'iron' and 'lead' against poor mortal man, with the greater power in favour of the Prussians. Besides which the French tactics were

An unequal contest.

out of date and unsuited to the new weapons and the rapid firing. We cannot admit that the French were beaten,—except on two points. First, they were just 'hammered' and 'pounded' to death by an overwhelming artillery fire; and next, they adhered to an antiquated system of tactics. From the very day that the rapid-firing rifles were introduced, advances in column to the close quarters attack were out of the question, and although the 'bayonet' may yet do much, it will now be difficult to get close enough to use it. The 'line' then still remains, and that nation will conquer that can best trust its soldiers in such a formation. The strongest men are not now necessary for the 'push home,' as in the days of Cæsar. The heavy powerful men of the cuirassier type cannot tread down the infantry. What could an army of Richard's armed with ponderous battle-axes effect nowadays? If they could get *at* the foot-soldier, well and good,—but that is out of the question. One Prussian corps of infantry totally destroyed two of the most magnificent regiments of the glorious French cuirassiers. The day has arrived to put light men on fleet horses, and to bring the heaviest cannon with the longest ranges, into the field.

How the French were defeated.

Effect of the rapid-firing rifles.

The largest men not required for the line.

Two cuirassier regiments destroyed.

Light men and fleet horses.

It will be necessary to pick out your *strongest* men for the artillery. That arm will require power-

The strongest men for artillery.

ful men, and men of the utmost endurance, in the work to come,—in those terrific artillery duels that will assuredly take place in future battles. And as for your infantry, reduce the standard; any man who can use a rifle is as good as a giant, with the advantage of being a smaller animated target for an enemy to fire at. Take in recruits of even fifteen, and pay more attention to accuracy of firing than to the size or weight of the men. It would not be difficult to train all boys when at school from thirteen upwards to the expert use of the rifle. We feel sure that as the boys love gymnastics, so they would 'go in' heart and soul to learn the art of firing. The greatest ambition of the plucky British boy is to have a small pistol; and to have a gun! why he would go half-wild with delight. Thus, without introducing the 'Landwehr' or 'Landsturm' systems existing in Prussia, we should obtain a huge army. In case of invasion our youths of nineteen and twenty would form an enormous reserve of intelligent soldiers, ready at a day's notice for the service of Her Majesty.

Reduce the standard for infantry.

School boys to be trained.

The British youth *lover a* gun.

Population of England in 1851.

The population of England and Wales alone in 1851, was 17,922,768, of whom 8,762,588 were males. In 1846, the state of education in Europe gave one pupil to nine of the population of Great Britain. Thus dividing the number 8,762,588 by 9,

we should have 973,620 male pupils in England and Wales alone. But with the new system of education, the proportion would now always be far greater. What an immense reserve we should have growing up every year! What strength within our own British Isles! And when armed with a rifle, a boy of seventeen would be no mean enemy. The cost would be nothing to the advantages we should reap from such a simple system. The world is in a most unsettled state, and the days are coming when every male may be called out to defend the national honour. If we neglect our artillery our men will be shot down at a distance; give us this arm in sufficient numbers to pound our foes on *equal* terms, and the British soldiers will do the rest. But not unless, for flesh and blood cannot make way unassisted against a torrent of shot and shell, fired by an enemy we cannot reach or shake.

An immense reserve.

What will happen if we neglect our artillery.

We do not for a moment assert that the discipline in the German army did not vastly contribute to their triumphs—this much we have already fully admitted; but we maintain that the French had to fight under even greater disadvantages than the Austrians at Sadowa, simply because they were overwhelmed by the tremendous artillery fire of the Prussians. Possibly our opinions may be opposed; we may be told, perhaps, that the

Prussian discipline.

French overwhelmed by artillery fire simply.

Prussians had *not* so many more guns, and so forth. No matter; it is our business to beware that we are not idle. It behoves us to look at the matter in a cool, practical, matter-of-fact light, and we shall do well. Common sense will tell us that man, however brave, must be dispirited where he finds all the losses on his own side; he must gnash his teeth with rage when he sees his splendid comrades smashed to pieces by cannon which his own artillerymen are utterly unable to silence or to shake for an instant. What hope has the bravest at such times?

Common sense view.

Artillery at Baylen, 1808.

At Baylen, 1808, Castaños awaited the attack of Dupont, who came up loaded with the plunder of Cordova but with fatigued men. The Spanish army drove him back. Brigade after brigade advanced, but with no better success, for the French were wearied, choked with dust, disordered and encumbered by the luggage waggons. 'Their guns, which came up one by one in haste and confusion and never equalled those the enemy had in position, were speedily dismounted by the superior force and aim of the Spanish artillery.'[1]

Artillery at Aspern, 1809.

The battle of Aspern, 1809, proves the effect of the concentric fire of artillery; the awful havoc made in the French columns was perfectly astonishing, and the result of the cannonade in

[1] Alison, vol. vii. pp. 360, 361.

that battle should alone open the eyes of all commanders. The French lost some 30,000 men.[1] 'On the second day Napoleon precipitated 70,000 men in close columns against a semicircle of batteries containing 300 guns; every *shot* fell with the certainty of death.' What chance would a man with a bow and arrow have against 'old Brown Bess'? What hope would a man with a sword have of reaching one armed with a revolver? What corps, armed with the best rifles, could stand against a battery of twenty or thirty guns? What we want is cannon everywhere in every action; and we can fairly trust to British gunners, officers, or privates, to handle any other nation's artillery in a satisfactory manner. But pop-guns cannot do what pistols can; nor should we rely on numbers alone, but at all cost or hardship should bring cannon into the field that will equal that of the enemy in throwing as heavy projectiles. By such measures we shall certainly avoid for ourselves another Sedan. When an enemy is compelled to cease fire he will draw off or leave an opening. Now at Sedan the French were surrounded by powerful batteries past which they could not penetrate; yet could they but have concentrated some heavy guns on one particular spot they might have succeeded. The same thing is proved by all the

Immense loss of 30,000 French.

Bow and arrow against Brown Bess.

Cannon required everywhere in action.

French at Sedan surrounded by an iron belt of artillery.

[1] Alison, vol. viii. pp. 100, 102.

sorties from Paris. Never was any attempt made to break through the Prussians which was preceded by the fire of heavy guns dragged out and massed at the points required. If for this purpose every man and horse had been made available, the Prussians could never have prevented the French from issuing forth at some part or other. The large guns in position were all afterwards captured; why then were they not concentrated as we have suggested, and used to cause fearful losses to the enemy? Had the exit of the French been secured, the heavier guns might have been left behind when once the army had escaped. A man with a slender rapier, by being more expert, may run another similarly armed through the body; but no one with a scythe would let him approach, or if he did he could cut him in halves at a single stroke. So also if you try to break through batteries of twenty-four pounders with merely light field-pieces you must be defeated. In future wars all antagonists who are on the alert will take care to be on pretty equal terms. We shall never see any more 'Sadowas,' or 'Sedans,' but we *shall* see the most unprecedented numbers of cannon brought into action in the battles to come. And the nation that neglects its artillery will certainly meet with terrible misfortunes.

Large guns required at Paris.

The French lost a chance of getting out of Paris.

A man with a 'rapier' no match for one with a scythe.

No more 'Sedans' for the future.

The Author as a mere youth saw 500 out of

1,100 fine fellows in *one* regiment killed and wounded at Chillianwalla by the fire of artillery, and he has highly respected that arm ever since. Nor has he ceased to write on the subject. It is for those who have seen the effects of this arm to publish what they know and not to be daunted by the remarks of cavillers. The subject is far too important to be dismissed with the impression that 'our scientific men know what they are about.' We ask were there not tens of thousands of scientific officers in the French army? What is all science worth, if misdirected? Why do we not build the same ships now as in the days of Nelson? The general who for the future goes into battle with an indifferent number of cannon will be regarded as foolish as the admiral who would dare to attack the iron-clad *Warrior* with an old wooden ship. It would be utter madness; it would demoralise any army in the world. No discipline will keep men together if their comrades are killed by thousands whilst the enemy stands comparatively unhurt. The only wonder is that the French held out so long, for notwithstanding all their deplorable misfortunes and defeats the glory of their army remains untarnished, and the bravery of their splendid soldiers will be as highly respected as in days of yore. They were unprepared, and adopted tactics suitable only

Artillery at Chillianwalla (Punjab).

Were there no scientific men in France?

Who will be a very foolish commander.

French bravery.

Wrong tactics and artillery.

for encounters with Asiatic troops; though indeed the system did well enough until the rapid-firing rifle was introduced. With Brown Bess, time was required to load and cap, and a rush was possible; now such is entirely out of the question, while it is more imperative than ever that artillery should cover all advances. Artillery saved our squares at Waterloo: by that noble arm Napoleon first made himself known: and by cannon will future battles be *mainly* decided. By what have all our naval victories been gained? By the superior discipline of the men, combined with the excellence of their artillery practice. Would any sane commander bring a 'battering ram' in these days to attack the wall of a fort? Yet this would hardly be more foolish than to go into action now with inferior artillery. Let those who doubt the power of this arm submit to a five months' siege with eleven cannon staring them in the face at a distance of only 120 yards, and we will wager that they will learn from experience that the 'arm' to which we draw attention commands respect, and demands our utmost, constant and unwearied attention. It is the weapon that strikes terror: it is the most powerful foe the soldier has to face, and it will remain so till science introduces something more powerful. Had the French Emperor looked more to it, instead of placing too

Artillery at Waterloo.

Antiquated ideas.

Siege experience of artillery.

The arm of terror.

much confidence in the fascinating 'Mitrailleuse' and the new rifles, we might never have had a 'Sedan.' 'Sadowa,' caused 'Sedan;' the far-seeing Germans, aware that all the nations of Europe had found out their *secret*, must have watched with glee the 'hurry scurry' to make 'breech-loading rifles,' whilst *everything else was overlooked!* But while all was consternation elsewhere, there was 'breathing time' for the Germans, and like sensible men they devoted it and all their energies to the perfection of their artillery. Then came the war, and as usual the 'early bird got the worm.'

The fascinating Mitrailleuse.

Sadowa caused Sedan.

Wide-awake Germans the 'early birds.'

The battle of 'Sadoolapore,' where 12,000 of British and Native troops faced most of the Seik army for several hours, was an artillery duel. So also was the battle of Goojerat in the Punjab campaign; and in both of these, as well as at Ramnugger and Chillianwalla, the Author marked the tremendous effects of our splendid artillery. Indeed all our losses in both the Punjab campaigns were principally caused in capturing the Seik cannon, to which they clung stubbornly, and used with considerable effect.

Artillery duel at Sadoolapore (Punjab).

Artillery at Goojerat, Ramnugger and Chillianwalla.

During the siege of Genoa, the troops under Massena were torn to pieces by the tremendous artillery fire.

Artillery at Genoa.

Hyder Ali had great respect for our artillery.

Hyder's idea

of cannon balls!

'In the war with him in 1798, Col. Wood, who commanded the British forces, found it impossible to bring him to a pitched battle. Wood wrote to Hyder at last and said, "That it was disgraceful for a great Prince, at the head of a large army, to fly before a detachment of infantry and a few pieces of cannon, unsupported by cavalry." Hyder replied, "I have received your letter in which you invite me to an action with your army. Give me the sort of troops that you command, and your wish shall be accomplished. You will in time come to understand my mode of warfare. Shall I risk cavalry which cost me 1,000 rupees each horse against your '*cannon-balls*' that cost *two-pence?* No; I will march your troops until their legs become the size of their bodies. You shall not have a blade of grass or a drop of water. I will hear of you every time your drum beats, but you shall not know where I am once a month. I *will* give your army battle, but it must be when *I* please, not when *you* please."'[1] When Hyder had laid waste the country, and exhausted Wood's army he attacked him and captured all his artillery; indeed, had not Colonel Smith arrived with succour, Wood would have been totally defeated. At Talavera the magnificent Guards were cut down in whole ranks by the terrific fire of

Hyder's letter to Col. Wood.

Hyder captures Col. Wood's artillery.

Artillery at Talavera; the Guards in danger.

[1] Martin, vol. viii. p. 46.

grape and canister from the powerful French batteries, and got into confusion; nor could anything have saved them but the timely arrival of Cotton's Brigade of Light Cavalry and the forward movement of the 48th Regiment, by the direct order of the Duke of Wellington.[1]

British loss at Talavera.

The loss of the British at Talavera was 6,268 out of 22,000 engaged. The French had 56,122 men and 80 guns. The British had 30 guns, and the Spaniards 39,000 men, and 70 guns. But 10,000 Spaniards fled on the French Light Cavalry riding up to them.[2]

Duncan's guns did excellent service at Barrosa; when the Guards drove back Ruffin's division, the French were followed close, and a rapid and well directed fire made them suffer immensely.[3] On the heights of Priesnitz (1813) Drouot placed 'a hundred pieces of cannon,'[4] whilst the Russians had only fifty guns. At Leipsic the Allies had 1,300 guns, the French only 720, but the charges of cavalry of those days did wonders; such would be impossible at the present period. At Fère-Champenoise (1814) 'nine thousand chosen horsemen cut down or made prisoners of 6,000 infantry, but the victors had 70 guns on the field.'[5] The Turks are good artillerymen, and so generally are

Artillery at Priesnitz.

Artillery at Fère-Champenoise.

[1] Alison, vol. viii. p. 282. [2] *Ibid.* p. 327. [3] *Ibid.* p. 337.
[4] *Ibid.* vol x. p. 213. [5] *Ibid.* p. 335.

Asiatics. The Russians suffered fearfully from the fire of the Turkish batteries in the Balkan (1828–9), and in the two years lost 140,000 men, and 50,000 horses. The first campaign was commenced with 160,000 men, the second with 150,000. The Turks had no more than 30,000 regular troops; indeed, exclusive of the forces of Sodra Pacha, they never had, at any time, in the field more than 100,000 Irregulars, nor, in 1828, more than 40,000 Regulars. Again, the artillery now is so powerful and has such long range that forts round a city, to be of use, must be far more distant than at present. Were not the outer forts of Paris helpless to save the inhabitants? Shells were sent right *into* the city. Does not this fact alone tend to prove that we *must* increase our artillery both as regards calibre and number? Then what labour it must have required to drag up those formidable Prussian guns—recollect the distance they were brought from, whilst the French had their arsenals and magazines close at hand; yet the Prussians were able to take the forts one after another in rapid succession. It is our own fault if we do not learn a lesson from the late campaign, but it will be too late to commence when war is actually declared. So long as men are made of mere flesh and blood, so long will round shot and shell

Turkish artillery.

Russian losses in the two campaigns in the Balkan, 1828-1829.

Artillery of the present period.

Prussian heavy guns.

When too late.

cause havoc ; and it is to give our noble soldiers fair-play that we urge the necessity of our being led into action on equal terms with our enemies as regards our weapons of resistance—and this irrespective of being equal in number, for that is not of the same importance. What could a regiment with the musket do before one armed with the Henry-Martini ? If you can punish an enemy at longer range than he can throw his projectiles into your troops, surely it is reasonable to suppose that you can thereby protect your own soldiers ? If, on the other hand, he masses heavy guns and cuts down your troops by thousands, your men are certain to be dispirited and cowed. It is not in the nature of man to submit to mere butchery without a hope of retaliation, and it would be mere massacre to go into battle without such a force of artillery as would efficiently cover all advances and would enable our men to reach the foe even when exposed to an enemy's fire.

The musket *versus* the rifle !

Man cannot submit to mere butchery.

CHAPTER XII.

Our Army not large enough, either for Home Defence or to guard our Foreign Possessions—The Sepoy Mutiny caused by the Smallness of the European Force then in India—Men and Guns the only real Argument in War—What we have is ours only so long as we can defend it—The Horrors of War little known—Now described—What Soldiers do for the State and their Reward—They are Cheap as an Insurance, but they cannot be manufactured in a day—Reductions would therefore be Impolitic and Dangerous—Probable Price we should have to Pay if Invaded and Conquered—As we cannot rely on the Forbearance of Nations, we should always be Prepared—When a Nation reaches the Zenith of its Greatness it is in Danger—How Decay begins; Patriots too Succumb—We should avoid Apathy and Indolence by Training for War—The Sad Example of Sedan again held forth to warn us.

Edward Hine's 'Flashes of Light.'

EDWARD HINE, in a pamphlet called 'Flashes of Light' (pages 74 and 75), recommends that every man in Great Britain should be made an artillerist and that school-boys should be drilled. This we read years after all our suggestions had been written; for the Author published the basis of this analysis in the 'Weekly Englishman,' in the year 1861, and his remarks on artillery were prominently brought forward in the 'Pioneer' (as before stated in this work) in 1869 and 1870. We

Our army not large enough.

cannot think with Mr. Hine that we are justified in assuming that 20,000 of us are equal to 2,000,000

of any other nation—even though we were *proved* to be 'Israel.' The army we have is not large enough, even now, for what it is expected to protect, and to enfeeble it would simply be to invite an attack. Would it be safe to keep the 'Koh-i-Noor' in a crystal bottle, without a guard, in the centre of a London street? Would you expose the wealth of our metropolis to be carried off by the inroads of countless hordes backed up by ponderous cannon —people who would admit of no law but that of Thrasymachus (Republic of Plato) namely that 'The just is nothing else but what is *expedient* for the *strongest*'? We have no right to suppose that one nation is so much superior to another that 1,000 of its soldiers could defeat 100,000 others—real soldiers, be it understood, not wild savages or an undisciplined mob. 'God helps those who help themselves,' said the magnanimous Sir Henry Lawrence, and there is sound truth in that good man's words. It is all very well for those who live at home in safety surrounded by millions of strong men, to counsel the reduction of the army; but have they for a moment considered what could be done if we found ourselves suddenly dragged into war? Again, those who have to guard our foreign possessions must not be exposed to unnecessary dangers. The smallness of the force of Europeans in India, before the mutiny of 1857, was the

Thrasymachus.

People who live at ease.

Troops for foreign possessions.

Cause of the rebellion of the Sepoys in 1857.

real reason why the Sepoys rose against us. Their priests excited them on matters of religion, and persuaded them they could easily master us and get the country to themselves. They said, 'There is no reason to fight these Europeans: if each one of you just take a mere handful of earth and throw it down, we can bury their small numbers under the heap.' Our wives and little children were butchered, and are we to be so mad, so utterly insane, as to tempt these fanatics again to rise and destroy us? 'Israel,' or not 'Israel,' we should not then save our beloved ones by accepting Mr. Hine's views; we should want cannons, men, and rifles,—the only arguments that can be used when war or rebellion breaks out. What said Napoleon? 'Master of the Channel for a few days, 150,000 men will embark in the 10,000 vessels which are there (at Boulogne) assembled, and the expedition is concluded.'[1] All hope of this, however, was lost by the action off Cape Finisterre, when Napoleon said to his private secretary,—Dara, 'Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol.' Knowing the vast preparations made for the invasion of England by Napoleon we may well ask where we should have been if we had not gained that victory. The instant he heard of the loss off Finisterre, Napoleon (without

Sepoys' ideas!

Massacre the result.

The only real good arguments.

Napoleon on the invasion of England.

What an escape!

Napoleon's wonderful

[1] Alison, vol. vi. pp. 36, 37.

a moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider) 'dictated at once the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz; and for the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and west of France.'[1] While we have neighbours who are so powerful, we should be careful to avoid anything like an invitation to attack us; the temptation would be great if they saw us with reduced forces and unable to defend ourselves. What we have is ours only so long as our army and navy are strong. Let these be cut down and the enormous wealth of Great Britain would be but poorly defended, for the chief safeguard would be withdrawn—the fear of the consequences of a defeat.

preparations for Austerlitz at *once*.

Powerful neighbours.

We remember how a poor Indigo planter[2] was told, by some agent in Calcutta, in 1857, that 'it was his *duty* to have *remained* at his factory.' Now this was after the magistrate of the district had told all the planters to take refuge in the stations held by British troops, because the Government could not spare troops for the protection of factories. It was very easy for the agent in Calcutta, in his office chair, and with his feeling of security, to dictate such an opinion to a poor fellow who was hardly out of the factory a few minutes, before a troop of rebel cavalry

The poor Indigo planter.

[1] Alison, vol. vi. p. 40. [2] The Author's own brother.

galloped in and asked for the master. This gentleman and his wife drove off by a country road, and only escaped after driving thirty miles at a furious pace, at the end of which the poor horse, having saved his master and mistress, dropped down *dead.* Let gentlemen who suggest reductions take notice of such facts as these; if they could but know one thousandth part of the misery that fell on India in 1857, or of the fearful results to a country that is conquered, they would, if reasonable men, change their opinions, thanking God that we have forces still that command respect, ready to defend the property and valuables of all our rich noblemen, our merchants, and our wealthy gentry. Money laid out thus is not lost. To save money by army reductions, is to cast away in our greediness the 'bone for the shadow.' The Scythian ambassador said to Alexander, 'Thou art the greatest robber in the world,' and a pirate said, 'But because I do this in a *small* vessel I am called a robber, and because thou actest the same part with a great fleet thou art entitled conqueror.' The words of our blessed Saviour should have the greatest weight, and if we are true Christians we should surely believe Him :—'When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace: but when a *stronger than he shall come upon him,*

Wonderful escape.

Miseries of war not known.

Money for troops is not lost.

The speech of the Scythian to Alexander.

The words of our Lord Jesus Christ.

and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.'

All the money we can spare is but as a 'drop in the ocean' in comparison with the degradation, the humiliation, the misery, and the shame that comes upon a nation that is conquered, and this irrespective of the vast indemnities that are demanded, and the horrors and losses in battle. Such misfortunes come from want of preparation: from misgovernment: from a penurious policy, unworthy of great nations possessing wealth enough to attract the notice of those who pursue a system of aggrandisement. But it must be remembered that potentates and rulers, however desirous of peace, or honest in intention, are often forced to go to war by the 'vox populi.' As the cupidity of the surging masses may drive the most honest rulers headlong into war, we should never trust to the forbearance of other Powers, but be prepared, if *necessary*, by 'force of arms,' to repel an attack or to uphold the dignity of our beloved Sovereign wherever her standard is unfurled. This is sound policy and should never be departed from. A nobleman has his men-servants to protect his plate and pays them most handsomely; do we do *more* when we keep up an army? Is it not intelligible that people who have wealth should like to see their property and valu-

No money too much to avoid national degradation.

How these misfortunes come on us.

Potentates often forced into war by mere 'Vox populi.'

Duly prepared for war.

What the nobleman pays for.

ables secure from rapine and plunder? Truly all our riches, in town or city, will not remain ours a day longer than we can defend them. This army too may have to meet rebellion at home, as it has had to do before now; is not this another danger for our wealth—that this army might be overcome? God grant that our legislators may be guided in all such matters wisely and as becomes the dignity of Great Britain, for as regards such momentous subjects no nigardliness should ever be permitted.

Is our wealth secure? and how long?

Hopes in our wise legislators.

How pleasant to have churches turned into hospitals; to see huge fellows smoking in these sacred edifices; to see your daughters and wives insulted before your face, the bodies of your beloved ones torn to pieces by shell, old men dragged away by guards and subjected to every indignity; to have your houses crowded with foreign soldiers, your drawing rooms turned into barracks, your mayors ordered to collect stores or pay heavy fines; your carriages and horses taken away from you, your lovely gardens trampled down, your hot-houses gutted. These are but few of the actual horrors of war, with its long sieges, misery, starvation, plunder, rapine, gross indignities and insults. Let those who are so inconsiderate as to cry out for reductions ask themselves whether they love their good and pious Queen; their virtuous wives, their

Horrors of war.

Plunder and rapine.

innocent daughters, and order, and peace. If they do, they will never grudge the pittance needed to maintain a suitable army of brave and loyal men. Remember your apparent wealth is not your own; it is lent to you by a Supreme Power, and if you are so greedy as not to use it in a noble and generous manner, Providence may at any moment transfer it into better hands. The wealth of Great Britain is to keep up our dignity: it is not intended that we should rule other nations and still not expend a proper sum to secure to us what honest labour has acquired. The Persians say, 'Pay the honest soldier without grudging, because he it is that keeps kings on their thrones.' These soldiers are the only men who are contented to live on without any hope of making fortunes. Men in business become millionaires, and pay their clerks and agents or assistants in a lavish manner in comparison with what a State can ever afford to give the soldier. The work the former pay for, is that of pen or brain; the soldier's duty is to support order and guard the country's wealth. Without them the nation would be in jeopardy either from within or from without, and actually open to attack. Would a jeweller place his diamonds in a plate in the open street? Those valuables are only his so long as the policeman does his duty, and not for an hour longer. Besides which, when you cut down

What the wealth of Britain is given for.

The Persian's saying.

Fortunes made in business.

What your soldiers do.

Helpless discharged soldiers.

the army you cause thousands of poor men to starve, for there is no man so helpless as the discharged soldier. The labourer is worthy of his hire, and in no profession does a man more thoroughly earn his bread than in the army in time of war. We sell our bodies to the State; soldiers are shot down whilst you are sitting at home at your comfortable firesides. Thousands are writhing in agony whilst you are seeing a play or an opera. Mothers and sisters are wringing their hands (having lost all that is dear in this world), and you are permitted to hear the words of our Saviour calmly and quietly in your churches. Yet you—in possession of all these comforts—would forbid the Government to secure to you such privileges and blessings, preferring to save some paltry sum—paltry in comparison with the enormous revenue and wealth of the country—and would reduce your army and turn thousands of brave and loyal men into the streets to starve. A soldier cannot be manufactured in a day; no money can purchase him ready made at the instant. You do not grudge the nobleman his grand mansion, his servants and gorgeous equipages, yet you would dismiss the very men who guard your houses, your banks and your property at a *cheaper* rate than any other class or profession is paid for work done. Look at the pay of

The soldier sells his body to the State.

Home comforts and blessings.

A soldier not made in a day.

Cheapest of all servants.

a banker: do the directors grudge that? Look at the money paid by drapers to their establishments. Consider the number of railway officials, and their allowances. Look at the lifetime of work an officer does in all climates and see what he can retire upon in comparison with the gains of our merchants and others in business. Your cheesemonger drives his carriage and a pair of spanking horses; has his men servants in livery, and his town and country house. The old general officer often dies and leaves a mere pittance to his children. The poor private loses his health in a tropical country and is discharged. And how little does he get for it all! Now our army is the best paid in the world, but still only a very small portion of your income is devoted to cover its cost. You do not enable the Government to give, in proportion, what merchants and bankers give to their servants. If you recognised your burthens properly, the State would not be constantly solicited to reduce the army. What would not the French give to recover the position they held before the war with Prussia? Consider the immense sum mulcted as an indemnity,—would it not pay for a large number of soldiers? What is *money* when compared with humiliation? What are diamonds and gold if you can by parting with them keep men with fixed

Men in business.

Small proportion to means.

What would not the French give to be as before the last war?

bayonets from getting into your banks, your treasuries, and your shops? Can degradation and sad humiliation be bought off? Alas that in the most unsettled period of the world—at a time indeed when 'The camp, and the sound of the trumpet, mingled with that of the clarion, and wars detested by mothers, rejoice many'[1]—people should be induced to cry out for reductions! You pay us for our work and it is our honest duty to tell you the dangers that surround you. No one can understand the pain of 'neuralgia' who has not suffered from it; no one can have the faintest idea of the miseries of a five months' siege till he has endured them: no human being but the soldier can conceive the actual horrors of war, or the trials and hardships that fall to the lot of a fighting man in a long campaign. Patience, endurance, pluck, and nerve are all demanded then of our noble private soldier. Long nights at 'sentry go,' when hungry, sick, and tired, and still he gallantly performs his duty to his Sovereign. Are not these men worthy of your sympathy and your utmost gratitude? If you think otherwise, where is your love for your Queen, or your patriotism? Let any man try the life of a soldier for thirty years, and he will know what the guardians of your national honour have to undergo.

What is money to loss of position or humiliation?

War a curse.

Our duty to put you on your guard.

Experience of actual war is necessary.

Hard duties of the poor soldiers.

Are they not worthy of sympathy?

[1] Horace, Ode I.

People who grudge money for the army are something like those who would forbid allowances to the members of the Royal Family; neither can be true lovers of their country, anxious to maintain its honour and grandeur at the highest standard of which the nation is capable. If we look at the ways of Providence in permitting us to hold India, we must surely see that it was His design and intention that we should rule there. In 1857, the fabric of the Government was shaken to its base, but His powerful arm enabled us to put down the Mutiny. In the time of the native rule money, sufficient to have done incalculable good to the inhabitants, was expended on concubines and courtiers of the lowest stamp. Was it not that the Ruler of the Universe, remarking the anarchy, disorder, tyranny, and bloody feuds that existed, placed our nation as His agents to preserve order and protect persecuted humanity? The money He gave to us in that wealthy country has since been well expended; this, all our 'Public Works' well show. The comfort enjoyed by the poorer classes is what they never knew in former days. The security to life and property, the facilities of transit, the just laws and charitable institutions—these are blessings of which their forefathers were ignorant. And although we may have many enemies, they are outnumbered by our

Men who grudge the allowances to the royal family.

Design of Providence in giving us India to rule.

Anarchy and disorder under the native rulers.

Benefits the natives have derived from our rule.

Wealth given for a good purpose.

friends. This wealth we have was given to us to use properly. It was like an advance of cash to be laid out for a particular purpose, and we are simply the agents to see it distributed in a just and honest manner. England has long had command of the seas and she has acquired unbounded wealth, but both are hers only on condition that she holds her position amongst great nations; and it is incumbent upon her to be the agent of Providence in distributing His precious blessings over all those portions of the human family which He has thought fit to place under her benignant and just rule.

Wealth given to maintain our position amongst the great powers.

Our duty to our subjects in distant possessions.

If we then curtail our army, we cannot perform our duty as a great governing power; to do so would be to entail anarchy on all our distant possessions, and consequent misery on the millions of foreign subjects who look to us to uphold order and secure to them their just rights. Money held in this way is simply 'trust money,' that has been deposited with us for a special purpose. Nor is our mission accomplished till we bestow on our foreign subjects that state of security and that protection from tyranny and injustice which God intended our nation should be the means of ensuring. Great Britain, by obtaining the supremacy at sea, opened the passage to India, and thus be-

Trust-money.

What is our mission in India.

came the means of carrying civilisation to the uttermost parts of the globe.

Money then must be liberally expended on our soldiers and warlike materials; the reduction of the army must be looked upon as the most unwise, most unguarded, indeed the most dangerous step or proposal. Our 'platform' should be that of the poet, who says :—

Money to be liberally laid out on soldiers and warlike materials.

> Rather stand up, assured with anxious pride
> Alone, than err with millions on thy side.
> Mean narrow maxims which enslave mankind
> Ne'er from its bias warp the settled mind.[1]

Narrow maxims, by Churchhill.

In these days of progress, we must not be found 'napping' or we may have to pay dearly for our lethargy, like Aponius Saturnius, who fell asleep at a sale, and Caius ordered that each *nod* of his head should be considered a bid, so that when the poor man awoke he found, to his dismay, that he had purchased thirteen gladiators at an enormous price!

A very expensive nap!

If we were ever conquered we should have to pay a terrible indemnity to buy the invaders out of our country; nor would it remove the degradation, if, after having worn the 'iron chain' of the conquered, any 'Caius' should afterwards present us with a 'golden one' of the same weight—such as was given to Agrippa the grandson of Herod.

To be vanquished is expensive also.

Caius and Agrippa.

[1] Churchill.

The Goths, who were supposed to have migrated from Scandinavia to the Euxine, were bribed to withdraw their victorious troops by an annual tribute, and this weakness on the part of the Roman Empire brought new swarms of barbarians to the very gates of Rome. The fate of Rome was at length determined by an irresistible emigration of the Huns, which precipitated on the Empire the whole body of the Goths.'[1] It was the feeble reigns of Decius, Galbus, Valerian, and others which afforded such openings for invasion.

How Rome declined.

Feeble reigns.

'Discussion is the bulwark of truth, the only safeguard against the imperfection of the human mind, the only chastiser of extravagance, the only antagonist of dogmatism, the only handpost that points us perpetually along the path of moderation, which is most commonly the path of truth.

Discussion the bulwark of truth.

'The philosophical historian will attempt to deduce from the past those laws of human action which have heretofore moulded the features of society, and which we may *predict* will, under similar circumstances, operate in a *similar* manner for the future.'[2]

It is for the fair discussion of all important matters that we are so much indebted to the enlightened press—the protector of our rights,

Our Press the safety-valve of the state.

[1] Malthus on Population.

[2] 'History of Modern Philosophy,' by J. D. Morell.

and the very 'safety-valve' of our whole constitution.

Schiller, in his 'Thirty Years' War,' says, 'It is only *immediate* advantages, or evils, that set the people in action.' Is not this very true? We find men applauded who make propositions that cannot be entertained with safety because personal advantages are anticipated therefrom by a section of the community. Reducing the army means reducing taxation, and that helps a man's pocket: thousands can see no further than personal comfort. How many we find in the world who care little for the sorrows or trials of the poor. 'What matter to me if an old woman's candle is blown out in winter, provided I have a cosy fire myself?' 'What matter the evils of war, so long as I do not get hurt?' The evil is not immediate and the mass care little for the future. People grudge the few paltry pounds paid in the year to maintain the national honour; whereas what large sums are not squandered in amusements? Ask the people of France what they feel? What would they not pay to bring back all those fine noble fellows who died in battle?

Immediate advantages.

What the reduction of the army means.

Want of sympathy.

Taxes are grudged.

When war is declared, we find men shouting out for more troops, as if they could get a trained soldier on the spur of the moment. Now it would be a very just rule, if introduced, that on the

A just rule necessary.

declaration of war, every man who had voted for army reductions should be forced to the front. It is clearly not right to place a certain section of the people only in a position of danger, without the means of encountering the enemy on anything like equal terms. To expect one soldier to do the work of ten of any other nation is more than unwise. Therefore, let those people who are content to take the risk—who are confident that there is no danger—be pushed forward in an emergency, and be taught by experience what war really means. If we cannot learn from the fate of France we deserve to fall.

Those who vote for reduction ought to go to battle.

No arguments in the world will ever persuade us that it is safe to trust to the forbearance of any other nation of soldiers. Do we trust the ruffians of our own isles? Can we go to bed without our watchmen—and if we did, what would become of our valuables?

Never trust to the forbearance of other nations.

The soldier loves his ease as much as other people in our world. The Roman præfect who resigned his office and retired into rural life for seven years, had an inscription put on his tomb, to the effect that 'although he had attained a great age, he had *really only lived those last seven years.*' Could the hopes engraven on the soldier's heart be read, the inscription found on thousands and tens of thousands would be a longing for peaceful re-

The soldier loves his ease, like others.

Fond hopes.

tirement—and this longing has been theirs from the first day they accepted the 'shilling.' Living a lifetime in exile, parted from wives, from children, and from home—some are struck down in youth, while others, clinging still to the hope of seeing their beloved ones once more, fall prostrate on the road of life perhaps when almost in sight of the village church. And are these brave men not to meet with your sympathy? Alas! there can be no gratitude left in the world if your poor soldiers are looked upon as a downright burden and a tax on the country—rather than trusty servants who guard your honour and all your wealth.

Trials of the soldier.

Who demand our sympathy.

To take an unprejudiced view of the matter. If any patriotic man will take thought and consider what he owes our Government, he will hardly inveigh against it, and the taxes imposed through its far-seeing wisdom. No; he will probably realise this fact, that what he pays is not in full proportion to the wealth he owns—all of which might go from him in a single day if the populace were permitted to sack his mansion and have a general scramble for all his money, goods and chattels. We are afraid that the ruffians of London and other large towns would not desist from such pleasant employment even if all the 'preachers' in England told them to bear in mind that they were of the tribe '*Israel*.'

An unprejudiced man.

Ruffians of London.

Demand for the 'Red-coats.'

We rather think the poor 'Red-coats' would then be in great demand, because a man will give anything to save his life. If this be true, cannot you respect the poor private who sells his life to you? He does so for 'honour,' for the upholding of the grandeur of your nation—the noblest duty (after serving God) incumbent on man.

To sell our fleet!

Perhaps we shall next hear people advise our Government to sell off our 'Iron-clads'? Generations pass before a nation reaches the summit of its glory and its grandeur; and the nearer a country approaches the zenith of its greatness the more critical the time. Rome had her day, and she passed away, but she hastened her downfall by neglect, and by becoming effeminate. Scipio miscalculated the strength of the forces under Hannibal—lingering at Massilia instead of awaiting the arrival of the enemy at the foot of the Alps, he was thus defeated at Pavia. The conquerors of Peru seized the Inca and his country by a stratagem, and such was the surfeit they got of the precious metals that at last it seemed 'that the only things in Cuzco that were *not* real wealth were gold and silver.' The ransom paid to the Spaniard Pizarro for the Inca, Atahullpa, was three millions and a half of pounds sterling, and of silver fifty-one thousand six hundred and ten 'marks.' The barbarians who overthrew Rome 'brought with

Scipio and Hannibal.

Conquerors of Peru.

A heavy ransom indeed!

them from their deserts, the freedom and *energy* of savage life. Amid the expiring embers of civilised institutions they spread the flames of barbarian independence; on the decayed stock of urban liberty they ingrafted the vigorous shoots of pastoral freedom.'[1] May we never see the day when the 'decayed stock of urban liberty' requires to be ingrafted with more 'vigorous shoots.' Yet be it remembered that all history tends to prove that the decay of nations commences always in the body or mass of the population; and while, as has ever been the case, the patriots, few in number, see the danger, the multitude—desiring effeminacy and 'urban liberty'—are blind, and carry all before them. A few years of opposition on the part of the patriots, and then they too are swept away in the torrent of comfort-seeking mortals, who, seduced by the pleasures of cities, keep their wealth for self-gratification, and, like the 'bees,' hoard up the 'honey of state' till another nation, watching the 'hive,' pounces down and carries off the sweets.

Barbarians.

How the decay of nations begins.

Even patriots succumb.

The patriots have ever stood out—they have raised the cry of alarm; but finally, being human, they too have been over-persuaded and led away, till it has ever ended simply in this, 'that what is everybody's work is not done by any body.' The glorious freedom of rural life,

Patriots.

Freedom of rural life.

[1] Alison, vol. i. p. 12.

Apathy sets in.

having been merged into a contracted view of things in general, energy departs, self-gratification and luxurious ways commence, and lead ultimately to gross selfishness. Money, because it purchases all the luxuries, becomes a god. Sluggishness and apathy set in, and the ruin of the nation follows. It is well for England that she has her foreign possessions; for these, with her colonies, maintain a large section of busy, hard-working men. Hence we have the type of the growth of all nations up to their zenith, and God seems to have willed that the more a nation sends out emigrants the more powerful that country becomes. What would appear to us to sap the nation's strength positively increases it. Demosthenes says, 'The possessions of the supine devolve to the active and intrepid;' again he says, 'It is the ultimate want which generally determines men's judgment of everything precedent.' It will be too late when a country is conquered to feel that its glorious freedom is now absent and gone for ever. Let it *never* be said of Great Britain—'Our total indolence hath been the cause of all our difficulties.'[1] God avert a calamity like that which was about to fall on the Athenians when a patriot had to stand up and say, 'It supposes, in the first place, that *we* who are Athenians could in our disputes

How our colonies benefit us.

Demosthenes on the intrepid.

The Athenians on arbitration.

[1] Demosthenes to the Athenians, 1st Philippic.

demand to have our *title* to the island (Halonesus) determined by *arbitration*.' Here was the symptom of growing decay in the Athenian power; either fear of the enemy, from not having a proper army, or the love of ease, must have induced Philip to propose that the contest should be settled by arbitration. Any country which arrives at such a state, and is compelled to *bribe* barbarians to keep away,[1] has no stability, no vitality. It is in the season of decrepitude that nations like individuals seek for ease from their labours, and when there is not a *constant* supply of vigour kept up—by training a large portion of the population to the art of war, and by giving our 'young blood' a love for travel and an active life—the nation becomes torpid; 'drones' are in the hive, not 'bees,' as they *were* when the nation was in its youth and manhood. The deeds of our forefathers are written in the annals of our country. Enduring all hardships, they worked heart and soul, and left us as a legacy the United Kingdom of Great Britain, and with it an indomitable resolution to maintain our glorious freedom in its fullest integrity,—freedom to which no other nation has as yet, in such a way and to such a degree, attained. Shall we by carelessness sacrifice our just rights, and throw away what

Barbarians bribed not to attack.

New vigour required.

[1] As Rome did.

has come to us from our noble ancestors? If we would keep that inheritance intact, it behoves us in the name of all that is good, true, and loyal, to keep our army at a strength sufficient to guard us from such misfortunes and such awful calamities. Let the nation rise up as *one* man, to silence all cavillers by the word of 'TRUTH,' insisting upon this —that by casting aside our feelings of patriotism to cherish an inordinate love for *filthy lucre*, we shall fail in our duty to our Queen and country.

How Rome declined.

When Rome began to depend mostly on mercenary soldiers, the warlike spirit died out. If a 'nation of shopkeepers'—requiring all its gold for selfish indulgences—refuses to pay for the protection of its goods, that nation will decline. The reduction of the army would choke the fountains of ambition, from which, as through arteries, a manly and warlike spirit is circulated among the population. The desire for glory and honour, the pride of doing our duty for the national welfare, will ebb away if the *springs* are not perpetually replenished. The 'backbone' of our strength will decay, and the huge 'Colossus' of State must then fall to the ground. The 'leaven' of the soldier-spirit is required to permeate the mass. From it the youth of the nation will imbibe a fondness for brave acts, and will be impelled to follow in the footsteps of those great men who,

How the fountains of ambition may be choked.

The leaven of the soldiery required to give vitality to a nation.

fighting nobly for their country, have left the records of their heroism stamped indelibly on the pages of history; teaching us thereby what our duty is if we desire to maintain our position as a great power.

Battle of Sedan related by a Frenchman, a lesson for every soldier.

We entreat of you to remember *Sedan*. As regards that catastrophe, see what a brave Frenchman says, and give your utmost sympathy to such splendid, but unfortunate, heroes:—

'Hours elapsed in this stern and heroic resistance, but every hour the circle of fire became more and more deadly, more and more vigorous, and enclosed our brave soldiers. Death stalks everywhere. The Prussian artillery, with its tremendous range, takes up position on all commanding points. The balls hail on the French ranks from an almost invisible enemy. These throw themselves, at the point of the bayonet, up the hill-slopes from whence comes the shower of death. The artillery fire smites them down before they can reach the gunners. Eleven hundred pieces of cannon thunder at once from far on our warriors—our warriors who love to fight with steel. Around them swarm three hundred thousand men, who drive them back and shoot them down under the cover of the woods or from the crest of the hill-slopes. Then it was that the army—the unhappy French army—be-

fore that girdle of iron, of fire, of cannon-balls and rifle-balls, recoils, retires, and buries itself within the funnel of Sedan, while from the bristling heights the batteries still roar.

Battle of Sedan.

'At first our soldiers attempted to pierce and bore through the Prussian lines; they attempted to escape and to work their way out by La-Chapelle, by the woods of the Ardennes, and by the open route to Belgium; but the cavalry, the hussars of Death, plunged into the woods, drove them back, or sabred them. Driven out of the forests, they march for Sedan, while from the crests of the hills of Givonne the Prussian batteries rained their iron storm on the roads, and lopped off branches, and smote down man. Before these overpowering numbers, before these thousands of cannon, before this terrific development of brute force, our troops, with the spirit of resistance still alive in them, still prepared to defend their colours and their existence against the masses of the enemy, but—crushed and reduced to impotence—fell back, and leaving their dead generals, officers, and soldiers on the hill-sides of the Ardennes, plunged within the walls of Sedan, now so sadly notorious.'[1]

[1] A translation from the French by R. G. L., 'United Service Institution of India,' April 1872, p. 111.

ACROSTIC ON SEDAN.

Swift as lightning came the *crash*
(Endless efforts—Scythian dash
Doomed to be of no avail),
Astounded, at that 'iron-hail,'
Noble France can only *wail*.

Dear reader, could mortal man do more than these noble — these superb — heroes achieved? And would you *now* side with those who desire to reduce our little army, or to leave us with a small and inadequate supply of guns? Consider these unfortunate Frenchmen, smashed on all sides by an almost invisible enemy. Well may the writer call them 'our incomparable army,' and announce that his heartrending recital was 'Sacred to the memory of the *glorious* vanquished.' Such an awful, such an overwhelming catastrophe, demands our sympathy indeed, and involuntarily calls forth the admiration of every soldier. Poor, unhappy, chivalrous Frenchmen! what a trial of nerve, — what unbounded bravery!

A truly incomparable army.

Noble France.

Those who have seen battlefields will realise all that those magnificent French soldiers had to contend with. It was, seemingly, from beginning to end—'Everything running foul of everything as in a fog.'[1] Downright confusion must have

[1] A translation from the French by R. G. L., 'United Service Institution of India,' April 1872, p. 107.

Vast odds.

resulted from such a *terrible* state of things. The odds all appear against the French—superior master-minds, overwhelming artillery, and countless numbers were all combined on the Prussian side.

French crushed by cannon.

The French were crushed, bewildered by an iron hail, and vanquished only by the superior range and numbers of Prussian cannon. Such heroes cannot be said to be conquered: they were merely mortal men escaping with life after undergoing a fiery

Ordeal of fire.

ordeal the like of which had never perhaps been known before in the whole annals of war since the introduction of cannon. It is not just to place soldiers at such a disadvantage in battle. The French, under such dispiriting circumstances, had about

No chance with such odds.

as much chance as men with swords have when opposed to others with rifles.

Napoleon said: 'Good infantry are the mainspring of an army, but the *best* infantry becomes demoralised and is *destroyed* if it has to contend against very superior artillery. A general with better infantry and a weak force of guns may obtain advantages in a campaign, but if his adversary is stronger in artillery this will be painfully felt in a *general* action.'

No more Sedans.

Another 'Sedan' can never occur if the French see to their artillery, and we doubt not that France will 'draw from it a lesson of that exalted bravery which alone can save her.'

CHAPTER XIII.

How Soldiers should be Trained for Battle—Real use of the Drill Ground is to Prepare for the actual Conflict—A few Cheering Words Electrical at the Critical Time—How Panics Spread—Dress an Important Matter; Common Sense should be the Guide—Lord Macaulay on Fools—It is long before wise Reforms are carried out—Dr. Tullock on 'Go-Ahead' Men—Wisdom of Adopting Advice that bears the Stamp of Truth—The Minds of Men compared to Rivers and the Freights they Float—On extracting the Pith of everything, and on Reasoning by Analogy—The World is nothing but Change—Changes in War—Martin Tupper on the Lottery of Life.

Presence of mind.

WE now proceed to call attention to the absolute necessity of soldiers exercising 'presence of mind' when in action. Excitement tends to make men fire too hurriedly; ten bullets well directed will cause more consternation in the ranks of the enemy than ten thousand flying harmlessly over their heads. We have seen veterans waver a little when two or three of their comrades were carried away by round shot or shell. We should accustom men to be prepared for the blanks in the line caused by casualties in action, by ordering files here and there to fall back or halt during an advance. We saw this done by a regiment after the battle of Chillianwalla, and we wondered it had not b

Effects of shell.

Addi
dril

What the parade-ground is for.

practised before. The parade-ground should not be looked upon only as a place where men may be marched about for show, or formed in perfect lines; troops should be drilled as if actually in the presence of an enemy, and prepared by previous training for any partial disorganisation that might suddenly befall them. One man marches in peace manœuvres by the side of another, the pivot men are in their places, and all goes well. Under fire the case materially alters—there goes a whole section under grape-fire—shot down at one discharge. What is the result? *Unsteadiness.*

Recruits in action.

Raw recruits are prone to believe that all the loss is on their side only. If we know that our men feel so, can we not imagine what the enemy feels if we make our firing *tell?* Again, a few

Cheering words electrical in effect.

cheering words are 'electrical;' for sometimes soldiers are in doubt as to which side is gaining ground. One of the commanders of former days prevented his soldiers from retreating by shouting out, 'Who let those asses loose?' In an instant the men recovered their presence of mind and the day was saved. At such times a joke or a laugh is worth any money; it takes off the men's attention, and the voice of the commander gives them renewed confidence. The Duke of Wellington well knew the value of encouraging speeches. [illegible] a commander shouts 'Come on, lads,' the

men leap after him, being proud to be spoken to by a great man; they trust to their commander and believe all is right. Those who have witnessed a panic will know what a 'word' can do at such times. There are moments in a hard-contested engagement when the spirits droop, when hope almost vanishes, and these are the most important moments, and should be anticipated; a few cheering words spoken then will spur on the wavering to further efforts. Men are gregarious, and a panic—like a fire—carries all before it; and as the knocking down of an intermediate house may save the other buildings, so has it been necessary to shoot down an alarmist to save a whole company.

Moments of despondency in battle.

A panic.

The dress of a soldier is another important matter. The Madras Fusiliers wore loose blouses and looked 'rough and ready' fellows indeed. During the siege of Lucknow our men worked in their 'shirt sleeves.' Common sense must ever guide us in these matters. Macaulay (alluding to the days of Charles the Second) says: 'There were fools in that age who opposed the introduction of vaccination and railroads; as fools of an age anterior doubtless opposed the introduction of the plough and alphabetical writing. In 1663 the Marquis of Worcester constructed a rude steam-engine which he called a "fire-water-work," and which he pronounced to be an admirable and forcible

Macaulay on *fools!*

instrument of propulsion. But alas, the Marquis was considered a madman, his inventions therefore found no favourable reception.' Folks in fact would have nothing to do with his *humbug* of 'fire-water-works,' and so those wise people left a future generation to laugh at their incredulity. There was a period too when our soldiers were driven almost distracted with cumbersome accoutrements and huge stocks; yet for years every remonstrance was met with opposition. All innovation was strenuously resisted till wise reformers in high positions came to the rescue, and then the soldier enjoyed the benefits of many prudent alterations in dress.

Wise men indeed.

Innovations gained the day.

In a spirited review on 'The Leaders of the Reformation'[1] we find these graphic passages:—

Go-ahead men by Dr. Tullock.

'In every age since the renewal of letters there has been a class of men who were anxious to distinguish themselves from those around them by going ahead—turning aside from the path which most of their friends and associates were pursuing—and by taking what they reckon a more advanced and elevated position.' Again, he says: 'There is indeed a bigotry which is despicable and injurious, the bigotry of those who refuse to practise any independent thinking, who slavishly submit to mere human authority, who never venture to

[1] By Dr. Tullock.

entertain the idea of deviating in any way from the beaten track, and denounce as a matter of course all who do so—who can see only one side of a subject (or perhaps only one corner of one side of it), who are incapable of forming any reasonable estimate of the comparative importance of different truths and different errors, who contend for all truths and denounce all errors with equal vehemence, who never modify or retract their opinions, who have no difficulties themselves and no sympathy with the difficulties of others.'

Adopt truth.

Anything which has the stamp of truth on it should be at once adopted; let us not look to the proposer—if the advice given is good, it should be followed. To reject good advice because the giver is disliked, or looked upon with a jealous eye by the listener, is indeed the proof of a narrow mind.

Men who merely can copy!

There are many men who, while they can copy anything, can never strike out any original plan. The writing of a court-martial with all its marginal notes is what these men shine in; yet there is no more talent demanded for that than is required from the Bengalee writer who copies an engineer's plan. A man zealous in the performance of his duty will pay strict attention to rules, but such does not require great mental exertion.

The minds of men like rivers.

The minds of men may be compared to the currents of rivers—some are rapid, some sluggish; our

lightest thoughts are those that float on the surface, whilst the precious ones are far down, beneath the under-current. Here comes a lot of antiquated ideas like a basket-load of withered flowers thrown out of other folk's gardens; then follows a contaminating thought, like a dead dog floating down the stream; presently a green twig follows, like a lover's promise broken off; next a solid yet roughly expressed idea, resembling the trunk of an old tree, which if cut into would be found durable and useful. Or perhaps the current brings by a burthen like beautiful dead birds, emblematical of soaring hopes transfixed by the arrows of destiny. Now, as our thoughts follow each other in quick succession, it is very evident that the rapid streams will throw off their impurities the soonest. But our most precious thoughts, on the other hand, cling like pure gold to the deep bed of the river, or deposit themselves at wide intervals along the margin. The wise gold-hunter, observing the indications of the existence of the precious mineral, soon adopts measures to secure the 'nuggets.' When he catches a few of these he heeds not all the rubbish he has seen float down the stream. If he waited for 'dead dogs' and 'withered flowers' he would get but little gold. Yet a lifetime of imprudence may bring an old age of wisdom; the imprudences are the 'dead dogs of the river.'

Our thoughts.

The most precious ideas.

The wise extract only the pith out of everything; if they took more they would be carrying cart-loads of oyster-shells instead of handfuls of pearls. If we hamper our memories with heaps of obsolete rubbish, a long life would be scarcely sufficient to enable us to read through an ordinary library. Life is short, and the greatest privilege in life is to be permitted to converse with magnanimous men, or to read the works of golden-hearted authors. By these means we get further convinced of the boundless elevation of that Eternal Being who framed the mind, and then we can soar into the infinite amplitude of the vast regions of contemplation. The most powerful memory is not sufficient to enable a man to recollect all he has read. Yet, all that is lost might as well never have been acquired. Men, therefore, are wise according to the manner they arrange their mental treasures. We may read a thousand novels, without evoking any feeling further than mere curiosity to unravel the plot; but a few pages of Plato, Socrates, and such works, will give us 'pabulum' for the contemplation of a lifetime. We must be *analytic* if we wish to have retentive memories; we must take notes and arrange them in proper order for use at the instant they are required. We must judge keenly by analogy in our investigations as to *probable* events. Narrow-minded

Oyster-shells or pearls.

The elevation of the Eternal Being.

Plato or novels!

Analogy requisite.

Narrow-minded men.

men never judge by analogy. They have a few rules before them and by these they decide, in an arrogant and unwarrantable manner in all cases, without any modification, or the full consideration of subjects that really require mature thought and reflection. Such men will tell you that we are not 'free agents' but merely poor creatures, and *not* responsible for our acts of impulse! What an *insult* to a merciful and benignant Creator! Men who cannot combat arguments generally put an end to the debate by venting their spleen on those they are unable to conquer, acting somewhat as Apollo did to Marsyas, who overcame him in a trial of musical skill, —in other words, they attempt to *flay their enemies alive* and hold them up to public ridicule. There is however a keen sense of justice in the world, and honest men will always rush to the rescue when others are unfairly attacked. The world cannot produce perfection, yet each man may add his mite to the general stock of truth. But it does not follow, because we cannot attain to perfection, that we should be apathetic or lethargic all our lifetime; or, as Xenophon said, when he saw a soldier burying a man who was *not* dead, 'We shall *all* die, but must we for that reason be buried alive?'

Apollo *versus* Marsyas.

Perfection impossible.

Xenophon and the soldier.

This world is made up of change. It is *designed* that such should be the case, or we should be a mere stagnant pool of civilisation. It is the

Perpetual change.

'troubling of the waters' that produces pureness, the same as the leaves of the lotus and other aquatic plants move the surface of water in tanks; these vegetable fans keep the liquid from becoming stagnant, and consequently unfit for use. In the same manner the element of the mind is the mover and purifier of states. An epoch arrives, when men like Bismarck arise and cause a revolution of things that had arrived at stagnation: these minds perform to the mass (or the mind collectively) what the lotus does to the water. They agitate the surface, they put an end to stagnation, and when we see the result we marvel at the *simple* means by which great events are governed. A battering-ram became useless when cannon began to be used. The heavy armour for man and horse disappeared when the musket superseded the cross-bow and the sword. So, when large cannon were introduced the French were unwise in allowing themselves to be brought into action under such *evident* disadvantages. To be opposed by merely incapable men is certain victory to the wise and energetic; the latter can see to the end and can easily detect the apathy or oversight of their foes. The great Bismarck, the far-seeing Prussian Emperor, and his shrewd Commander-in-chief, all saw what gave them the victory in the Danish war and at

The mind the mover.

Change in weapons of war.

French taken in.

Sadowa, and those two events prepared them to anticipate the French at 'Sedan.' It was like Goliath of Gath smitten from afar by the pebble from the brook; and the giant in his armour was no match for the youth with a sling. His head was cut off with his *own* weapon; and so also the French army was crushed by the very weapon that had brought the first Napoleon into notice. By the good use of artillery, wherein they equalled if not surpassed their former enemies, the French had covered themselves with glory; but by not being up to the time—by allowing the Prussians to meet them with guns more powerful and of far longer range—they were powerless to encounter the foe and lay at such a disadvantage as must be clear to any youth of twelve years of age.

Goliath of Gath against David.

French artillery of former days.

Was it not the Aulic Council that brought about the capitulation of Ulm? But for that, Mack might have assembled 170,000 men in the Tyrol. He dared not depart from the order of that Council; while Napoleon, having despotic power, did as circumstances dictated or demanded. Frederick is another instance of a commander with unlimited power. One head, one organisation, is imperative in war; otherwise, all is confusion. Were there not men in the French army who saw the mistakes made? But too often the downfall and humiliation of states is caused by

The Aulic Council caused the capitulation of Ulm.

One head in war.

those at the head scorning to listen to thinking, practical men. It cannot be otherwise; all history teems with instances of men of no repute, who from time to time start up and astonish the world with their brilliant achievements, brought about by the simplest and easiest methods! Cromwell starts up, and lo! we see a great general. The American war breaks out, and behold! we see numerous commanders step out of their offices and their civil lines of life to evince high military qualifications, and to handle large armies with consummate generalship.

Men of no repute astonish the world.

American generals an instance.

War is the time to develope the stuff a nation can produce. The raw material only requires to be manufactured: but in time of peace there is so much jealousy that practical men are kept back. We are apt to think that in all matters the scientific body *must* be right. A man may be able to explain the law of the trajectory, yet perhaps he cannot hit a target. We prefer the practical sportsman who can shoot his tiger or bear, to the one who lays down rules for firing yet fails to make a bag! War bursts out and then we see who are our really good soldiers. Opportunities make the man,—though tens of thousands never get the opportunity. But besides opportunity, the man, to gain repute, must hold a position in which his power is untrammelled. Numbers do very well in subordi-

War calls the man.

The 'scientific body.'

Who is most to be relied on?

Opportunity required.

nate positions, who, if they are called upon to act on their own judgment, will be found incompetent.

Incompetent men.

Ney, Berthier, Murat are a few out of thousands of examples. But it is the same in France, England, Austria,—among all nations in fact.

Martin Tupper.

Martin Tupper says :—

If in the lottery of life thou hast drawn a splendid prize,
What foresight hast thou and skill ! Yea, what enterprise and wisdom !
But if it fall out against thee, and thou fail in thy perilous endeavour—
Behold ! the simple did sow, and hath reaped the right harvest of his folly :
And the world will be gladly excused, nor will reach a finger to help.
For why should this speculative dullard be a whirlpool to all around him?
For the man has missed his mark, and his fellows look no further.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Grand Struggle in Progress for Liberty—Torrens on the Profession of Arms—Great Britain without Army or Navy would Fall—We have been told before that the British Lion was in his Dotage—Crimean War and Sepoy Mutiny Proofs to the Contrary—Our Volunteers—Our Love for Athletic Sports—Advantages of Training, especially if called upon to meet Hardships—Our Army before the Mutiny little known to the Nations of India—Better Knowledge should be widely distributed—True Civilisation a thorough Appreciation of each other's Mental Powers—Generals carefully Estimate Intellectual Attainments of Antagonists—Foresight and Precaution the most Consummate Generalship.

Liberty's grand struggle.

It must surely be obvious to all contemplative minds that at the present time the whole world is making a grand struggle for liberty. Alas! for how many years past have we not observed the few bright sparks of the fire of independence *stamped* out of men, men indeed who love freedom even as we do? Or if perchance these sparks were not entirely extinguished, have they not been left to smoulder under heaps of cold-dead ashes, that cannot be resuscitated? But can those mountains of precious dust from the fuel of Liberty's fire be ever rekindled? Read the fate of the Poles, Hungarians, and Circassians, and reflect for a moment. Liberty

The Twins of Liberty.

seems to have given birth to *twins*. One is a sturdy fat creature, the other weak, emaciated. One an Oliver Twist, the other the obese 'Fat Boy.' One gets all he requires, the other calls loudly for *more*. One struggles manfully through trial and adversity, the other goes to sleep at the door of Liberty, and not having energy, his intellect is so obtuse that when roused he forgets his important mission, and requires a good 'pinch' to awake him still *further*. Let us hope that Garibaldi's feats

Fat Boys.

may yet rouse to effort the 'Fat Boys' who prefer inglorious ease under the slavish thraldom of tyrannical potentates. Let us not in England destroy the

Our watch-dog.

faithful watch-dog who awakes us from a lethargic sleep, when we know he does so only because he spies the thief. War comes like a thief in the night; and for the love we bear towards our good and gracious Sovereign, and in obedience to the promptings of honour and duty, let us encourage every man who tells us what perils to avoid and how to avoid them. The really staunch and religiously loyal soldier who stands sentry at the portals of Freedom, must stop and challenge both the man who attempts to force an entrance and him who seeking to out-wit us would stealthily creep into our tower of strength; to the sentinel it should make no difference whether the intruder be our greatest open enemy or the fraudulent servant of our

own Government. Within our noble Palace of Freedom the 'Regalia of Liberty is deposited,' consisting of incalculably costly gems, and he who wishes to enter must show his 'pass' or be met at the point of the bayonet. Men who voluntarily enter the lists to fight for Liberty and Freedom are indeed true soldiers. Where in the wide world can we find a nation so devoted to mercantile pursuits—which can yet produce hundreds of thousands of intelligent, well-educated men, to do the hard work of drills and parades? Where, else, can we find soldiers of the Line coming forward as ours do, cheerfully to undertake every hardship or privation, and only for honour's sake? Ours is indeed the 'Land of Liberty,' because men consider it no loss to sacrifice their lives sooner than suffer the honour of our nation to be tarnished. Our men feel proud to be counted amongst those who uphold the Banner of Freedom. Torrens says: 'Now, as the profession of arms is essentially an honourable one as opposed to the nature of ordinary callings which are followed for profit, so does it ensue that every means whereby the greater honour, credit, and personal distinction can be procured for the members of that profession should be by them carefully and perseveringly cultivated. The soldier in adopting arms, makes, as a member of the

Regalia of Liberty.

Our noble volunteers.

The profession of the soldier, by Torrens.

community, many sacrifices. He bids farewell to the liberty of free action; he segregates himself from society, to become one of a select and separate body, governed by a rigid system, peculiar to itself; he renounces in most instances, all chance of accumulating wealth, and accepts as an equivalent the modest livelihood of a gentleman supported by the proud sense of duty and cheered by the hope of distinction.' But for our splendid sailors and soldiers, militia and volunteers, what would become of all the enormous wealth of Great Britain? Are there not countless idle and needy vagabonds of many nations, not excluding our own, ready to rush in and plunder our churches, banks and treasuries, to seize upon the household valuables of our high-born nobles or of our wealthy merchants and gentlemen—if not held in check? We should cherish the army, and should shut our ears to those who would produce equivocal proofs to persuade us that constant and unwearied preparations for war are quite unnecessary. On the contrary, nothing should induce or tempt us to stand still while other nations are progressing in military science, while the clarions of war are sounding the alarm on all sides, while nations are making vast preparations, and parading huge armies amounting to *millions* of men. To do so would be utter insanity. Remember that a clever fellow may

Navy, army, militia, and volunteers.

Alertness necessary.

persuade a simple-minded man even to doubt his *own identity.* In one of the large cities of Scotland (say Edinburgh) there lived a professor of mathematics who was famous for being an honest simple-minded man; we will call him John MacClaughlan. Some of his friends, taking advantage of his habit of deciding all matters by logical deduction, determined to play him a trick. One of these disguised himself and called on the professor. The great mathematician asking his name, the visitor replied, 'John MacClaughlan.' '*Very odd,*' said the professor; but he went on: 'And what was your father's name?' 'Alick MacClaughlan,' said the stranger. 'Your name you say, sir, is John MacClaughlan and your father's name was Alick MacClaughlan; where do you reside?' 'Up at the White Mill,' said the visitor. The poor old professor put his hand up to his head and said, slowly and emphatically, 'Your name is John MacClaughlan, you say: and your father's name was Alick MacClaughlan: and you live up at the White Mill. What then is your *present* profession, sir?' 'I am the professor of mathematics *here,*' unhesitatingly replied the stranger. Another good thump on his head, and the bewildered professor said, 'Your name you say is John MacClaughlan,—am I right?' The stranger

Logical induction.

John MacClaughlan.

nodded assent. 'And your father's name was Alick MacClaughlan, eh?' 'All right,' said the visitor. 'And you live up at the White Mill?' 'Undoubtedly,' answered the stranger. 'And you are *really* and *truly* the professor of mathematics *here?*' 'Of course I am; can there be a doubt about it?' The amazed professor said, 'Why bless me, sir, you *must* be *me* then;' and as he said these words, (at railway speed) he stared at the unabashed stranger as much as to say, 'Am I *mad* or in a *dream?*' Just previous to the Crimean war idle prattlers taunted us by saying that 'The British soldiers had buried their martial ardour, and that our prestige had departed.' Were we not reminded of what the Prussians once said of us, viz. 'That the British Lion had grown old: that he was in his dotage: and that his teeth and claws must be drawn out'? During that time, however, the watchful eye of the Press was scanning the horizon of events. Through the long interval of peace our soldiers stood like brave veterans at a funeral, mute and with arms 'reversed;' the instant the order was given to 'load,' each man handled his cartridge, and terrific volleys like those of our Guards at Inkerman soon convinced the nation's enemies that, although we had buried our 'Hero Wellington,' his name, like his great soul, was immortal, and that the martial fire he had kindled

Denies his own identity.

British Lion grown old!

Mute attention.

was far from extinguished. The 'General Assembly' sounding over the length and breadth of our land was immediately answered by the whole country preparing for battle. The Russian might be a strong giant, but he was totally unable 'to hold the two sturdy boys—Europe and Asia—in his right hand and his left' as predicted by that sapient prophet the *Augsburg Gazette*. The General Assembly. Europe and Asia not Russian!

Notwithstanding that almost an entire army of Sepoys had mutinied, a few stout British hearts—few in comparison with the dense array of rebels—trusting in Providence, made our foes stand appalled before them. A dead calm precedes as often as it follows a storm. Let us be therefore ever prepared, and we may rest assured that Britons, when the day arrives, will prove themselves soldiers as of yore. Who can witness reviews of our volunteers without a feeling of pride? The brave old veteran of the line feels his heart beat high at the sight of educated gentlemen with their rifles in their hands doing the same duties as the gallant private soldier. A glance at the 20,000 men who composed the first parade of volunteers before the good Prince Albert, ought to have convinced other Powers that a 'nation of shopkeepers' could produce, as regards physique, the finest-looking soldiers in the world. It was not a desire for further conquests that called out The Sepoy Mutiny. Volunteers and their physique.

this splendid body from their civil avocations; it was prudence only, teaching us to place our nation in a position to *command* respect.

Bond of union.

These patriotic men are held together by a noble bond of union, which is so strong that the more the system is encouraged, the greater is the military ardour that permeates the whole of our enormous mercantile and agricultural community. The Author had the opportunity, when on furlough in 1871, of visiting the large gymnasium in Liverpool, and he was quite astonished to find how the general appearance of the youths had improved in comparison to what he recollected them in past years. Moreover so many fine young fellows are now to be seen carrying themselves as erect as soldiers—a great contrast this to the slouching gait of the lads of populous towns in former days. This love for athletic sports has already done wonders. It is quite delightful to see young men with finely developed chests and muscular arms performing really magnificent feats of strength, and priding themselves on a pastime so healthgiving, and so much more creditable than visiting night after night those seductive places of amusement that lead young men to ruin. After sitting for hours over a desk, must it not necessarily improve a man's health to have a few hours of vigorous exercise? One of the Indian

Liverpool Gymnasium.

Athletic sports.

Conducive to health.

papers had a good article (in April 1872) on the great advantages of the game of cricket. Cricket.
The writer said its great beauty was, that it was the means of inducing men to work hard without any further reward than the noble feeling of having vanquished, and that this desire to *excel* grew and gained ground till it became a moral duty; and this, among others, is one of the secrets of the success of the British as a race in colonisation. The gymnasium is a glorious institution, and we hope yet to see prizes offered yearly Prizes should be given.
for pre-eminence in athletic feats, as is now the case with rifle-shooting; training of this kind would produce a class of men who, in time of danger to the country would readily endure the utmost fatigue that might be demanded of them in any sudden emergency.

The Author at the siege of Lucknow found the Advantage of training.
great advantage of having trained himself since his arrival in India in 1842 in lifting weights and using clubs. For five months the duties called for more than ordinary physical exertion. Long hours without sleep, and the enemy only *forty yards off*,—this made a mortal feel that to do one's duty as a soldier, the body as well as the mind must be able to endure the strain. Under such circumstances, when food is scarce and ordinary comforts unprocurable, those suffer the most who

need the greatest nourishment; they drop in a day if their wants cannot be supplied, even at any cost.

Want of stamina.

The Author remembers in particular one officer who, at the commencement of the siege appeared an unusually powerful man. But that fine-looking fellow had no stamina; when privations came and comforts were unattainable, he drooped and died. Why? Probably from his privations, generally, and the loss of his usual quantity of sustaining food.

Persian anecdote.

The Persians tell a story of two men who were confined on suspicion for several days in the same chamber and deprived of all food. When the door was opened, one, a stout man, was dead, the other, weak-looking, was alive. When the king was amazed at this, a courtier said: 'There is nothing to cause wonder; the one who is dead always eat three meals a day,—the other eat very little, and was abstemious all his life.'

Parade of national power wise.

During a long experience of an Indian life spent in the army we have come to the conclusion that we tempted the Sepoys to oppose us by not parading our strength more, before the Mutiny. An Italian gentleman in those days said to us, 'I have been from Calcutta to the Punjab, and my constant cry was, Where is the Government? If I do not steal or commit murder no one asks any questions. But I should like to see more British soldiers. I

ask where they are, and I am told 50 or 100 miles off.' Now if this was a foreigner's opinion, what must the Sepoys have thought, who are all so fond of pomp and display? The Hill-men many years ago were more impressed by the Governor-General's fat old native butler parading his lordship's kitchen-kettle slung on a bamboo and carried by a *couple* of coolies than they were by his Excellency himself, when he made his appearance like a quiet unassuming English gentleman. To their eyes there was something very imposing in the strut of the well-dressed and portly butler; they probably thought that it was because the butler was an august personage that the kettle, instead of being confided to an urchin of eight years old, required two men to carry it. It would have a good effect to send now and then troops of well-dressed cavalry through villages not generally traversed in the usual line of march. The people of towns and villages off the main roads often never see European soldiers in large bodies. Many of the Sepoys, for instance, had never met a Highlander; but when they did, they admired their 'legs' immensely—and made uncommon good use of their *own* to get as far away as possible!

Where is the army?

The native butler and his kettle!

Cavalry through a village.

We remember, just before one of the battles in the Punjab Campaign, seeing the 9th Lancers

The Lancers.

pass a Sepoy regiment which was drawn up in line. This native corps never having been quartered in any cantonment with European Cavalry, were quite astonished by the Lancers, and cried out, 'Bravo! who *dare* face men like these? Against such men the Seiks have no hope.' No doubt 'Handsome is as handsome does,' but we care not if we create a smile when we say that the nobility of look and dauntless bearing of some of our dashing Irregular Cavalry officers, when passing through a crowded street, have often altered the supercilious and impudent stare of a huge Bazar Lothario into a glance of unmistakeable awe and respect, whilst in the same case a delicate-looking young ensign in his red-coat would perhaps have been *sneered* at. This was the case in the French army; the grand dress of the Paladin Murat, and his noble seat on horseback, quite fascinated his soldiers. So also the Bengal Irregular Cavalry created a wonderful sensation among the French in China—who had never before met these superb regiments of horse,—in the ranks of which are some of the most noble-looking British officers that could anywhere be seen, even in Great Britain. Could some of these corps be shown in Hyde Park the people of London would be equally astonished at their appearance and their feats with sword and lance, and at the same time incalcu-

Sepoys' remarks.

Dashing Irregular Cavalry officers.

Bengal cavalry officers.

A suggestion.

lable good would be done to the troopers themselves, who on their return to India would explain to the natives the power of Great Britain. Sir Jung Bahadur, the ruler of Nepaul, from his visit to Europe became a polished and enlightened man; he stood firmly with us during the Mutiny of 1857, and 20,000 of his troops did excellent service for us at that critical period. But anyone who has read 'Haji Baba's Visit to England' will have remarked the vast difference between European and Asiatic ideas. He says, 'The Prime Minister was a *dervish* in appearance, so mild, so kind, that we marvelled how the affairs of that great country could be directed by him.' Far different this to the Prime Ministers we have seen in some Native States; fellows who scowl at everyone, touch up their moustaches—which means in India defiance—treat all around them as if they were mere dirt, and, when addressed, reply as if people were not worth a moment's consideration. This is their *poor* idea of nobility of look! Yet we find this all over the world. Men really uneducated will act thus when in power. We must conclude therefore that wars can never cease till nations have reached such a state of civilisation as can only be attained by a true knowledge of each other's mental powers. Electricity, like the mind, was at our

Sir Jung Bahadur.

Haji Baba's remarks on our Prime Minister.

Prime Ministers of native states.

When wars will cease.

disposal, yet how long it remained unused for the telegraph!

Satisfaction of commanders at meeting inferior foes.

It is thus that the greatest minds,—as regards their power,—have sometimes remained dormant till an emergency brought out their usefulness, or an accident proved their innate worth. We feel quite confident that all victorious commanders enjoyed an inward satisfaction when they knew that they need not be uneasy at the intellectual attainments of their antagonists. What would not Napoleon have given had he only succeeded in making Wellington for a single moment forget that Bonaparte was before him? And doubtless on the retreat from Moscow he would have given all the wealth of Paris could he have induced Kutusoff to be similarly oblivious. It was that universal law, the law of extremes, that then came into operation. It was the terror and respect engendered by the recollection of Napoleon's former triumphs and victories that made Kutusoff harass that mighty conqueror so cautiously. With what care and circumspection he approached the jaded heroes of the Imperial Guard! Had the Russian commander hazarded all in one rush upon the tired Frenchmen, Bonaparte was just the man to have gained from the rash act the means of extricating his army. But the wily Kutusoff knew him right well; he saw his great

Examples in Wellington and Kutusoff.

Dread of Napoleon's name.

The wily Russian.

antagonist in a strong net, and would run no risk, lest the enemy might break out of it. He did with men what the Prussians did so cautiously at Sedan with cannon. Such was his respect for the heroic courage of the French, even when in a hopeless state, that he countermanded an attack simply because he heard that the troops in a certain village 'wore high bear-skin caps;' he knew well that 'the Old Guard never surrenders' and dared not attack such desperate enemies. Napoleon was in fact vanquished by his own great name making his enemies magnify his power when that power had almost departed, and at a period when his great mind, by a last desperate effort, might have turned his misfortunes to his advantage had his enemy only considered him a poor prostrate and fallen foe instead of cautiously and wisely regarding him as the victor of Marengo. Here extremes met; fear of the great caused respect, and the latter brought caution and prudence into operation. Had the Russians been elated at the distress of the French army, too much courage might have caused rashness and defeat. Victory is a fond nurse that often kills her darlings by too much favouritism and kindness. Kutusoff knew Napoleon to be a man of gigantic mind, with endless resources and expedients ever at his disposal, and he felt that it

How Napoleon was *really* vanquished.

would be a great risk to have despised such a foe so long as he had a company of grenadiers left. The commander who won a battle with a mere body-guard of 100 horsemen was not to be trifled with, or to be too much provoked. The 'king of the forest' must not be goaded to fury, or perchance he may dash at, and burst the bars of his cage; the Russian general had a long head, and study had told him 'that the fortune of war might take away what the fortune of war had given.' Here we find the consummate general who takes every reasonable precaution; here was a grand temptation, which a less wise commander, or one less acquainted with the knowledge of *men*, might have been unable to resist. Our soldiers should study the incidents of the Russian retreat *on* Moscow, and the final retreat of the French *from* that city, so that we may never give our foes the opportunity of acting on this *cut-us-off* principle. The Prussians well knew that in former wars the French trusted to rapidity of movement. How often had they not 'whipped round' the Austrians? Now, common sense told them that they must invent some plan to keep such impetuous foes at a *distance*; if they could only do *that* they *must* defeat them. The Prussians gained their end most effectually by their cannon, just as they punished the magnificent Austrian infantry

Kutusoff's great prudence.

Consummate generalship.

A grand temptation.

Prussian foresight.

at Sadowa with the needle-gun, and drove them off the field. But because the Austrians and the French only suffered we must not flatter ourselves that *we* ourselves were not quite as much 'taken in' as the former at Sadowa, or the latter at Sedan. It is indeed incumbent on us to remember these sad events and carefully to keep ourselves ever up to the mark as regards ARTILLERY.

We were 'taken in' as well as others.

CHAPTER XV.

How Times are changed—Warfare Now and in Times Past—Science of Defence becoming superior to that of Attack—Further Arguments for Powerful Artillery—Probable Value of Cavalry in the Future: their Horses should be taken to be harnessed to Guns—The sole Object of the Author's Remarks to save the Nation from Disgrace—The actual Horrors of War again enumerated—Imagine an Enemy in London!—How such Times of Trial are the true Test of Men—Our Course is clearly to progress in Knowledge, taking advantage also of every Improvement in Weapons—Wars must at length cease when all Nations become equal in military power.

Times are changed.

THE time has long passed away since the days when a single gigantic warrior, clad in armour, could, with his powerful right arm and ponderous battle-axe, turn a victory into a defeat. At the present day a ploughboy with a pocket pistol, could shoot down a Goliath or a Saladin from behind a hedge. In 1861 we said, 'So, when military science further progresses, it will be found as necessary to set aside our Armstrong guns and Enfield rifles, as it was for our ancestors gradually to exchange the bow and arrow for the musket and cannon.' James, in his history of Cœur-de-Lion, says, 'Whoever has given the slightest attention to the history of the human mind must have re-

What was expected in 1861.

How the mind changes, by James.

marked that at certain points it changes the path which it has previously been pursuing, assumes a new course, suited to the circumstances that for the time surround it, labours therein, until, operating upon everything within its sphere, it has produced a complete alteration in all around it.' Now, this is what far-seeing and observing men are on the look-out for; if it be proved that iron ships can resist shot for even five minutes, *pro tem.* they must be better than those of wood. King Richard might have done very well opposed to the arrows of Saladin's hosts. Yet what could such a warrior accomplish now? The formations made at Waterloo are dangerous, yea, useless in these days. 'Old things have passed away, behold all things are become new,' and yet, (extreme?) 'There is *nothing* new under the sun.' If our enemy's guns carry a quarter of a mile further than ours we are not safe, for even fifty yards is of deep importance in gaining cover for your infantry. Now that all are on the alert we shall soon be equal again. Bows and arrows were opposed to bows and arrows, and huge guns will now meet huge guns. The *Times* (in an article on French iron-cased ships and Armstrong guns, September 15, 1869) said, 'The science of defence will have become superior to the science of attack; and when that comes to pass, war will have been shorn, not only of many

Far-seeing men.

Old things passed away.

The *Times* on the science of defence.

of its horrors, but of many of the prospects for the sake of which it is undertaken.'

Change in cannon.

It will be observed that with the introduction of ironclads we have reduced the number and increased the weight of our naval guns; as gunnery then is in reality our '*science of defence*,'—as we depend upon it, whether equal or more powerful, to protect our infantry and injure that of the enemy, we must increase both the number and range of our cannon for field service. An ironclad resists shot, if only for a time; and when hard pressed can retire out of range, having suffered perhaps but little damage. But every shot, into a mass of flesh and blood, causes fearful loss of life, and it will make no difference whether you advance or retire, the more powerful artillery will cut down your soldiers still. The French felt this at Sedan. It is no absurdity to say that we should bring into use every man and every horse rather than be overwhelmed at any future time by superior numbers, or more powerful guns. It will be seen in the next war—perhaps not far distant—that artillery will be so powerful, and so largely employed, that the loss of life will be far more than we have ever heard of since the introduction of powder. When men in former ages, with equal weapons and courage also on a par, fell upon each other with swords,

Powerful artillery.

What we may yet expect from artillery.

the carnage was tremendous before a victory was purchased by either side. So will it be again when both armies have the same cannon, the same style of rifle, the same qualities in the other weapons they employ to throw projectiles. Surely common sense, backed by all History, tells us that this is *true?*

When armies are equal.

When arrows were used the shield was of service, but bullets rendered both shields and armour useless. So cavalry are compelled by the present long-range guns to keep at distances too great to allow of their falling suddenly upon infantry; besides which, the latter possess rifles that may be fired with such rapidity that it is no longer necessary to fix bayonets to receive a charge of horse. It is not at all absurd to suppose that cavalry nowadays will be destroyed if they are hurled at guns or at infantry. In former days, when cavalry worked wonders by their speed, it was a most important arm; but they can no longer act as before. Remember how that glorious body of men—the splendid Austrian cavalry—went down before the Prussian infantry at Sadowa. But a battery or two of heavy guns would have obliged the Prussians to pursue with less haste, and might have prevented the awful bloodshed in the cavalry. It will be well to consider whether a very large proportion of the cavalry should not, at once, be trained for the

Cavalry kept off now.

Cavalry will be destroyed by infantry or artillery.

Heavy guns requisite.

Suggestions.

artillery; and also whether, on the battle-field, every available horse should not be used to drag up the heaviest cannon to the points of importance.

We deny that heavy guns cannot be used in the field.

We utterly deny that it is impossible to use as heavy guns in the field as on our iron-clads; that fallacy will be disproved ere long by time. That it may be expensive is another matter, but we would rather have one gun which could dominate the field, than whole batteries unable to stand ten minutes before such a cannon in the enemy's hands. We would rather use the horses of a whole cavalry regiment in drawing up huge guns, than send our splendid horses and men to be shot down at five miles' distance from the enemy. We disagree *in toto* with Col. Sir G. Wolseley when he says that a cavalry soldier should possess an idea that he is more than a match for an infantryman or that three guns is a proper proportion to 1,000 men. We know that some of our best cavalry officers have a full impression that their arm would have no chance against the breech-loading rifle. An officer who is now in the Native Irregular Cavalry, and who came from a distinguished Dragoon regiment, told us, that, with all his pride in his own noble branch of the service, he thought, for the reasons above specified, it had lost much of its power in battle in the present day. Might we not have a

We disagree with Col. Sir G. Wolseley on cavalry.

Impression in the Irregular Cavalry.

glorious artillery if we used for this purpose a large portion of our cavalry horses and men? What we want now is light cavalry; cuirassiers could no longer do us any harm, for all our light horse would be well protected by artillery, and the distances to be got over now would render the heavy cavalry almost useless. The tremendous charges of Jena and Leipsic will never take place again; they are simply impossible. It is our duty to save the soldier's life, and we give this as our unbiassed opinion and one which, if not yet admitted, must in time come to be believed. The Author was considered 'half daft' when, a *year* before the Prussian and French war, he predicted that in the very next great actions we should find an army overwhelmed by terrific artillery fire. Was not that the truth? Oh! that the French had but taken the *same* view—what misery and humiliation that grand and heroic nation would have avoided!

Glorious artillery possible.

Cavalry charges impossible.

Considered 'Half daft!'

We claim not to possess prophetic power, but we do claim to have read history for a *purpose*, and to have waded for long years through ponderous volumes as a mere matter of duty and as a grateful servant of Government. In History we have traced the ramifications of the human mind, even as a plodding medical man delights to trace the beautiful arrangements of the nerves in the human

No claim to prophetic power.

The human mind studied.

Cavillers disregarded.

body. There can be no arrogance in boldly asserting that which we can see by analogy as clear as we see the glorious light of the sun. We have had too many 'snubs' in our chequered life to fear the voice of cavillers; we care not if we are pronounced even to have a 'slate off'—if, by such a sacrifice of our mental position amongst men we shall have said one word that may tend to animate our nation to secure ourselves from humiliation. We can afford to let people laugh at our 'presumption,' as it may be called, if we can avert disgrace and misery from falling on Great Britain. We have seen what comes from being unprepared. The Mutiny of 1857 should remind us what calamities may arise at such dreadful times. We have learnt by experience—sad experience, purchased by the loss of the very lives of those dearest to us—that all the money in the world is valueless—a mere bagatelle—in comparison with the precious fruits of peace and order. To ensure that order and that peace we care not if we raise a hornet's nest of critics about us. We have tried to perform what we believe to be a duty, and no man can perform his duty, who is daunted by the fear of the ill-will or ridicule of his comrades from doing that which he considers right, and believes from his very soul to be true, and just, and wise. We have seen that in times of danger the oldest men are not always those who

We wish to avoid disgrace to our nation.

Sad experience.

A duty we owe to our country.

Oldest not the wisest always.

can be best relied upon, and we have been informed, on the most indisputable authority, of acts so rash, so imprudent, that we wondered whether those who were guilty of them had ever read, in all their long service, a single book on military tactics, or had attempted even to study their fellow-creature—man. Fortunate it is that at such times men so incompetent are set aside, and that thus the power to create confusion is placed beyond their reach. There are people who can dash off pages of sarcasm: who can write and speak glibly on the most important matters: yet their opinions are really worthless. In this little work we disclaim all desire to dictate or be in the least arrogant. We commenced a case and have produced our witnesses to prove it; it is for loyal, impartial, sound-minded, reasonable and patriotic men to be our judges, and to say whether the witnesses from history and from science are considered *unimpeachable* or otherwise. Had we never been in a campaign —had we not served through a protracted siege of five months, it is probable that, like many others, we should have given no thought to this momentous matter. But we *know* the *curse* of war; having tasted its cup of bitterness we understand what it really means. Those who have been nourished in the lap of luxury, may be excused if they cast such an uninteresting study aside, but

Sarcastic men.

We only try to prove a case.

What made us take up the case.

Curse of war.

it behoves the hired servants of the State to remember that their duty to their Sovereign calls upon them to publish all they know that may tend to uphold the honour of our Queen and Nation.

Sudden astonishment at a crisis.

If the reader could but have seen the looks and could realise the astonishment of men who, from a state of comfort and peace suddenly found themselves surrounded by hundreds of thousands of enemies, he would pardon the imperfections of this little warning work. At such times a man is seen as he really *is*—the rough bold outlines of his character are developed, or the opposite traits. It is in times of scarcity, when some men would almost grudge their comrades the scrap they are devouring as their scanty rations, that we find out the generosity, magnanimity, and patience of our neighbour man. The dainties of your table disappear; the comforts of your cities are gone; your luxuries are no more; the shells rattle against the walls of your rooms; your comrades are blown to atoms; delicate women and poor emaciated children are exposed to extreme peril and hardship. Oh, good 'men of England who live at home at ease' if you wish to keep the demon War from your doors, if you do not want him to be glutted with the blood of your precious ones, hold him in check, as you would, pistol in hand, stand at your door to keep a robber at bay.

Man is seen as he really *is*.

Hardships arrive.

Perils.

How to meet the demon War.

We are not 'word-painting;' we honestly tell you what we ourselves have *seen*: when war breaks out it would be too late to speak. The Author has before his eyes a scene such as this. A room full of poor delicate ladies: little children sitting on the floor, which is strewed with broken biscuit, cups and plates: the Venetian blinds closed: the building resounding with the crash of round shot and shell: the infants crying, the elder children amazed and wondering what is going on: a girl of seventeen has had both legs severed by round-shot: a beautiful intelligent little maiden has been seized with cholera, and the distracted mother is at her wits' ends to know what to do: anxious wives are asking if their husbands had survived that fearful day, and imploring to know the worst—these, dear reader, are a few of the sad recollections of a soldier who paid a hasty visit to his wife and children (during a short cessation of fire at his outpost) on one of the first days of the siege of Lucknow. As long as he lives, those horrid, those painful sights can never be obliterated from his mind, and even now they haunt him in his dreams.

No mere 'word-painting' but truth.

Sad, sad recollections.

Never to be forgotten.

And yet with the enemy in London this is what you might expect, or worse, for in addition scientific men would direct the aim of their guns, and you would be surrounded by a belt of fire, your fine furniture and pictures would be destroyed, food

The enemy in London.

Ruffians let loose to plunder.

would be scarce, perhaps the ruffians of the city, taking advantage of the confusion, would break into and plunder your houses. All the money you can spare should be given to secure us from such miseries and misfortunes. You have only to ask the people of Paris what they suffered, to shudder yourselves at such a prospect; every penny that can be spared would be well spent to secure us from such miseries and misfortunes. At such a time the conventional forms of politeness disappear, the ball-room attentions offered to the fair sex, the coquetting with dainties to hand to ladies—these vanish, or are retained only by the most refined and unselfish members of society. Man as a rule is selfish, and it is when distress and peril, war and privations arrive, that we see who are the really noble and generous in heart. The tinsel and the hollowness of society is then revealed. We see in reality then who of the fair sex are resigned, devoted, and true; who among men are brave, magnanimous, and noble. Society demands as much and even more than it gives, whilst self-abnegation, unselfishness, and generosity come, all of them, from other, higher, and nobler motives. In times of misery, man is a painful spectacle; but the effect of moral uprightness[1] is as clearly visible

All the forms of society depart.

The true and good.

Man is a spectacle in times of misery.

[1] Sir Henry Lawrence is a brilliant example of magnanimity and self-abnegation.

then as the changes produced in the worldly-minded by altered circumstances. In the ball-room, what self-abnegation is there in trotting about with a chair, in turning over the music, or waiting till the ladies are helped to supper, with the prospect a few minutes afterwards of a right good 'feed'? But alter the case—crowd those ladies into a room, and shell it for even a few hours; give each man only one pound of wheat in grain, which he has to get ground as he best can, and made into cakes as he best may; let the gnawing of hunger be fully realised with the awaking from disturbed dreams of banquets to find nothing to eat—and we can assure you on our word of honor that then you would be perfectly astonished to find there was so much selfishness in the world. 'Self' is uppermost in many hearts. Yet at such times we have seen the humble uneducated soldier share his last 'pipe-full' of tobacco with his trusty comrade, and learnt, in other ways the generosity and nobleness of these poor fellows. We understood then what the words to 'Love your neighbour as yourself' really meant. If you want therefore to find heart go amongst the poor—go to the ploughman's cottage, and there one kind word that will not take a half-penny out of your pocket will secure to you one of God Almighty's large hearts. They will be devoted to you—these

Self-abnegation in the ball-room!

The case a *little* altered and *then*?

Love of self.

Generosity of private soldiers.

people who live on the humblest fare. These poor soldiers, these humble ploughmen do far more, as a rule, than those who have the bountiful gifts of heaven lavished on them. The Author learnt this during the siege of Lucknow when at times there was almost no hope. This little tribute of gratitude is offered to the gallant soldiers whom the Author commanded at his outpost,—men of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, a splendid corps that with only 600 men bravely stood up to meet about 100,000 rebels surrounding the Residency position. We shared the same perils together, and lived in the same room. Never was such devotion seen, never can we forget what those men did; having watched them day and night we have found out the stuff of which their hearts are made. We shall never cease to take an interest in the noble private soldier whose innate worth is not thoroughly known: and who is generally judged by the imprudent acts of his comrades, arising—not from innate badness—but from idleness and excess in times of peace. There are no men who are so obedient in times of danger, no mortals who think less of their own personal comforts, and certainly none who will more cheerfully lay down their lives for the honor of their beloved Sovereign. We have seen men, enfeebled by sickness, scorn to go into

Experience at Lucknow.

The noble 32nd Regiment.

The private soldier's character.

Devotion to Her Majesty.

Hospital; men who had to sit half the time, from sheer weakness, yet when told to go away replied, 'It will only make the work fall *harder* on *other* men, sir.' There was perhaps no Chesterfieldian politeness in this—but it was devotion and a pure high-minded sense of *duty*.

Precious water!

When water can only be drawn from a well by creeping on the hands and knees through the darkness of the night, under the fire of shell and round shot, that water is more precious than the 'Koh-i-Noor' diamond; yet, the man who runs the risk of his life to get it, will share it with his thirsty comrades without a grudge. See the opposite side of the picture:—say here, at Ascot races is a party of wealthy folks eating and drinking and making merry; a number of little hungry urchins beg for a few scraps, and are driven off by the 'liveried' servants. Which of these is the type of self-abnegation? Who would not rather respect the donor of the cup of water, and despise the others? Men are spoilt by the luxuries of large cities; there is too much of the 'pay for yourself and think of no one else' system in wealthy towns, whereas in the country there is a kind feeling towards our neighbour. Remark also the people you meet on board a ship; has no one seen selfishness on a long voyage? Again, have you never seen a man dispose

The other side of the picture.

Selfishness in cities.

Example.

of half a dozen oranges and refuse to give a bit of one to some importunate child who asked for it? Have you never seen two or three well-fed men conversing about money matters, boasting of profits, talking largely of their prospects and their plans, and yet denying a single copper to a poor woman who, by her looks, is evidently starving. These of course are but exceptions, for, thank God, the noble-minded and the generous may be counted by millions in this world—were it otherwise, what a world it would be! He who sees his poor neighbour part cheerfully with his last penny, and then complains when he himself has to pay a few shillings for an honest tax, cannot have much generosity in his disposition. Turn the tables and bestow the rich man's money on the poor; should we not get more cheerful taxpayers? We are too prone to forget that money is only a blessing to us so long as we can do good with it, and that God loves the cheerful giver in all things. If an enemy held possession of London for a month, we imagine that those men who grumble at taxation would gladly pay for food in one day what their taxes would hardly amount to in a year. We have known ten pounds offered for a single fowl, and refused; and, after all, what is gold without food?

Who is generous of these?

Use of money.

A certain man was found dead in the desert

Valueless pearls.

with a bag of pearls attached to his waist; on the sand he had written with his finger, 'To the hungry man a boiled turnip is as good as a broiled fowl.' The 'pearls' then had not been of much use to him. During the Mutiny soldiers were known to have given several pearls, of value too, for a glass of rum! We ourselves remember that a very small bottle of honey was sold for four pounds, to be used for a sick child. But we have known men eat puddings, made of precious eggs and milk, while our own infant actually died for want of nourishment. Have not we who have experienced such things a right to be almost 'Timons'? Are we not bound to raise the warning cry and to implore all sensible and loyal men to be on the alert? Surround yourself with a powerful army and spare no money for artillery, and you will never see Great Britain conquered; if invaded it could never be held. War, horrid war, comes stealthily, and oh, its miseries require a far abler pen than ours to describe or to give the faintest idea of the misfortunes and the agonies of mind that it produces. We can only show the 'handful that is the *sample* of the cart-load.' What would you think, reader, did things come to such a pass that you could not get a coffin for a dead wife? Yet we have seen that, and have reason to remember it. These are

Costly comforts.

A stern fact.

Arm yourselves at once

Hard times.

important facts that thinking mortals should remember; though, doubtless, it is not so pleasant to study such matters as it is to peruse a novel. Read of the horrors of the siege of Jerusalem, and know that those incidents are mere types of the miseries that have been endured by suffering humanity in later days. If then you can realise all that we so earnestly, and with all our heart, wish to impress on your minds, will you not, as loyal and brave men, band together, and support the Government when money is wanted for the army? When national and patriotic demands are made on our purses, more men are needed of the Peabody type. As for us soldiers, most of us have no large sums of money in the banks. Thousands have not even a house or an inch of land we can call our own,—our interests bear no comparison to those who possess enormous wealth in money and in property: yet we soldiers are as fond of our homes and the safety of our beloved ones as any *millionaire* in the nation, and we soldiers pride ourselves no less on our loyalty than you real patriots.

Horrors of later days.

The Peabody class wanted.

Soldiers have no possessions as a rule.

We will add little more on this subject as we feel sure we shall have the support of all loyal and good men. We must only beg that the faults in this work may be viewed with a considerate and generous eye; for

Reliance in loyal men.

we possess no literary attainments and no merit beyond the *practical experience* of thirty years. If our well-intentioned efforts are somewhat disparaged on account of our want of eloquence, remember it is only the production of a soldier who, during long years of exile, has endeavoured to search for truth. Eloquence, recollect, is not always truth, and surely there must be some truth in the pages of history? Our greatest trouble in preparing this work has been to arrange our evidence under certain heads so that we could pick out our 'witness' and hand him into court in proof of the *exact* part of the case at issue; such witnesses do not 'forget' and are *unbiassed*, which is highly important. But in drawing up our case for the judges' decision we have had to curtail the evidence immensely, so as to avoid being tedious, and we have excluded enough to have filled volumes. Fortunately, these notes, collected with considerable labour and care, will still be useful to us. They are too precious to put aside, and will supply much food for future meditations and study. The advice of Sady the Persian poet (of whose 'Goolistan' we have made an entire analysis) has been followed in preparing this work. Sady says, 'The discourses of Sady are mixed with pleasantry, on which account the short-sighted may extend the

Appeal for the consideration of the reader.

The trouble of arrangement.

Unbiassed witnesses.

Notes excluded.

Sady's advice taken.

tongue of reproach: saying, it is not the part of a wise man to waste the brain in vain pursuits, and to endure the smoke of the lamp without any advantage; however, the enlightened minds of the intelligent, who comprehend the *tendency* of our discourse, are sensible that the pearls of salutary advice (i.e., from history), and the better medicine of admonition,[1] are both mixed with the honey of pleasantry simply in order that the reader might not in disgust refuse his acceptance.' The messenger performs his duty by delivering his message.

The 'turn-out' bugle.

We have sounded the 'Turn out;' it is no fault of ours if the men are late for the PARADE.

Nations becoming equal.

As intelligence progresses, each nation will gradually approach its superior in military power, till every army—in Europe at least—is equal in military science. When one Power is unable to take forts or sink its enemy's ships must not war necessarily cease—unless indeed we exterminate each other? Now where commanders study history to elicit the real causes of victories and defeats they will find that battles have been won by the superior intelligence and abilities of the leaders, and not always by *numerical* superiority. As all nations were created by the same Omnipotent Being, we are justified in believing that when

Victories gained by ability.

[1] From history; also as regards *us*, of course.

men become equal, as regards invention of machines of war or weapons of defence, they will also become equal as regards military tactics. Meanwhile, let us throw aside all that is inapplicable to present circumstances, although based on the highest antiquated authorities. 'Progress in knowledge is often paradoxically indicated by a *diminution* in the apparent bulk of what we *know*.'

Progress in knowledge.

When the nations become equal in the science of war, wise men of these Powers will not be slow to mark progress, and to be on a par with others as regards the knowledge of the various weapons of defence. The Prussians threw aside all antiquated ideas—ideas that were inapplicable to the wants of the period—and hence their success. But such was our love for '*old things*,' such our reliance in the weapons of the past, that not till 'Sadowa' did we improve our rifles; and we remained in the same state as regards our ideas of artillery till Sedan, coming upon us like a thunderbolt, made it clearly evident that heavy cannon overwhelmed the French. It was by throwing aside obsolete rubbish, by the 'diminution of what we know,' &c., as already quoted, that the far-seeing, practical Germans led the way and twice anticipated their enemies, actually hood-winking tens of thousands of sensible men who never, however, seemed to give such grave subjects a thought. Doubtless

Prussians wise.

We were hoodwinked!

many of our great military authorities, our able commanders and our superior generals, may have remarked what was passing, and, for all we know to the contrary, may have remonstrated a thousand times. The fact remains, that the 'Nation' at large did not take the matter up, fully satisfied that extraordinary events were imminent from the entire change and improvements in the implements of war. We blame our Nation therefore, as a *body* of intelligent, far-seeing, scientific and practical men for not ventilating this subject, and for not urging a thorough and searching inquiry into the real reasons why the Danes were so easily conquered. The weapon used against them was that used afterwards against the Austrians at Sadowa with such tremendous effect. How was it that our nation was not aware till the latter date of the great improvement gained—not so much in the needle-gun itself, as by the breech-loading process? It was by a careful forecast of future requirements in battle that the Prussians went ahead as they did. Well it was for Prussia that she had three such wise men at the head of affairs.

The nation blamed.

The Prussians take the lead.

It is only out of the mass of generally acknowledged truths that we detect falsehoods. Experience and the study of men alone must be our guide. His judgment is clearly the best who constantly keeps his previous knowledge before his

Falsehood, how detected.

mind's eye: who, out of the wealth of his intellectual store perpetually tests falsehood by truth: who from time to time throws off an accumulation of obsolete absurdities, absurd notwithstanding their antiquity, to replace them by indisputable ideas based in common sense. Our past studies must be firmly impressed on our memory to be of use at a moment. How would the physician prosper who had not his knowledge of medicine stored accurately in his mind ready for instant use? His drugs and remedies are his weapons of defence against the maladies by which mortal man is attacked. So, if a general has no knowledge of past history, he must fail from ignorance. Plato says, 'Those studies which in their youth they have pursued promiscuously must be brought before them at one view, that they may see the *connection* of the *whole* with each part, and with the nature of real being.' This is what we desire to impress on young officers.

Test of falsehood.

Medical weapons of defence.

On the field of battle, where a man carries his library in his head, all the books in the world would be useless; yet one man may not make good use of his reading, and this is no more wonderful than that two medical men differ in the treatment of a disease. It must depend upon their talent to detect what the nature of the disease *is*, and what its treatment should be. Some readers may

Talent to understand our reading.

turn out bad commanders, just as some medical men gain little confidence; but, as a rule, those who study their profession are the least likely to make absurd blunders. Without attaining actual perfection, we may yet have good medical men, and good commanders also. If both sides adopt the same precautions, war must necessarily cease. Both will play the same game, and be on equal terms. The Briton was once a savage, so a savage may some day be equally as civilised as the Briton. Formerly, tens of thousands died of diseases for which no cure was known, but as medical science advanced the strength of the enemy was discovered, and the best method of procedure against him. Then he was opposed by weapons that checked his advance, and attack and defence were put on a more equal footing. So will it be as regards war. War then is a malady which is to be cured like many the physician deals with—by *mind*. If rifled guns carry miles it may be found prudent to fight with smaller armies. The smaller nations then, may yet be a match for the greatest, in the same way as in our navy four huge guns do now instead of 120 small ones. In other words, as science progresses it will be no more wonderful for the meanest nations to command respect and assist in upholding the general peace of the world, than it is to see huge

Progress in medical science.

War a malady.

Guns changed.

railway vans raised by the mere pressure of the handle of a powerful machine. Towards this all is tending. As 'the body has many members, but all have not the same office' so nations are all members of the body of humanity, working their own ways, doing the particular work that God has required of them. One is the 'head' and another the 'legs;' both acting apart for a certain period to be brought finally together. The gradual improvement in fire-arms is acting in this direction; each ruler will learn to cultivate friendship and peace, and those who rebel will be overpowered, or forced to submit. There is evidence of this in the 'balance of power—' a principle which is still in its youth, or, perhaps, approaching its manhood; it will arrive at its full maturity when civilisation has reached that point where mankind acknowledges that war and peace, although extremes, have met, and that discordant notes aptly arranged produce harmony. How can we think otherwise when we find that the engines of war are now becoming so terrific that their very power to destroy life is an indication that they are ultimately intended to *preserve* it? The fact is evident that man was made a free agent so that he might work out his own destiny. What is seen in a school is but the type of what is done in the world; a lot of boys fight away till they find that it is better to live

The body and the members.

Improvement in arms.

War and peace end in harmony.

Engines of war.

The school of the world.

in peace. The human family has been brought into collision, as nations, at different ages or periods; and generations were required to make such a huge school fully aware of the advantages of peace. As moral training brings boys to their senses, so will the intellectual portion of humanity, which rapid civilisation is now making so formidable, come forward to insist upon peace being upheld. As time draws on, science—or intellect developed—will give the preponderance to the thinkers of society; invention will make up for superiority of numbers, and thus the opposition of the ruder members who delight in war and violence will be checked. Truth may be compared to a permanent perfume. Fresh from the scent-shop it is of course more perceptible to our senses than after long exposure to the air; but like the soul of man it retains its innate worth long after the body has evaporated, or disappeared from our gaze. The action of an atmosphere of falsehood may partly deprive truth of its most powerful influences, still it remains immortal, and can never be quite annihilated. It may be, and often is, hidden like the sun, only to burst forth with redoubled splendour. 'Steady progress' is the very opposite of 'go-a-head' haste. The first is based on a previous calm and dispassionate investigation of all new theories or inventions ere we adopt them in room

Peace enforced.

Invention powerful.

Truth like a perfume.

'Steady progress' *versus* 'go ahead'

of antiquated systems. On the other hand, the latter may tempt its votaries to adopt all novel ideas and schemes too hurriedly, and without mature thought or deliberation. It consequently breaks down. Truth is to be found by watchful care and by using our powers of judging by analogy. It is the precious metal mixed up with dross, and to see it in its beauty the latter must be melted down. The time draws on when there will be the 'drawn battle between barbarism and civilisation:' the two gladiators well matched, will shake hands and retire for ever from the 'Arena of War;' then will be fulfilled those words 'when men shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.' A millennium of peace will then ensue such as we are taught in our Bibles to believe.

The end of war the *millennium.*

Based on our Bible.

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